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PREFACE
How about doing the right thing?
Doing the right thing is just that: doing the right thing. It is what I am trying to 
do while writing this sentence. It is what you, my reader, probably are trying 
to do right now: figuring out what this book might mean for you. It is what art-
ists do when they make art, mothers and fathers when raising their children, 
politicians doing politics, managers managing, teachers teaching, plumbers 
plumbing . . . who doesn’t? 
Yet wanting to do the right thing is something different from knowing the 
right thing to do, and that in turn is something other than actually doing the 
right thing. Is it right to ask a great deal of  money for a painting when you 
yourself  doubt the quality? Should you charge more for seats in your theatre 
even when that scares away people with little money? Is charging 1000 euro 
for a lecture to a local group the right thing to do? How about paying your 
kids for household chores? How about selling the company to the highest bid-
der? And why do we talk and think so much about monetary issues?  What is 
the right thing to do? 
Even though I am an economist, I too wonder why people are so quick 
to focus on monetary issues. It is my profession to do so, you might note. But 
after many years of  struggling with such issues I have gained the insight that 
the right thing to do for me as an economist is to push the questioning, to 
ask myself  and you: why are we doing what we are doing? The purpose is to 
move our conversation beyond the monetary. Why am I writing, and why are 
you reading? Why are you engaged in the arts, or in anything for that mat-
ter? What purpose does it serve? What is so important to you? This gets us 
thinking and talking about our values. And that is where I want to take our 
conversation. To get us to think and talk about our values, about what is really 
important to us, about how values work and how we can work with them. 
It is only midcourse in the writing of  this book that I got to write this 
beginning.  At first I was still stuck in the usual academic mode of  distancing 
myself  from the here and now, to invite you to a lofty position where we can 
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oversee the follies and fortunes of  those toiling away in the worlds of  arts and 
culture. I shared with my wife what I was thinking and told her that I actually 
wanted to understand what it is to be doing the right thing. We were still in 
bed and she was eager to return to her morning slumber. “Why not call your 
book Doing The Right Thing,” she murmured and turned around. I got up and 
realized I had my topic and my title. 
For the sake of  a good life, a good society and – what the heck – for 
a strong and inspiring civilization. 
It is only fair to direct the same questioning to this project. What for? What is 
so important here?  
This is what I figured out. I am doing this because I strive for a good life 
and as part of  that I want to contribute to a good society. And if  you were to 
really push me, I would say that I am fending for the survival and vitality of  
the civilization that you and I are enjoying. As for civilization, I fear that the 
barbarians are at the gate, in the form of  movements that want to do away 
with Western civilization and its values; and, more importantly, I fear they are 
already entered in the form of  forces that disparage and dismiss the impor-
tance of  the manifestations of  our civilization. I sense these forces within 
the university, for example, where economists dismiss their own history and 
are proudly ignorant of  the philosophical underpinnings of  their discipline. 
I sense these forces in the hardening mentality, in the waning compassion, 
in the loss of  direction in spiritual and cultural life. I sense them also in the 
turning away or sneering at the sources that have formed our civilization. As 
I am involved primarily in the worlds of  the arts, the sciences and, to a lesser 
extent, religion, I want to contribute especially to doing the right things in 
those worlds. I do so by engaging in all kinds of  situations, as you will notice, 
because I make plentiful use of  the insights that I have gained from these 
worlds. 
My hope is that the ideas and insights in this book stimulate scholars and 
practitioners of  economic theories to think about what it means to do the 
right thing, as they have done for me. The idea is to get you and me thinking 
about the values that we want to realize, and what goods of  value we have to 
offer to others, so that they can realize their own values. Writing the book is 
clearly valuable for me—otherwise I would not bother. But will it enable you, 
as the reader, to realize something of  value for you? To explore this question, 
I have first applied the book in my teaching and shared it with professionals in 
special seminars. It appears that the answer is yes. It pleases me when bache-
lor and especially master students make use of  the framework presented in the 
book. Influencing scholarly work is another important objective of  the book. 
While perhaps it is wishful thinking on my part, I would be truly satisfied 
if  the value based approach that I develop here contributes to the develop-
ment of  another economics, and with that to another economy.  
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What follows is intended to be an alternative for the instrumental-
ist reasoning that currently prevails. 
In other courses my students mainly learn “instrumentalist reasoning.” That 
is, they learn about the instruments that presumably are geared towards some 
kind of  policy goals like the increase in economic growth, lower inflation, 
lower unemployment, lower debts, greater efficiency, minimization of  costs or 
the maximization of  profit. The focus in the teaching is on the quantification 
of  desired outcomes. Perhaps as a consequence, too many students see their 
study merely as an instrument for additional income and a good career.
Instrumentalism, or the prevalence of  instrumental reasoning, is one of  
the three malaises of  modern life that the Canadian philosopher, Charles 
Taylor, identifies (Taylor, 1991). He associates it with an eclipse of  ends, or 
the difficulty that professionals and politicians nowadays have in answering 
the question “what is what you are doing good for?” I concur. Answers like 
“more economic growth,” “more profit,” or “more personal growth” leave 
unanswered what more growth or more profit is good for. 
The other two malaises of  modern life that Taylor identifies are indi-
vidualism and a loss of  political freedom. All three are related. Individualism 
refers to the tendency to stress the autonomy of  the self  and to think of  people 
as independent choice makers, as is common in standard economics. The 
question that the individualist perspective prioritizes is “what is a rational 
choice or decision?” The social and political nature of  people is imagined to 
be secondary. According to Taylor this perspective is responsible for a loss of  
meaning, as meaning can only be realized in a social and political context. 
As to the loss of  political freedom, Taylor refers to a politics that is becom-
ing increasingly technocratic and instrumental, forcing people to accept sys-
tems that are imposed upon them for reasons of  efficiency, maximization of  
growth, controllability or uniformity. The prevalence of  instrumental reason 
alienates people from political discussion and political life and renders them 
therefore instruments for instrumental exigencies.
When I became a part-time politician in May 2014, while continuing 
my professorship, the dominance of  instrumental reason became even more 
apparent to me.  Civil servants are focusing on achieving quantifiable results 
and procedures, their customers are welfare recipients and they are keen on 
organizing competitive market processes for youth care, reintegration and 
other such services. They seek greater efficiency and better services for the 
“customer.” As a result, when quality is at stake, these are often monitored 
with quantitative indicators. But what if  the pursuit of  those indicators actu-
ally distracts from the qualitative objectives? What if  counting the number of  
publications in top journals distracts from the quality of  scientific research? 
What if  the pursuit of  an optimal number of  job placements takes place at 
the expense of  the quality of  work generated? And what does the number of  
visitors to a theatre reflect about the quality of  its performances? 
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When I tell civil servants that their actions and words betray a neo-liberal 
perspective, they look at me puzzled. Virtually nobody is able to explain what 
is meant by neo-liberalism and how it differs from the liberal perspective asso-
ciated with economists such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. This 
baffles me, since the term is so widely used nowadays to describe policies in 
the US, the UK and the European Union. Apparently it does not resonate in 
circles where neo-liberalism is actually practiced. 
Neo-liberalism breathes instrumental reasoning, but it is different from 
the practice of  instrumental reasoning as it shows up in most economic text-
books. There, students learn how to devise instruments to promote certain 
policy objectives. It is the engineering approach that was promoted by my 
erstwhile hero Jan Tinbergen, the Dutch econometrician, who won the first 
Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. It considers the economy as a machine 
that politicians can tinker with using the insights of  economic research. 
Liberal-minded economists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman are 
opposed to such tinkering and advocate small governments and a minimum 
of  government intervention. Neo-liberalism, as defined by Michel Foucault in 
his lectures on bio-politics (Foucault, 1975-76), differs from liberalism in the 
sense that it refers to the practice of  governors (including civil servants) who 
embrace the market approach as their policy. Neo-liberalism incorporates the 
logic of  markets in the logic of  governance. 
In the neo-liberal perspective, politicians and especially civil servants talk 
about the world as if  it was one big market. They view citizens as customers, 
seek market solutions for their problems (such as the high expenses of  health-
care), are result oriented, stress the importance of  free choice and competition 
and speak in terms of  products, demand, supply and efficiency. It is just as if  
they ingested an introductory economic textbook. But they are working for 
governments, not market-oriented organizations. It is the powerful result of  
what is called New Public Management and portrays mistrust towards gov-
ernmental practices. The reasoning is even more instrumental than it was in 
social democratic regimes; the goals are mainly instrumental, such as greater 
efficiency, lower costs and more economic growth. (Justice would be a sub-
stantive goal.) The practitioners are apparently not aware of  this. 
My aim is to confront the people around me with this frame of  thinking, and 
to suggest that there is an alternative, as I articulate here. 
Another economy. . . ?
The alternative to instrumental reasoning is substantive reasoning. Such rea-
soning focuses on what is important, on values and also on what is worth 
striving for. Substantive reasoning aims to articulate the substance of  what we 
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-and others- are doing, what qualities individuals, organizations and groups of  
people are pursuing. 
All around I observe explicit striving for quality. When it is not in the arts 
and the sciences, I see it in movements that stress the quality of  the environ-
ment, health care, public life, democracies or social life. So many are seeking 
alternatives to the instrumentalized and financialized worldview that appears 
to be prevalent now. They want another economy, an alternative to the poli-
cies that assess everything in financial – and therefore quantifiable – terms, to 
focus instead on the important qualities. But how to articulate such policies? 
How to determine that what we do actually contributes to a better quality of  
whatever kind? 
Proposals and initiatives for another economy abound. They aim at a 
sharing economy, a circular or a creative economy. While digital technology 
and robotization create new possibilities in this respect, craftsmanship is back 
in vogue. Work is being re-conceptualized and experiments with new forms of  
organization are underway. McCloskey and others plea for humanomics: an 
economics that does justice to the fundamental values of  faith, hope and love. 
Buddhist economics appeals to the imagination as an answer to the largeness 
of  scale of  contemporary society. And, of  course, the commitment to a sus-
tainable economy is strong. 
Having witnessed the sterility and ineffectiveness of  standard econom-
ics when it comes to substantive and therefore qualitative issues, and to an 
undergirding of  innovative ideas, I now want to contribute to an alternative 
way of  reasoning, another approach. I call it the value based approach to the 
economy. 
. . . calls for another economics!
The value based approach is intended to offer a substantive, a quality-ori-
ented approach that is so obviously needed in the realms not only of  the arts, 
the sciences and religion, but also in politics, organizations, social life and 
certainly in private life. It is meant to better understand what other people 
do and especially of  what we do ourselves, or would want to do. It should 
motivate coming up with and identifying the emergence of  new alternatives.
It is an economics that restores an old and long tradition in economic 
discourse, including thinkers like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Adam Smith, 
John Maynard Keynes, Carl Menger, Thorstein Veblen, Max Weber, Joseph 
Schumpeter, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Frank Knight, E.F. 
Schumacher, Kenneth Boulding, Don Lavoie, Elinor Ostrom, and contem-
poraries such as Deirdre McCloskey, Luigino Bruni, and Robert Skidelsky, as 
well as so many others who may not all register as economists. 
This tradition contrasts sharply with the prevailing so-called neoclassical 
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approach, which I will refer to as standard economics. Standard economics is 
defined – just check the textbooks or ask anyone who studied economics – as 
the science that studies the allocation of  scarce resources, or the science of  
rational choice. Such a definition of  economics actually stems from the thir-
ties, more precisely from an article that the British economist, Lionel Robbins, 
wrote in 1932 (Robbins, 1932). In this article, Robbins sidesteps the value dis-
cussion that had dictated the scientific practice of  economics until then and 
suggested instead that economics is all about scarcity. He made it seem that 
economics is about survival, overcoming hardship, with more growth, more 
income and more profit as the obvious conditions for surviving and sustain-
ing. That position may have made sense at the time of  the Great Depression. 
After all, what other goals would get the economy out of  hardship? Yet, that 
way of  thinking, such a mindset, makes less and less sense today. Sure, we still 
make choices. We choose to go on vacation, to merge companies, to increase 
prices for a performance, to provide debt relief  to a country and welfare to 
people with no income. And so on. Does scarcity figure into those choices? 
Maybe. But we most certainly also make such choices because we consider 
certain things more important than others. In other words, we value certain 
things and seek not just to survive, but also to realize a good life and a good 
society. The clincher was the inclusion of  this definition in the first modern 
textbook for economics, written by the brilliant economist Paul Samuelson 
who would later win the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. I began my study 
of  economics with the ninth edition of  that book.
In another definition, standard economics concerns the system of  pro-
duction, distribution, and consumption of  goods. When standard economists 
think of  “goods,” they think of  “commodities”; when they discuss “distribu-
tion,” they zero in on the exchange of  goods in markets. What would happen 
if  we expand the notion of  goods to include not only (intangible) services, as 
is common standard practice, but also goods like “knowledge,” “friendship” 
and “freedom”? After all, such goods are certainly as valuable as “refrigera-
tors” or “consulting reports.”
My aim is to restore the discussion of  values in economics or at least to con-
tribute to such a restoration. That makes for a different definition of  econom-
ics: I propose to define economics as the discipline that studies the 
realization of  values by people, organizations and nations. 
Standard economics specializes in the financial aspects, in the kind of  
activities that lend themselves to measurement in monetary terms. That is 
why I will generally speak of  “financial” phenomena instead of  “economic” 
phenomena. Economics, as I define it here, covers a much larger field than 
standard economics does. 
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The value based approach developed and revealed in this book has at least 
seven distinctive characteristics. They are: 
1. When doing the right thing, people strive to realize their values. That is, 
they need to be aware of  what those values are and then, by interacting 
with others, by producing, buying, selling, socializing or conversing, they 
try to make those values real. This perspective contrasts with the focus 
on preferences and utility maximization in standard economics. (See 
Chapter 3 and 5.)
2. The realization of  values is a cultural practice; economic behavior, there-
fore, is embedded in a culture and makes sense only in its cultural context. 
Consequently, we want to look beyond the financial aspects of  transac-
tions and recognize their cultural significance, or their interaction with 
the relevant cultural context. The idea that culture matters contrasts 
sharply with the standard economic perspective in which culture is given 
a marginal or instrumental role. (See Chapters 1 and 2.)
3. In order to work with and on the basis of  values, we need to work sensibly, 
using phronesis, as the Greeks call it. We need to weigh options, deliber-
ate, experiment and evaluate, all in striving to do the right thing. This is 
quite different from the supposedly rational choices we make in standard 
economics. (See Chapter 4.)
4. In order to realize values, people have to generate and appropriate goods, 
both tangible and intangible. The most important goods are shared with 
others. Consider goods like friendship, art, religion and knowledge. Goods 
can also be practices, such as sport, science, crafts and art. The standard 
perspective does not acknowledge shared goods or the role of  practices. 
(See Chapter 6.) 
5. Some goods are more important than others. Some goods are worth 
striving for; they render actions meaningful and make doing the right 
thing satisfying. When practices are worth striving for they can be called 
praxes. In chapter 7, I will distinguish four domains of  ultimate goods 
and praxes: personal, social, societal and transcendental. The standard 
perspective offers only the ill-defined concepts of  welfare and well-being 
when dealing with ultimate goods. (See Chapter 7.)
6. In the determination of  the sources for value generation, the value based 
approach compels us to go beyond financial entities (e.g. financial wealth) 
and consider the great variety of  sources that enable us to realize our val-
ues. Such sources include our upbringing, our society and our memories, 
and – at the root of  all – our faith, hope and love. (See Chapter 8.)
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7. To make our values real, we usually need to involve others. To do so we 
can avail of  at least five different logics: the logic of  the oikos (the home), 
social logic, logic of  governance, market logic and transcendental or cul-
tural logic. The standard approach pays attention only to market logic 
and, to some extent, governmental logic. (See chapters 9 and 10a and b.)
When applying the value based approach, you will see all kinds of  things in 
a different light, including your own actions and choices. Rather than sim-
ply trying to define your budget constraints, you want to identify your values 
and then figure out by what logic you can realize them. You will note the 
importance not only of  those goods that you own yourself  (like your computer 
and your bicycle), but also those that you own together with others (like your 
friendships, your knowledge, your love of  a certain kind of  music and your 
memories).  You will have to rethink what it is that makes a person rich, or 
another person poor—(what defines richness and poverty anyway?) – and, 
more generally, what it is that constitutes wealth. Who knows, it may affect 
what you choose to do next. 
The value based approach might also profoundly affect the way of  doing 
business or conducting policy since it takes as a starting point the ends of  busi-
ness and policy. Such ends cannot be profit maximization or more “economic” 
growth. Instead, it invites and compels a serious consideration of  qualities. 
To get practical, this part of  the book will conclude with an exposition 
of  the quality impact monitor. It will undoubtedly elicit the critique that the 
value based approach is instrumental in practice and is used to serve the gov-
ernmental logic anyway. While that may be so, the governmental logic must 
be included as part of  doing the right thing; in that context we are in need of  a 
framework for making the discussion of  qualities both concrete and effective. 
 
This is not a “how to” book, although it certainly has elements of  such a book. 
This book does not explain how to make or lose money or what to do to get 
things right. It is rather a book that gets you (and me) thinking about what it 
means to do the right thing. And to do that, I need to get us to ask ourselves all 
kinds of  questions, mull over various concepts, think through consequences, 
understand different logics in their interaction with others, pay attention to 
the context and get a picture of  the larger context (of  the creative economy, 
for example). There is so much to know and even more to understand. Even 
so, here and there you may feel prodded to do the right thing and imagine 
yourself  reading a “how to” book. 
Disturbing? 
I imagine that for quite a few readers the reasoning presented in this book is 
strange at first. An honors student at the Erasmus University called it “the 
most disturbing text he ever read.” I do not know what other texts he has 
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read, but I can take a guess. I took this as a compliment. The more you are 
trained in the disciplines of  economics, business economics and law, the stran-
ger and the more disturbing this reasoning is likely to be. At first you will 
recognize little of  what you have learned. To use the expression of  the British 
poet Samuel Coleridge, all I ask of  you is “to suspend your disbelief.” Who 
knows, you may get some new insights – as have quite a few of  my students 
and the professionals with whom I have shared some of  these ideas. 
I stress the therapeutic and edifying tasks of  science
I may be pushing the limits of  the acceptable by implying another interpre-
tation not only of  the subject of  economics, but also of  the role and task of  
science in general. The convention prescribes that science is meant to explain 
and to predict. Such an interpretation gives the sciences an instrumental role: 
to equip makers and shakers in the world with the knowledge they need to 
shape the world to their liking, with new inventions and effective policies. This 
conventional interpretation of  what the sciences should do, stimulates the dis-
tancing positioning that scientists are inclined to assume, as I was at first.
I now have rather different views on the role and significance of  science. 
Operating in a political position has only encouraged me to further recognize 
the ineffectiveness and sterility of  the research outcomes of  standard eco-
nomics when determining the right thing to do. It is rare that scientific find-
ings have a direct impact on policy, though this is contrary to what standard 
economists tell their students.
Following a suggestion made by Richard Rorty in his Philosophy and the 
Mirror of  Nature (Rorty, 1979), I see the two main tasks of  science as being ther-
apeutic and edifying. I would argue that these are its main roles. Scientific 
work is therapeutic when it poses new questions, uncomfortable questions 
maybe, and makes people aware of  certain phenomena. (Why would lower-
ing wages be the solution to unemployment?  Might subsidies for the arts 
actually be harmful to the arts? Can the pursuit of  financial wealth actually 
be a goal in life?) The scientific contribution is therapeutic when it gets people 
to reflect upon what they are doing, and makes them question the obvious, 
the conventional thing to do. The therapeutic effect is when people come to 
realize that there is a problem, that they have good reason to be more criti-
cal and that they have a question of  which they were not aware before. “Oh, 
maybe culture does matter. How then? What difference does that make?” 
“Is it really so that the empirical findings of  standard economics leave policy 
mostly unaffected? What would then be an alternative?” As we all should 
know, knowledge is born of  confusion, and the process of  knowing begins by 
asking the right questions. 
Questions require an answer, or at least a way of  thinking that points 
us in the direction of  an answer. That is where the edifying aspect of  sci-
entific practices comes in. Scientific work becomes edifying when it offers 
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concepts, ways of  thinking, models, insights and findings with which people 
can make sense of  the questions they encounter and enables them to see their 
world in a different light and act accordingly. Standard economics has been 
edifying because it provided accounting frameworks that produced numbers 
about profit, total production, consumption, investment, foreign trade, gov-
ernment deficits and debt, and so forth. It edifies with notions of  the market, 
of  rational choice, of  externalities, of  public goods, of  asymmetric informa-
tion, risk, games and so many more concepts that have proved to be helpful in 
thinking about all kinds of  questions. Now people and organizations are get-
ting questions about qualities, about values and about goals and meanings, for 
which the standard approach appears to fail in providing answers. Therefore 
another edifying framework is called for. 
Part of  the edifying task of  scientific work is the characterization, or 
interpretation, of  what is. When people become overwhelmed by the world 
around them, they need to establish what they are looking for and identify 
the relevant features. Scientists, including economists, play an important role 
here as they provide glasses with which to look at the world. Economists, for 
example, make people distinguish market processes and individuals who are 
consuming, producing and laboring, and do that for certain prices. They pre-
sent a particular worldview. The value based approach aims to change that 
worldview and, with that, the characterization of  the world as we look at it. 
Once you adopt the value based approach, you will distinguish shared goods, 
observe social behavior, co-production and co-creation and will have a new 
perspective on what constitutes richness and poverty. 
So, although I have no reason to deny the explanatory and predicting 
task for the sciences, it is their therapeutic and edifying role that renders the 
sciences particularly relevant for daily, organizational and political life.
Getting inside the elephant
At a conference I suggested that the value based approach is but one of  many 
perspectives on the beast that we call economics. I used the anecdote of  the 
blind men as an example. This anecdote that originated in ancient India tells 
of  four blind men who are asked to describe an object that is in front of  them. 
The first observes a string, the second a tree trunk, the third a tube and the 
fourth a sharp object. They all have a specialist perspective. Only when they 
share their perspectives will they realize that they are in fact observing an 
elephant. 
In economics there are all kinds of  perspectives, including the standard 
one based on rational choice, a game theoretic perspective, an institutional 
perspective, a behavioral perspective, an Austrian perspective, and so on. So 
why not add a value based perspective to get a more complete picture of  the 
beast that we call economics? 
Figure 0-2   Getting inside the elephant
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Then I realized that I was trying to do something different. All perspec-
tives that I listed have in common that they are the perspectives of  spectators. 
They all require that you step away from the beast and observe it from a dis-
tance. The value based approach suggests instead to get inside the elephant, 
inside the beast, to figure out what the beast needs to do in order to do the 
right thing. The beast can be a person, an organization, a city government or 
any other moral entity. 
By getting into the beast we are made to wonder what it takes to do the 
right thing and why it is often so difficult doing the right thing. 
A standard critique is that the focus on doing the right thing is hopelessly 
naïve. Those uttering the critique see ugliness all around, including selfish 
behavior, power mongering, abuse, corruption and exploitation. As if  I do not 
see all of  that. I admit that the following exploration is not for those who seek 
action that is self-serving or corrupt. I prefer to engage in conversation with 
those who seek to do the right thing. After all, that is ultimately the only way 
to realize the values and thus to true happiness. 
Accordingly, let us try to get inside the elephant!
Figure 0-1  Looking at the elephant
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The credit should go to . . .
In order to do the right thing, all kinds of  knowledge and understanding are 
necessary. We do not operate in a void. Fortunately not. We are part of  a civi-
lization and that means that we can benefit from the knowledge and insights 
that people have generated up till now. Much of  the knowledge that I needed 
for writing this book and that we need to do the right thing is within reach; it is 
stored in numerous texts that scientists, humanists, philosophers, theologians 
and sages have left to us, forming the core of  civilization. We only have to do 
some work to retrieve that knowledge and to interpret it so that it is of  use for 
doing the right thing. 
A lot of  the material in this book is a product of  my teaching in all 
kinds of  courses and programs. Quite a few of  the ideas that I include here 
I developed in seminars, in conversations with students and professionals. I 
benefit from my involvement in the program of  cultural economics and cul-
tural entrepreneurship at the Erasmus University, and programs of  Creare in 
Amsterdam, Uganda, India, Brazil and Japan. The theme of  doing the right 
thing for leading the good life and creating the good society, I developed in 
the context of  Academia Vitae, a university for and about life. That university 
came to pass, unfortunately, due to the economic circumstances at the time. 
Presently I am involved with its successor, the Academy for Liberal Arts. The 
students of  the Academy for Liberal Arts are professionals eager to reflect 
on their life, their work and the world around them. The questions that they 
contemplate are almost all concerning the meaning of  their life and their 
work. The teaching is on the basis of  mainly classical texts. So when I start 
with Aristotle, you can imagine where I learned this (and that is certainly not 
Is the value based approach to economics normative? 
The question inevitable pops up in the company of  economists. They 
have grown up with the idea that economics as a science should be 
“positive,” that is, focus on the world as it is. Economists should abstain 
from imposing their own values, or norms, on their analysis, that is, 
they should not be normative. 
 Let me state clearly that the value based approach is not norma-
tive by studying the realization of  values. It becomes normative just as 
standard economics does a) by the stance it advocates for the economist 
and b) by the appeal it makes for a conscious realization of  the good 
life and a good society. Where it differs from standard economics is 
that it calls for involvement in real life—and not the detachment that 
standard economics propagates—and encourages people not just to 
consider economic processes from a distance but to become aware of  
one’s own participation in them.
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in the conversation of  economists!). So this book is a product of  teaching and 
hopefully will in turn serve as a text for teaching. I hope that both students 
and professionals will learn from it. Then again, aren’t we all students when it 
comes to living the good life? 
In the last stage of  writing this book, I became more or less accidentally 
a politician, part time that is. It was a sobering experience at first. I felt like 
the blind man having to figure out what this large beast is about. It changed 
my perspective. Before I merely had purported that the standard scientific 
approach is not very effective in business and politics; now I experience the 
sterility of  scientific work daily. As a governor responsible for welfare, pov-
erty and employment, including the employment of  people with a disability, 
I am in need of  all kinds of  knowledge but could not figure out where to get 
that knowledge. What will motivate employers to hire people and what will 
motivate people to actively look for work? And what can I do? At that point I 
realized that I benefited most from the ideas that I develop here in this book. 
Just how I benefited, should become clear in the second part. 
As to the practice of  citing, I follow the advice that the philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre once gave me. Say what you have to say, work with what 
others have said, but limit the references to a minimum. They only distract. 
Yet, I defy the advice somewhat by elaboration of  the more technical and 
academic issues in the footnotes and a few boxes. I do so in anticipation of  
the standard critique of  academic colleagues concerning aspects that I have 
not considered or elements I have left out and so on. Nevertheless, as I am the 
one pleading to engage in conversation, I should make an effort to show that 
I take my partners in conversation seriously. And I do; without McCloskey, 
Seiz, Fisher, de Beus, Verbruggen, Prins, Van Heusden, Frey, Throsby, Hutter, 
Taylor, Amariglio, Velthuis, Dekker, Goto, Magala, Zuidhof, and so many 
others who have put their ideas on paper, I would not have been able to write 
this. Everything that this book contains, every idea, every insight, is borrowed 
from others. Only the ordering is original. 
Even so, I immediately admit that the discussion that follows does not do 
justice to what others have written and rarely engages with other approaches 
and arguments. I could offer a few lame excuses, such as a lack of  time to do 
so, and the number of  pages that would need to be added if  I had done all 
that. However, the honest argument is that I prefer doing it this way, even at 
the risk of  being criticized or worse, ignored.
Finally, I would like to thank Mark D. White and Carlos Hoevel for peer 
reviewing the manuscript for Ubiquity Press.
 
Let us begin the conversation
The book starts with the kernel of  the approach, which is what it means to be 
doing the right thing. And that is the realization of  values, including the way 
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of  making those values real. You will learn about phronesis and how that differs 
from the notion of  rationality that is usually taught. 
Those who are interested, or required, to study the text rather than just read it, will find 
questions on www.klamer.nl and www.doingtherightthing.nl. After all, studying the text is a 
matter of  approaching it with questions. All knowledge begins with questions. 
A personal note
I am frequently asked the question why I wrote this book, why I felt compelled 
to argue the importance of  culture and values, and why I am so arrogant to 
argue another definition of  economics. 
I am not entirely sure of  my answer. I could say that I had to write this 
book, yet I can list so many reasons for not writing a book like this. The risk 
of  being ignored is significant. Derision in certain circles is likely. Why bother? 
There must be some reasons. 
When I reflect on my intellectual career, I recognize that I have always 
moved towards the margins of  the conversation that I was a part of. I felt 
most comfortable with the critics, especially when they followed social and 
humanistic values. Cold, cynical reasoning—that I too often encounter in the 
conversation of  economists—deters me. This may have something to do with 
my upbringing as the son of  a protestant minister. Till I was about 14 years 
old, I was deeply religious and committed to the life of  a minister. The minis-
ter in me is still alive, as you may conclude here and there from what follows, 
but my spiritual life is troubled. I am searching to recover some of  what I feel 
I have lost, the inner dialogue with the deity. That is perhaps the reason that 
I stress the goods to strive for and to include the category of  transcendental 
goods. That may also be the reason for the development of  the notion of  
shared goods.
With this book I want to express my hope for a world that would make 
more sense (at least to me), for a valuable economy, for an economy based on 
values, for a humanistic economy. It may all be wishful thinking, yet it is the 
responsibility of  the scholar not only to see the world as it is, but also to imag-
ine the world as it might be. 
With age comes the desire to be inclusive in the argumentation. I do not 
seek opponents to attack them with arguments and to destroy theirs in pass-
ing. Enough has been done to take down the bastion of  standard economics. 
I satisfy myself  with presenting the concepts and arguments that make sense 
to me and render my life meaningful. It will please me if  it does so for others 
as well. If  that is not the case, then I will happily take this book with me to 
my grave. 
PART 1
FRAMING AND RAISING  
AWARENESS
The exploration of  a value based approach requires a frame, a set up 
that can get us going. Values evoke the notion of  culture because culture 
is about values. How then can we give culture a meaningful role in a 
conversation about the economy? What can we make of  the relationship 
between culture and economy? What is culture anyway? The concept is 
used in so many different ways, so we need to be clear on that. 
In the next chapters I will propose that a value based economy is 
about the realization of  values. Realization of  values in turn signifies the 
awareness of  and the valorization of  values. In this part we focus on the 
awareness aspect. Part II will deal with the valorization issue. 
If  you embrace the idea that what we do, or what organizations or 
governments do, is ultimately the realization of  values, you will have to 
recognize with me that the standard economic models of  rational behavior 
do not suffice. The realization of  values calls for something like phronesis, 
or practical wisdom. 

CHAPTER 1
DOING THE RIGHT THING STARTS AT 
HOME;
IN THE END IT IS THE CULTURE THAT 
MATTERS
The streets were dusty, the sun stood high and 
the atmosphere was different.  There I was, in 
the streets of  Kampala, the capital of  Uganda. 
The next day a program would start with people 
of  Uganda’s cultural sector. This was my first 
time in Central Africa. 
I walked by the wares spread out on the side-
walk by a street vendor. Determined to ignore 
the stuff, my eyes caught a glimpse of  the banner 
shown here. Wasn’t this banner stating exactly 
what my approach is about? Here is the message, 
so plain, so obvious. Can it be true if  displayed 
on a dusty sidewalk in the heart of  Africa? I paid 
the vendor what he asked for—the equivalent of  
1 euro—and continued on my way. 
The banner is a reminder for you and me 
that the important things in life are not for sale. 
We can buy all kinds of  things but owning those 
things does not guarantee that we have what we 
really want. We can buy a house, but that does 
not necessarily get us a home. Even if  the house 
is wonderful, it does not necessarily stand for a 
wonderful home. 
Figure 1-1: Banner
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House or home
It is so tempting to steer the conversation to the house. We can know so much 
about it. The house is tangible. We can easily spot deficiencies and we usually 
know what to do about them. A cracked window can be replaced, a leaky roof  
can be fixed, and the attic may have space for an additional room. The house 
has a price. 
The price renders the value of  the house concrete. We can attach a num-
ber to it. In that way the collection of  bricks, the wood, the concrete, or what-
ever the house is made of, and its shape and its design become a quantity. I 
can say that my house is so much. When I subtract the amount of  my mort-
gage I am left with a number representing what I am worth, more or less, or 
at least what my house is worth to me.
That number is pretty high. At least that is what I think. Maybe you had 
expected more. I might point out that during the recent financial crunch I lost 
a lot of  money and that my mortgage payments eat up a large chunk of  my 
salary each month. But then, who cares? I do not, really. The loss was virtual 
and even after the payment of  the mortgage interest, I am left with sufficient 
money to sustain my family and hobbies. 
Here is my point. I do not care so much myself  because I do not own the 
house for the sake of  those numbers. And I am not watching each day what 
is happening to those numbers. The reason for this is that I am preoccupied 
with something else, something far more important: my home. I share the 
house with my wife and kids because we want to have a home. It is the home 
that really matters to me. Even if  the house were to fall down, the home will 
remain standing, at least so I presume. The real loss occurs when we lose our 
home—as I once did because of  a divorce. Then the house represents mere 
financial value that has to be split somehow. 
Figure 1-3: My homeFigure 1-2: My house
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My home stands for all that I share with my wife and kids. It evokes the 
atmosphere in our house with its furniture, decorations and special places. 
Also with the memories that we generated there and now cherish together, the 
shared stories, the dogs and the cats buried in the back yard, the party that 
we gave last year, the Christmas celebrations, the dramatic scenes, the door 
post where we measure the height of  the kids throughout the years (gosh, how 
they’ve grown!). Not to forget the gatherings with friends and families, and so 
much more. 
My home is my oikos. I prefer the latter term as it evokes the original 
meaning of  economics—oikos, the Greek word for home, and nomos, the Greek 
word for law. The great Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle began the 
discussion about economics by pondering the laws of  the household. They 
wondered about the right thing to do for someone running a household. One 
issue they encountered was whether or not to trade. (The best thing to do, 
Aristotle argued, was to be autarchic and only to trade in case of  necessity. 
We would beg to differ now, but the issue remains pertinent as observed in the 
question of  whether or not a home cooked meal is better than going out, and 
under what conditions.) 
The economic discussion nowadays tends to focus on the numbers, on 
the things that can be bought and that therefore are measured in monetary 
terms. The numbers convey a sense of  concreteness and practicality. A house 
is good for numbers. A house is concrete. So it is tempting to talk about the 
house, about its physical state and about its price. The house gets us to think 
of  markets, of  demand and supply (“As there are currently so many houses on 
the market, the price of  ours will inevitably be going down.”).  A house is a 
product that can be sold and bought. The oikos is another matter altogether. It 
makes for an entirely different discussion, a discussion without many numbers 
and without the appearance of  concreteness and practicality of  a house. It is 
the quality of  the oikos that I really care about. That is the substantive issue to 
me when buying a house. The price of  the house is subsidiary to that. 
When I brought up the oikos with my Ugandan students, they asked for 
my definition. For me my oikos is the circle of  people with whom I have essen-
tial connections. In the oikos, people are connected by fate. So I said: my oikos 
makes me think of  my immediate family, and possibly my parents, grand-
parents and siblings, their partners and kids and my parents in law. They 
laughed. They would consider their extended family as part of  their oikos and 
some would include the local community in which they grew up as well. It 
was immediately clear that their oikos was not only larger than mine but also 
meant more to them, or, to put it better, it meant something different. This 
showed in their sense of  loyalty that far exceeds the one we have in western 
culture. The idea that we put our parents in an elderly home, and to have 
others take care of  them, seemed outrageous to them. If  someone has wiped 
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your bottom, it is a sign of  civilization that you wipe theirs when needed, one 
man noted. I could only nod knowing that at that very moment a nurse might 
be cleaning my mother in law. 
Even so, my oikos – small as it may be – plays also a pivotal role in my life. 
While writing this I am at my home. In a moment my wife will expect us to 
have coffee together, and that means I need to have something to say. Who 
knows, I might have to say something about what I feel. There may be an 
issue about the birthday party of  our adult son tonight, or about the hockey 
team of  my daughter that will come for a get together tomorrow night. There 
is shopping to do tomorrow. I have to work in the yard in the weekend. She 
will have to see her mother. My mother will come over for dinner. Ah well, 
you get the picture. The point that I want to make is that my family requires 
a lot of  work and that I did not get any schooling for that type of  work. It is 
the household work, but also the ever so demanding relational work. It is all 
about qualities. When I have my head in the newspaper at breakfast, I am not 
doing it right, as the other family members expect my input in the conversa-
tion. When I am not eager to go to the birthday of  my son tonight, I fall short 
of  expectations. (My wife is calling me for the coffee, so please wait.)  
(When I came down, I hinted at what I was just writing. So I got a scath-
ing remark about my confusing work and home, and one thing led to another. 
There was disagreement about my use of  the term therapeutic—it popped up 
in the introduction. I could not quite explain why I was writing all this—isn’t 
this too personal? What does it have to do with economics?—and before I 
knew it, we got into an old, rather painful issue. I told you that relational work 
is demanding. I had to hang in there to maintain at least the minimal standard 
of  the quality that is expected from having coffee together. Fortunately, I am 
getting better at it, so I more or less succeeded this time.) 
Work on the oikos is a matter of  realizing qualities of  moments together, 
of  dinners and breakfasts, of  relationships, of  evenings spent together, of  
vacations and so on. It is a practice, something we do. Working on the oikos 
implies that I attend to the needs of  kids and partner, visit my ageing mother 
weekly and try to be a responsible father and husband. In other words, I am 
trying to do the right thing to maintain the qualities that make up my oikos. 
Sure enough, I also enter the market place for the sake of  my oikos. Every 
Saturday I go to the local farmers market, to buy supplies for the meals of  
that weekend—supplies such as fish, vegetables, fruit, bread, and milk. And 
I finance expenses such as my daughter’s membership for the sport club, her 
clothes, her allowance. I pay the interest on the mortgage, the repairs of  the 
house, the vacations and, every now and then, I buy something for myself, like 
books, underwear and shirts. Though most things I buy with my money are 
intended for my oikos. 
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These personal references may strike you as strange, or awkwardly pri-
vate. The reason for sharing them is to point out that the oikos is not only the 
basis for my life; it is for all people in all societies. Everyone needs to have an 
oikos of  some kind or another. You may not need a family as I do in order to 
have an oikos. A group of  intimate friends may constitute an oikos, or people 
may have chosen to live by themselves and create their oikos in a most personal 
way. However the oikos is shaped, it is where we start our lives and it is most 
likely also where we end our lives. When people are lonely, it is often because 
they lack an oikos in their life (although you can be lonely in an oikos too). 
Students every now and then question the importance of  the oikos, but they 
are usually in transition from one to another of  their own making. We grow 
up in an oikos; the oikos shapes us and makes us what we are. 
The anthropologist Stephen Gudeman speaks of  the base instead of  oikos 
(Gudeman, 2008). The phrasing is appropriate as it rightly suggests that the 
oikos is the base. It is in the oikos where most people grow up. It is an oikos that 
many will try to reproduce, and it is the oikos that has a profound influence on 
most of  our lives, as any psychologist will tell you. In the Latin American com-
munities that Gudeman studies, the base is more extended, as it is in Uganda. 
However, the core idea is no different. In the US and Europe the oikos is to be 
conceived as the base, as the place where our lives definitely begin and usually 
end. 
Home also stands for culture and content
The home is a good metaphor for what an organization, a society is about. 
When a theatre group owns a theatre, a building that is, it may be fortunate 
for having the building, yet having the building is not the point or the purpose 
of  their activity. The group wants a home and the home is constituted by the 
content, the plays, the people who come to watch the plays, the atmosphere 
in the building, the energy, the excitement, the shared values and the shared 
memories. A building is just a building. 
This is no different for a company. Also a company is about something, 
things of  value, meaningful things, meaningful practices. Take an engineering 
firm. The boss of  an engineering firm had asked me to speak with his man-
agement team during a daylong session. I came in the beginning of  the after-
noon. The entire morning had been spent discussing the financial numbers, 
the balance sheet, the turnover, the profits and the like. Using the metaphors 
of  the house and the home, I suggested that all that they had discussed was 
the value of  their house and the value of  the things flowing in and out. But 
those were not the most important things for them. Much more important 
were the qualities they had realized like the qualities of  their craftsmanship, 
the motivation of  the people they work with, the ideas that were generated, 
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new contacts, new clients, opportunities, their shared values and their shared 
aspirations. After all, I suggested, that is what their business is about. They 
agreed enthusiastically. So why not start the discussion next time with what is 
really important, with their home that is, and leave the discussion of  the finan-
cial matters for a later moment? When the qualities are clear, the finances 
would be most probably clear as well. They looked at me with the expression 
of  “Yeah, you’re right,” but I saw them wonder how they could ever do the 
right thing at this time in this age. 
The proposal is similar in discussions with people of  theatres, museums 
and other such organizations: focus your attention on the home, on the quali-
ties of  what you are doing. With these people the suggestion usually resonates 
with what they already believe and do. In their case, the doubt sets in when 
they face a financial shortage, as they unfortunately often do. Yet, the money 
issue is only instrumental and subsidiary in the end, as they readily acknowl-
edge. Money is not what defines their success, even if  it may be an indication 
thereof. 
Economists may identify in this proposal a reference to their notions 
of  happiness, welfare or well-being. By suggesting that we should focus on 
the content, I seem to suggest that we are seeking happiness and welfare, or 
well-being. I will address this argument later, but let me note here that when 
you and I seek happiness, or well-being, we still need to know what it is that 
makes us feel happy and well. We need to know what constitutes the kind of  
home that works for us, that makes us happy; we need to know the qualities 
that really matter. The conventional economic discussion assumes that the 
things we buy contribute to our happiness and sense of  well-being somehow. 
It bypasses the critical issue and that is how the things we buy, like a house or 
a car, contribute to the quality of  our home, that is, the thing that we are ulti-
mately interested in. Something crucial happens between the purchase and 
our sense of  happiness, and that is the realization of  the oikos, or something 
similar. The purchase of  something is not doing the right thing in and of  itself. 
It never is. It is in realizing our oikos, or whatever else we value, that we are 
doing the right thing. 
If  you go along with this, you might associate anyone who pours over 
financial data, or insists on quantification of  whatever, with the drunkard in 
the following drunkard joke. The drunkard is standing under a lamppost and 
looking at the ground. When asked what he is doing there, he says that he is 
looking for his keys. “So why are you looking here?” “Well, don’t you see? 
Here at least there is light.” Even if  we can measure things in terms of  money 
that does not mean that those things are what life is all about. If  we really 
want to look for our keys we will most likely have to grope in the dark. That’s 
life.  
In the end culture is what matters. Culture is tough; money is soft. 
Oikos is all that gives meaning to intimate life. It constitutes my personal cul-
ture. Culture is all that gives meaning to shared lives. With our actions in the 
company of  others, like family members, colleagues, fellow citizens or fellow 
professionals, we generate and sustain cultures. Those cultures define who we 
are; they provide us with a context of  meanings, with a sense of  belonging, 
with inspiration hopefully. When we are groping in the dark, we will inevita-
bly end up needing the notion of  culture.
Culture, as I use the concept here, has three distinct meanings. 
Culture in the anthropological sense (C1) connotes the stories, history, expec-
tations, artefacts, symbols, identities and values that a group of  people shares 
and with which they distinguish themselves from other people. In this sense a 
family, company, city, region, ethnic group, nation, and continent can be said 
to have a distinct culture. Having a culture implies having the possibility to 
share the meanings of  life with others. Having a strong culture can be a great 
good for the insiders; it also excludes outsiders. 
When the Germans write “Kultur,” they indicate the second meaning of  
culture: here culture connotes civilization, usually expressed in the accumu-
lated achievements of  people in a certain region over a long period of  time in 
the arts, sciences, technology, politics and social customs (C2), or in the words 
of  Matthew Arnold: “a knowledge of  the best that has been thought and 
done in the world and a desire to make the best ideas prevail.” (Arnold, 1869, 
p. 8) This notion of  culture refers not only to what people share, but also to 
what they have accomplished in various domains. 
Common parlor culture refers often to just the arts, sometimes including 
design, architecture and certain crafts (C3). This notion of  culture is intended 
when people speak of  the “cultural” sector or “cultural” policy. It is a subset 
of  the broader grouping C2. I will use this category also for other practices 
with a distinct content, such as architecture, design, technique and religion. 
In the conversations of  scholars in the humanities, anthropologists, soci-
ologists, historians and philosophers, all of  these interpretations are contested 
and problematized (Elias, 2000; Lasch, 2013). Their usage, therefore, calls for 
caution. The notion of  civilization in particular is under suspicion because of  
its pejorative usage. People speak of  civilization to imply superiority. Kultur 
was an argument of  German national-socialists to subject other, inferior, “cul-
tures,” and exterminate so-called “degenerate” people like the Jews, gypsies 
and homosexuals. 
Likewise, while stressing one’s own culture may generate warm feelings 
among those included, it excludes everyone else. Because of  such pejorative 
usage scholars have made serious work of  deconstructing notions of  culture, 
civilization and identity. Recently, we have witnessed attempts to recover the 
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original notions from this deconstructive work as there is a clear need for 
them. Nevertheless, we need to continue to watch out for pejorative usage.
Culture is important. The culture of  the oikos (C1), for example, determines its 
resiliency; that culture will remain standing even when the house falls down. 
Qualities of  their culture tell us what not only an oikos, but also a workplace, a 
community or a society are all about. By way of  their actions people sustain, 
strengthen or undermine their culture; at the same time the culture that they 
are part of  informs and gives meaning to what they do. Although we may 
abstract in our thinking about human behavior from the cultural context, we 
may be left wondering how it is possible for us to act independently of  such a 
context, even if  we are not aware of  it. As is often noted, culture is for people 
what water is for fish: once outside of  it, we become very aware of  its impor-
tance in our daily lives. In the presence of  another culture we distinguish our 
own. 
A strong culture (C1) renders communities tough in dire circumstances. 
When a museum experiences declining monetary numbers because of  lower 
subsidies or lower ticket sales, the questions arise how tough is its culture (C1), 
how committed its people, and how strong the support. A strong museum has 
a strong culture. 
We have furthermore good reasons to suspect that large communities 
(in the form of  cities, regions, nations and even continents) derive strength 
from a lively artistic climate and active scientific communities (C2 and C3). 
Economic circumstances may constitute the necessary conditions, but in the 
end what counts are the qualities of  the culture (C1, C2 and C3): they tell us 
how rich in content, how varied and inspiring life in that community is, and 
how strong and effective the shared values are. 
Accordingly, culture (C1, C2 and C3) matters. In the end, it is all that 
matters. All the rest is subordinate, or instrumental for the realization of  cul-
ture. The oikos is culture in the sense of  the values, stories, memories and aspi-
rations that its members share. Monetary quantities, or those values that we 
measure in monetary units, are instrumental at best; all too often they distract 
from what really matters in the end, i.e. our culture, or cultures. Culture mat-
ters for any oikos and workplace, but it also matters for a city. Sure, cities are 
important for jobs and economic activities, but it is the realization of  all kinds 
of  qualities that make a city what it is. Paris has its atmosphere, New York its 
energy. Vienna has its coffee houses, and London its traditions. As Jane Jacobs 
so famously pointed out, cities need to be livable (Jacobs, 1993). The qualities 
of  a city determine how well it enables its people to realize a good life, how it 
inspires its visitors and provides a good working environment for its workers. 
Culture matters for a nation, too. The qualities that make up the culture 
of  a nation determine what kinds of  lives its citizens are able to realize. 
Here we have a major theme that is: culture matters. 
CHAPTER 2
DIFFERENT WAYS OF MAKING SENSE 
OF CULTURE IN RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE ECONOMY
When you and I are trying to do the right thing, we will not immediately 
consider the cultural context in which we are operating. Inside the elephant, 
culture is like water for a fish: as long as you swim in it, you are not aware of  
its existence. Only in contrast with another world with another culture, does 
your own culture become noticeable. I myself  realized my Dutchness only 
when I began studying in the US, in North Carolina. And I am aware of  the 
significance of  culture each time I switch between the academia to political 
life. Gosh, how different those two worlds are. 
This chapter aims to demonstrate the consequences of  the “culture mat-
ters” position, how different that point of  departure is from so many other 
approaches, including that of  standard economics, but also that of  cultural 
economics – the field in which I have done a great deal of  my research. 
Accordingly, this chapter addresses scholarly discussions and illustrates the 
particular position that this book represents. The purpose is orientation for 
you, the reader, and to provide context for the exploration that follows. 
Scholarly positions on the role of  culture 
Scholars like me want tools in order to explore the role of  culture, how to talk 
about it.  I am concerned with the practice and thus also with the meaning of  
the expression “culture matters” in practice. Furthermore, I am interested in 
the type of  conversations that render it meaningful. 
There are, for example, scholars who focus on cultural processes and dis-
cuss nothing else. We could name them culturalists. They are anthropologists, 
sociologists, historians, archaeologists and others who are studying culture in 
general (C1 and C2) or, like art historians, the arts (C3) in particular. As an 
economist, I cannot help but notice that their work offers little to no insight 
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into the financial aspects of  their fields. They suggest that culture stands alone. 
In their case culture is all that matters! 
When I turn to standard economists, the discussion is biased toward the 
opposite side of  the spectrum. Economic discussions zero in on the financial 
aspects of  life, on the instrumental part. Culture does not figure into those dis-
cussions. So, that does not help when we are interested in the way culture (C1, 
C2 or C3) works in the economy and how economic processes affect culture 
(again in all three kinds).  
Recently, scholars in a wide variety of  disciplines have broken with the 
one-sidedness of  culturalist and economic discussions and have begun to 
explore the relationship between economy and culture. Historians are studying 
cultural factors in the development of, for example, the financial sector; soci-
ologists and anthropologists are exploring interactions between economic and 
cultural phenomena; business economists have turned to cultural processes 
in organizations; social geographers point to the importance of  geographical 
factors for the arts and the creative industries; and cultural economists study 
the economics of  the arts. The sociologists Ray and Sayer coined the notion 
of  the “cultural turn” to characterize the surge of  interest in the interactions 
between culture and economy (Ray & Sayer, 1999). 
As scholars, we seek the right conversation to be in. There are all kinds 
of  conversations for us to join. So which is the right one when we want to 
understand the right thing to do, when we want to understand the intricacies 
of  economic life while pursuing what is important to us? 
If  you are accustomed to the standard conversation of  economics, you 
must already have noticed that I am nudging you towards a different con-
versation, a conversation that does justice to the oikos, to culture, while tak-
ing financial phenomena seriously. I am trying to change the conversation 
by recovering long neglected concepts, such as values and goods. I do so by 
connecting other ongoing conversations. 
I first need to define this notion of  “conversation” that I am using. 
“Conversation” is a metaphor
I will use the metaphor of  the conversation quite a bit in this book, in addi-
tion to terms like “practice,” “praxis” and “a commons”. Earlier I dedicated 
an entire book to the exploration of  the metaphor (Klamer, 2007), so I will 
be brief  here. Conversation, as I use the metaphor, denotes the more or less 
organized exchange of  ideas of  a group of  people on a particular subject 
in a particular way. A conversation can take place at a particular moment 
in time, or in a particular situation but usually I will refer to a conversation 
that takes place over a period of  time in all kinds of  settings with a range of  
participants. “Science” is such a conversation, as are “art,” “politics,” “busi-
ness” and “sport.” Each of  these conversations consists of  many distinctive 
conversations. “Science” consists of  conversations like “physics,” which in 
turn consists of  conversations on “thermodynamics,” “elementary particles” 
and so on. “Economics” is a conversation, too, made up of  the conversations 
on “game theory,” “microeconomics,” “cultural economics” and many other 
subjects (as you can see when you consult the index of  the Journal of  Economic 
Literature).  
When I speak and write of  a conversation, I do not only intend to get 
you thinking about people talking. They may just as well be writing, reading, 
gesturing, listening, attending a conference, checking out a journal and chat-
ting in the corridor.  Economists generally prefer to refer to fields, evoking the 
image of  people trotting around in Wellingtons. The German philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas speaks of  communicative action (Habermas, 1984). That 
gets closer to what I would like to draw your attention to. I follow the British 
philosopher Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), the German philosopher Hans 
Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), the American pragmatist Richard Rorty (1931-
2007) and the sociologist Randall Collins (1941-), among others, and opt for 
the term “conversation.”  The idea is that you think about practices, about 
people trying to make sense in a particular context with certain topics and in a 
certain mode of  reasoning, with certain habits, customs and rules of  conduct. 
A conversation, as I use the term here, is a commons, that is, a shared 
practice. Chapter 6 is dedicated to developing the notion of  the commons 
and of  shared goods and practices. 
The question, then, is in what conversation are you or in what conversa-
tion do you want to be. Or, if  you are a practitioner, what conversation do you 
want to consult in order to make sense of  your world, and in order to figure 
out what is the right thing to do in your life and your line of  business. 
Six conversations on the relationship between culture, economy, 
economics, and the arts
When I survey the field, I distinguish six ongoing conversations on the rela-
tionship between the economy (E) and culture or, more restrictive, on eco-
nomics as a science (e) and culture (C1, C2 or C3).  
1. The “culture does not matter for economics and the economy” 
conversation.
This is the conversation that I learned when I studied economics. It is still 
the dominant conversation, also in the world of  politics, business and jour-
nalism. In this conversation the notion of  culture does not show up at all. It 
is not taught and it is not used. The presumption here is that economists do 
not have to bother with culture (C1, C2 and C3) as it has no significant influ-
ence on economic processes and is therefore not something economists have 
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to account for. Quite a few economists, if  pressed with the issue, will remark 
that they would not know how to bring cultural factors into their model. They 
would not see why they should bother explaining cultural phenomena, such as 
the existence of  national cultures or the rise or decline of  the arts. They will 
insist that culture does not matter much in economic processes and therefore 
does not have to figure into their economics. 
According to this conversation, culture (C1, C2 or C3) is separate from 
economy (E). 
            
             E       C1, C2 or C3
This is clearly not the conversation I am seeking out here, although I will use 
some of  the insights it provides. 
2. The “economy does not matter to culture” conversation
Open a book on art history, read a novel or talk with scholars in history, soci-
ology, anthropology, archeology or philosophy, and you will wonder whether 
something like an economy even exists. Quite a few discussions about arts 
and culture focus on cultural matters only and bypass financial processes alto-
gether. You will not find references to prices, incomes, financial conditions, 
market transactions or any other financial factors. 
          C1, C2        E
In an even more ambitious version of  this conversation, culture stands for 
what could be called ‘the transcendental part of  a civilization’. This kind of  
culture involves the arts, the sciences and religion, as well as other domains 
(like those of  nature lovers, and sports fans). In general, these kinds of  cultural 
practices reach for something that is beyond earthly matters (our daily food, 
social status and pecuniary income): they may express a quest for beauty, the 
truth, the good, the spiritual, the sacred. 
If  interpreted this way, these conversations comprise literary conversa-
tions in which economic processes are somehow incorporated, as in the novels 
of  Charles Dickens, John Steinbeck and Thomas Wolfe. When I hear col-
leagues in the faculties of  the natural sciences and the humanities speak, I 
suspect that they operate in this conversation. In their world, knowledge and 
the pursuit thereof, the esthetical, the truth, and human sensibilities and all 
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such cultural phenomena crowd out economic (mostly financial) factors and 
processes. This is also the conversation of  quite a few artists and people work-
ing in the artistic field: they tend to write everything artistic in capital letters 
and keep all things of  the economy small. 
More importantly, these are the conversations that engage people who 
are immersed in a religious or spiritual world. Not only the Pope will be in 
this conversation when he addresses economic questions, but so will Muslims 
when they plead the Sharia or ban usury. The Dalai Lama will always put 
economic factors in the larger context of  transcendental meanings. He will 
characterize the pursuit of  money and other such aspects of  the ordinary 
business of  mankind as a distraction from the search for enlightenment. “Let 
go of  the ego,” he will tell economists and anyone else willing to listen, “for 
the ego holds you back.” 
Although I can easily get caught up in culturalist discussions, I am too 
much of  an economist to be able to forget about financial aspects. 
3. The “economics matters to culture” conversation. 
Cultural economists apply the tools of  economic analysis to the world of  the 
arts. You could call their conversation an instance of  economic imperialism: 
the tendency for economists to consider any phenomenon, from love to sui-
cide and so also art, religion and science, suitable subjects for their approach. 
Marriage, Gary Becker famously argued, is a rational choice, the outcome of  
a rational calculation of  costs and benefits (Becker, 1976). So is the choice to 
have children or to abort them, whether or not to believe in God, to do art, 
or to do science. 
In the “economics matters” conversations the standard concepts and 
tools of  standard economic analysis are pivotal. So this conversation is about 
markets, rational choice, elasticities, contingent valuation, consumer surplus, 
externalities, public choice and more of  such concepts. 
As can be expected, economists dominate the “economics matters” con-
versation. They have applied their analysis to the phenomenon of  religion 
and to science (for instance Oslington (2003) and Mirowski and Sent (2008)). 
Economists who study the world of  the arts label themselves cultural econ-
omists. The well-known economist William Baumol (1922-) was a pioneer. 
Prominent members of  this research community are David Throsby, Bruno 
Frey, Ruth Towse, and Françoise Benhamou. 
   E                    C3 (the arts)
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When you are in love with the peculiar reasoning that economists apply (in 
terms of  rational choice, opportunity costs, marginal costs and marginal ben-
efits, asymmetric information, game theory and so on), you will love these 
conversations. If  you do not, you may wonder why people get paid for devel-
oping this kind of  discourse. Cultural economists will appeal to the relevance 
of  their conversation for policy makers and to its legitimacy in academia.
4. The “arts matters to the economy” conversation
Some cultural economists, but especially people from the cultural field and 
policy makers, like to point at the relevance of  the arts and artists for the 
economy. This discussion gravitates around the issue of  the economic impact 
of  culture, and of  the arts in particular. The objective is to demonstrate that 
some economies grow better and faster than others due to the presence of  art-
ists and a creative climate, that badly functioning cities flourish because of  the 
arts, that creative industries come to thrive in certain cities and not in others, 
and that culture (C3) attracts tourists (and their money). 
                   C3    E
For the economic impact of  the arts, the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao is 
exemplary. Although the jury is actually still out, it is generally assumed to 
have transformed and boosted the economy of  that once desolate Spanish 
city, by bringing in crowds of  tourists, and in their slipstream, new businesses. 
The argument is that arts and their cultural organization can be good for the 
economy. Richard Florida famously argued the importance of  the creative 
class for local economies, spurring the increasingly important creative indus-
tries and politicians will point to the economic effects of  proposed investments 
in the arts, such as new museums, theatres, festivals and the like (Florida, 
2002). The literature on “creative cities” makes more or less the same point. 
The conversation includes studies that show how artists can contribute to 
urban generation (as happened in the Soho neighborhood in New York), and 
how prices of  real estate go up when cultural organizations move in. 
Note that this conversation renders the arts instrumental for economic 
processes. Economic growth is apparently the goal and the arts are its maiden.
5. The “culture matters to the economy” conversation
The “culture matters to the economy” conversation focuses on culture in its 
anthropological meaning (C1) and as civilization (C3) as well as the economic 
impact that those cultures can have. Most famously, Max Weber (1864-1920) 
argued that protestant culture was responsible for the rise of  capitalism and 
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the concurrent economic growth in northern European countries (Weber, 
2001). Economic anthropologists have pursued this line of  research while 
standard economists have ignored it. You will look in vain for the notion of  
culture in economic textbooks. 
Recently, economists like Deirdre McCloskey, Virgil Storr, and Robert 
Lane (although he is actually a political scientist) have picked up the line of  
argument where Weber left it (McCloskey, 2007; Lane, 1991). McCloskey, for 
example, argues that values and virtues affect economic processes and should 
account for the Dutch Golden Age in the early 17th century and the takeoff 
of  economic growth in the late 18th and 19th centuries. In 2000, Lawrence 
Harrison and Samuel Huntington (1927-2008) published their book entitled: 
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress (Huntington, 1997). The title 
says it all. I should also mention here the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
(1930-2002), who not only argued that economic factors influence culture, but 
also that knowledge of  the arts and other knowledge stands for cultural capital 
that is needed for the accumulation of  economic capital. So again, culture 
impacts economy (Grube & Storr, 2015).
Quite recently literary scholars, historians and social geographers have 
developed their own separate conversations on the “culture matter” thesis. 
Inger Leemans, for example, sorts out the importance of  peculiar Dutch cul-
tural traits for the Golden Age that Dutch society enjoyed in the first half  of  
the 17th century (Leemans & Johannes, 2013; Goede de, 2005).  
Also important in the “culture matters” conversation is the discussion 
of  culture in business literature. In the seventies, the Japanese miracle got 
business economists interested in the value of  culture in successful business 
strategies (Cameron & Quinn, 1999; Waterman & Peters, 1982). The Dutch 
scholar Hofstede made a big impression with his identification of  cultural 
differences among IBM organizations across the world (Hofstede, 2003). This 
research evolved into an extensive research conducted under the name of  cul-
tural economics and dealt with questions on the role of  culture in organiza-
tions, on the impact of  cultural context on organization performance, and the 
management of  culture in organizations (Beugelsdijk & Maseland, 2014). All 
this contributes to an increasing awareness in the business world that culture 
matters not only in the environments in which businesses operate, but also 
within businesses themselves. 
Another discussion centers on creative processes in businesses and how 
artists can contribute to such processes. 
The “culture matters” conversations appeal to politicians and business 
leaders to pay attention to culture in the anthropological sense and to the 
arts in particular. Politicians should care about art and culture--so this con-
versation seems to imply--because culture boosts the economy. Business lead-
ers should understand that the culture of  their organization is critical for its 
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performance. A strong culture makes for a strong and sustainable organiza-
tion, at least that is the suggestion. 
6. The “economy is embedded in culture” conversation
I now come to the conversation that is most relevant for my inquiry. This is the 
conversation that views economic phenomena as manifestations of  culture. 
In the “economy is embedded in culture” conversation, culture is what life is 
about and the ordinary business of  mankind--including the trading, consum-
ing and working that people do--are part of  cultural phenomenon. 
Suppose you finished a painting. What you do with the painting is a mat-
ter of  what you are used to doing. It is a matter of  your values and, with that, 
it is a matter of  the culture that you are part of. In the culture of  cavemen, 
painting is a strange kind of  activity. When you’ve finished your cave paint-
ing, you must be pleased if  you get your share of  the food that others hunted 
down or gathered. In order to get the time to paint, you most likely have a 
special status in the group, such as a medicine man, or as a spiritual man. In 
the culture of  17th century Netherlands, you have to realize your value as a 
craftsman. In order to get anywhere with your work, you need to be part of  
the guild and partake in its customs and rituals. Selling your painting is part 
of  the ordinary business of  the guild. In the contemporary culture of  high art 
you will seek the approval of  fellow artists, and socialize with the right people 
in the hope of  getting your painting into the collection of  a contemporary art 
museum or an important art collector. Maybe a critic will write about it! In all 
three cases you operate in a different culture. 
In the “economy is embedded in culture” conversation, the variations of  
the conversation are what evoke interest. What do the actions say about the 
culture in which the actor, you, is operating? Clearly, speaking of  guilds in the 
contemporary setting would be meaningless. Then again, some artists may 
wish they had the status that the painters of  cave paintings had. 
The “economy is embedded in culture” conversations stress the mean-
ingfulness and value-laden character of  human actions, and will tend to put 
them in the (cultural) context. Whether you and I go shopping, do our job, 
or engage in entrepreneurial activities, we attribute meanings to things and 
activities, we value them and, along the way, we generate meanings and values 
for ourselves and for others. We humans are signifying people: we attribute 
meanings to what we do and need a cultural context in order to make sense 
of  what we and what others do. See for example Van Heusden in (Klamer, 
1996).
In these conversations the main purpose of  studying the behavior of  
people is to sort out, interpret and characterize the meanings and values 
that people attribute to things and activities, and the meanings and values 
that they realize with their actions. Exemplary is the work of  the well-known 
American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) who shows in his 
Ce
lengthy descriptions of  how culture becomes manifest in daily practices, such 
as cockfights in Bali. His article Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight is a clas-
sic as it demonstrates how to “read” culture (Geertz, 2005). 
In recent reinterpretations, Adam Smith is considered a participant in 
this conversation. When we read The Wealth of  Nations in the light of  his ear-
lier Theory of  Moral Sentiments we understand that people, in their striving to 
do right, answer to their moral sentiments (Smith, 1776). In Theory of  Moral 
Sentiments Smith depicts people in their moral life, acting out of  sympathy for 
others, and seeking to be virtuous. In The Wealth of  Nations, he confronts the 
problem that sympathy and virtue appear to lose their relevance in market 
situations. The market poses a special situation since you and I cannot ask 
for favors and will not expect pity from others for the simple reason that we 
usually do not know our trading partners very well. That is why we appeal to 
their self-love, as Adam Smith famously argued. By acknowledging as much, 
Smith hastens to add that the market is but one element in society. There is 
sufficient space in which people can be virtuous and be benevolent towards 
fellow people. At least, that is the point of  The Theory of  Moral Sentiments, 
the book that he most cared about. 
The “economy is embedded” vision is also present in the writings of  
Karl Polanyi (1886-1964). This economic historian shows how all kinds of  
economic institutions, foremost among them the market, are historical and 
therefore not universal. Markets function in some settings and not in others. 
Children are bought and sold in some historical and cultural settings, whereas 
such a practice is a taboo in the contemporary Western world. High bonuses 
are in some situations a sign of  success, whereas in others they are considered 
immoral. It is all a matter of  culture, this conversation will suggest. 
A similar inquiry into the embeddedness of  economic processes and phe-
nomena you find in the conversations of  economic sociologists such as Mark 
Granovetter and Viviana Zelizer, and of  economic anthropologists such as 
Stephen Gudeman (Granovetter, 1985; Zelizer, 2005; Gudeman, 2008).
I would like to make sense of  C, of  what makes life meaningful, 
of  the content of  our lives, be it our oikos, friendships, society, 
art, religion or science. For that purpose I am in need of  a con-
versation, a conversation that, for example, can make sense of  
the banner that I picked up in the dusty streets of  Kampala. 
So let us see what happens when we think in terms of  culture, 
when we focus on the things that are really important to us. 
The first thing that happens, at least in this book, is that we start paying atten-
tion to values and, more particularly, to the realization of  values. 
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CHAPTER 3
DOING THE RIGHT THING IS A 
MATTER OF REALIZING VALUES
Acting in a culture, or contributing to a culture – be it that of  your oikos, the 
organization in which you work, your profession, your city, your society or 
whatever entity – implies the realization of  values or whatever is important. 
Whether I plan the family Christmas dinner, go to a theatre, shop in a market 
place, consider merging my organization with another, plan an exhibition, 
make art, deliver a speech, vote on a new law or run with a friend, I am real-
izing values. At least that is what I will postulate. 
When I consider how to spend an evening, I need to take into account 
what is important to me. I could waste my time watching mindless televi-
sion, but I also could consider spending time with my children or attending a 
theatre performance. When a theatre group decides to do something entirely 
different next year, it seeks to realize something important to them. They may 
want to surprise other theatre makers, to test their own capacities, or to attract 
new groups of  people to their theatre. 
Is it possible that in everything we do, consciously and with the intent to 
feel good about it, we are seeking to realize something that is important to us? 
In all examples values are at stake, people are becoming or made aware of  
them, and then make them real by acting upon them. They may even reflect 
at a later stage to find out to what extent they succeeded. (When I lie down 
that evening I may conclude that, indeed, I wasted my evening with mindless 
television or that I had a great time with my children or that I still feel stimu-
lated by the play that I attended, or not.) 
My suggestion is to interpret all such considerations and deliberations as 
realizing values in the sense of being aware of them, and the actions 
that follow as the realization of those values in the sense of valorizing 
them or making them real. 
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Realizing values has two meanings:
Focusing on the realization of  values is what cultural institutions (such as 
museums, theatres, and orchestras), religious communities, and academic 
institutions do, at least in principle, and what they need to assume their stake-
holders are capable of  doing. Good museum directors strive to make great 
exhibitions to make real what is important to them and presume that museum 
visitors are looking for great art because that is important to them. All kinds 
of  other organizations do the same. Charities do, but also accounting firms 
and law firms are doing so in the sense that good lawyers want to be just that, 
good lawyers, and good accountants want to be good accountants.
When I use the term valorization, I refer to the making real of  the relevant 
values. It is often interpreted as implying only the realization of  financial or 
exchange value (i.e. by selling something for a price), but I explicitly include 
the important values, such as artistic and social values. When someone made 
a painting it is one thing to sell it and quite another thing to get it recognized 
as a serious work of  art. Valorization is the realization of  relevant values, 
financial or not. 
I focus in this book on the cultural, academic and, less explicitly, religious 
institutions because it is their goal to do good, that is, to do the right thing. 
What interests me is what it takes to do the right thing and what it is that pre-
vents people in those institutions from doing the right thing. 
Take the university. Focusing on the realization of  values is what I do with 
my colleagues at the university when we practice science and when we teach. 
Sure, we scientists can be jealous, passive aggressive1 (I plead guilty!), eager 
1  Passive aggressive is when you agree to some action and then don’t do it 
as a way of  protesting or obstructing. It is what I do when the administration of  my 
university issues new rules without consulting me. I do not protest but try to ignore 
them. 
AWARENESS
Being aware of one´s own values 
Being aware of the values of 
others
MAKING REAL
Making one´s own values actual
Making the values of others 
actual 
Valorization
Realizing values
Diagram 3-1: Meanings realizing values
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for attention and money, and rude to colleagues who think differently and to 
students who do not do the work, but if  we sit down in a sensible mood, we 
will affirm our commitment to the pursuit of  truth, the need for collegiality as 
an important value, and to honesty. See Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 
he describes the contrast between the scientific values of  scientists and their 
actual behavior (Merton, 1968). By doing all that, we valorize scientific and 
social values. 
At times my colleagues and I may confess our weaknesses. Psychologists 
will tell us that they are part of  our shadow side. I have found the notion 
useful. No need to pretend that I am perfect. Yet, when I test my craving for 
attention, and my need of  external rewards with my impartial spectator, I do 
not feel proud. Shame is the more appropriate feeling. I feel so much better in 
the pursuit of  truthfulness, good conversation and good teaching. 
Focusing on the realization of  values is what the cultural sector is all 
about, at least what the “serious” leaders of  cultural organizations and “seri-
ous” artists are aspiring to do. An art museum is dedicated to the arts, a thea-
tre group to theatre. The artistic director of  the Rotterdam Philharmonic 
Orchestra wants to have the best musicians and the best conductor to perform 
Mahler’s Fifth as it never has been performed before. Or he wants to perform 
experimental music of  a new composer because he truly beliefs in its power. 
His goal is to make great music at its best. 
In the pursuit of  his goals this director of  the orchestra has to battle a lack 
of  interest among regular visitors. He may have to deal with a skeptical busi-
ness manager, and reluctant musicians. And he has to face the overwhelm-
ing preference for the usual, for recognizable music that makes listening easy. 
That is, he is up against the desire for amusement and entertainment. And 
because entertainment sells tickets, he has to be creative in realizing his music 
while avoiding bankruptcy. 
The Dutch poet Lucebert once noted: “everything of  value is vulner-
able.” People in the Dutch cultural sector have embraced this saying to char-
acterize their recurrent dilemma. In trying to do good, to realize that what is 
important to them, like great art, great music, great theatre, they risk losing 
everything. The question is then whether they have to compromise on their 
values in order to be able to continue their activities. Some will tell them to 
pay more attention to what the public wants. Others will admonish them to 
be forceful in expressing their values, to stand for the art they want to make, 
and to persuade or seduce others to pursue great art.
Nothing new. 
With this approach to the subject of  economics I follow a rich tradition to 
which a great range of  authors and endless practices have contributed. I 
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name the works of  Thomas Aquinas and Adam Smith, any religious work, 
quite a bit of  work in psychology (Maslow, for example) and more recently 
the works of  Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, Charles Taylor and 
Deirdre McCloskey. Other economists are picking up the theme like Robert 
Skidelsky. (These authors all operate in the “economy is embedded in culture” 
conversation.) A favorite source of  mine is Aristotle, and then in particular his 
Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle & Ross, 1959).
Acting upon values implies the striving for the good. 
Aristotle (384-322BC) is the pragmatic Greek philosopher who had a profound 
influence on civilization. That influence began in the 12th and 13th century 
when scholars translated his work in Latin. Aristotle’s works became a major 
source for philosophers through the 19th century. Thomas Aquinas (1225-
1274) used the bible and Aristotle, to whom he referred as the Philosopher, as 
his main references when he addressed moral issues in economic situations. 
Aristotle was more or less ignored during the major part of  the 20th century 
but is now back in vogue. Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum are two 
prominent contemporary philosophers who have brought his work back to life 
(MacIntyre, 1981; Nussbaum, 1986). In particular his Nicomachean Ethics 
receives a great deal of  attention nowadays (McCloskey 2007, 2011, 2016; 
van Staveren 2001). There are even business handbooks that instruct manag-
ers how to apply Aristotle in their work.
It may be interesting to realize that Aristotle probably wrote the text to 
instruct his son Nicomachus.  He began the instruction as follows: 
“Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, 
is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has 
rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim.” (Aristotle & 
Ross, 1959, p. 1094a)
A contemporary reader may have some difficulties here. At least that is 
my experience when I read this sentence with students and professionals. 
Especially the notion of  the good triggers questions and doubts – as if  there 
would be a good out there for you and me to be realized.  I do not want to 
pursue the philosophical discussion at this point and suggest staying prag-
matic by interpreting the good as the purpose that a person, a community or 
an organization is seeking.
In an organization the purpose is expressed in the mission that some 
organizations have articulated and most have not. (The mission cannot be the 
maximization of  profit, as we will see in a moment.) 
Aristotle continues by suggesting that the good varies: 
“But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, 
others are products apart from the activities that produce them. 
Where there are ends apart from the actions, it is the nature of  the 
products to be better than the activities.” (Aristotle & Ross, 1959, p. 
1094a)
An actor wants to be a good actor. His good is in the acting, in the perform-
ing on stage: by acting he can realize his good. A craftswoman whose craft is 
making hats seeks to produce great hats. 
Aristotle affirms such a reading when he continues: 
“Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also 
are many; the end of  the medical art is health, that of  shipbuild-
ing a vessel, that of  strategy victory, that of  economics wealth. But 
where such arts fall under a single capacity – as bridle-making and 
the other arts concerned with the equipment of  horses fall under the 
art of  riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the 
same way other arts fall under yet others – in all of  these the ends 
of  the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for 
it is for the sake of  the former that the latter are pursued. It makes 
no difference whether the activities themselves are the ends of  the 
actions, or something else apart from the activities, as in the case of  
the sciences just mentioned.” (Aristotle & Ross, 1959, p. 1095a)
Aristotle admonishes his son to distinguish means from ends. It is a lesson that 
seems pertinent in a wide variety of  situations today. It is a lesson for business 
managers who mistake the instrument of  profit as an end in and of  itself, or 
youngsters who seek money (lots of  it!) as their goal. 
Asking about ends or goals can, therefore, be a therapeutic intervention. 
(As I noted in the preface, my intentions are therapeutic and edifying and not, 
let that be clear, normative or moralizing.) It is what coaches do when they 
help professionals, and it is what therapists, priests and ministers do in their 
therapies and ministries. When I consult artistic organizations we invariably 
begin with figuring out what its mission is, what it is after. The answer usually 
requires a bit of  probing. 
Swapping instruments for goals is all too common. A director of  an 
American art museum declared in a seminar for art managers that he has 
three goals and they are 1) fundraising, 2) fundraising, and 3) fundraising. 
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(I was told this anecdote by a Dutch banker who had picked it up in an arts 
management course at New York University. He cited it in approval. So now 
you can imagine how I responded.) That sounds tough and he probably tried 
to unnerve his audience. Even so, he might be asked in the spirit of  Aristotle 
what purpose the fundraising serves. It would be strange to set up a museum 
in order to raise funds. Such a goal also seems to make a bad proposition to 
those providing the funds. This director was swapping means for ends.
Money is never an end. The pursuit of  money is always a means to some 
end or another, even if  it is sometimes difficult to articulate that end. (If  you 
disagree, tell me a case in which the pursuit of  money is an end in itself.) 
Asking others and yourself  about what is worth striving for is probing for 
the good(s) that you and others are pursuing. It is the Aristotelian question.
CHAPTER 4
PHRONESIS IS THE VIRTUE IN MAKING 
VALUES REAL
In striving for the good we will need to consider all that is important to us. 
That means that we need to consider our values. We also need to know the 
values of  others and a great deal more to assess the situation at hand and to 
know what works. Acting upon my values in pursuit of  some good or another, 
and applying all available knowledge in doing so, is called phronesis, to use a 
term of  Aristotle. Phronesis is practical wisdom. Gonzalo Bustamente wrote a 
thesis on Phronesis in which he explains that it calls for thoughtfulness, aware-
ness of  the goods to strive for and the relevant values, and a clear under-
standing of  what other people want and need, proven practices and strategies 
(Bustamente Kuschel, 2012). 
Aristotle considers phronesis a cardinal virtue, that is, a virtue that is cru-
cial for all valuations, for all actions. A virtue is a value that we attribute to actions. 
A virtuous person is someone who has internalized the important virtues. As 
long as you and I consciously strive for practical wisdom, we probably have 
not internalized that virtue. We are not practically wise, but we would like to 
be. The person that others see as being practically wise, will not comprehend 
when told so: for isn’t what he does self-evident?
Phronesis is what sensible people practice when they go the theatre “to see 
a serious play” instead of  “slouching in front of  the television,” or “mind-
lessly playing silly games.” Phronesis is what the director of  a play does when 
she seeks a conflict with her actors in order to break through an impasse; it 
is what a student does who cancels a date in order to study for an exam. It is 
by phronesis that we figure out what is the right thing to do. It is what makes us 
realize whether or not an action was right.
Mind you, people are not always sensible. My choice to waste a pre-
cious evening watching mind-numbing television programs is not sensible. 
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Attracting a sponsor with a dubious reputation is not the sensible thing to do 
for a serious art museum. Being greedy is not sensible and neither is being 
obsessed with getting attention and appreciation for one’s work. So often I 
have acted in ways that I regret afterwards. I have eaten ice cream when I 
should not have, responded inadequately to a critical remark, or accepted a 
speaking engagement when I should have used the time to write or be with 
my family or friends. Often I need others to point this out to me. Adam Smith 
uses in his The Theory of  Moral Sentiments, which could be read as a treatise 
on phronesis, the impartial spectator as a device to check your actions (Smith, 
1759). The impartial spectator is the voice you and I carry in us, that tells us 
whether or not our actions are right. It is our conscience speaking. 
Phronesis kicks in when a banker realizes that his fixation on gaining high 
bonuses has not made him a better banker and that he needs to figure out 
what he actually wants to accomplish and what his values are. Phronesis oper-
ates when people begin considering the quality of  food they consume, or when 
a CEO of  a company decides to invest in the culture of  his organization. 
Phronesis is one of  the four cardinal virtues that the ancient Greeks, 
Aristotle among them, articulated. The other three cardinal virtues are tem-
perance (striking a balance between overdoing things or not doing enough), 
courage (overcoming fears in doing the right thing), and justice (taking into 
account interests and sensitivities of  others). Thomas Aquinas and other 
Christian thinkers later added the three theological virtues—faith, hope, and 
love—to complement what later became known as the seven classical virtues. 
Faith stands for confidence, hope is keeping a future perspective and love is 
about the ability to feel a deep connectedness, the kind that my wife and I 
aspire to realize when dealing with situations in our oikos.  
Well in to the 19th century these virtues were common knowledge; chil-
dren learned them at school. During the 20th century, these were mostly 
forgotten. These virtues were slowly but surely replaced by a focus on instru-
mental knowledge and thus on things that can be quantified (like profits, 
economic growth, numbers of  visitors and numbers of  publications or cita-
tions). Recently they are coming back in vogue, thanks to philosophers such 
as Alasdair MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum and Philippa Foot (1920-2010). I 
learned of  them from Deirdre McCloskey who wrote a trilogy on the bour-
geois virtues (McCloskey, 2007, 2011, 2016). As I will try to clarify in the next 
chapter, being aware of  the seven virtues and knowing how to realize them 
in dealing with our values, is most helpful for doing the right thing. In this 
chapter the focus is on phronesis. 
How phronesis differs from the ideas of  rational behavior and 
rational choice
The idea of  phronesis is quite different from the idea of  rational behavior 
or rational choice that you learn about in standard economics. The idea of  
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rationality presumes that we can calculate the best choice; it involves the idea 
that we derive the best choice by maximizing some objective function (util-
ity, profit) under certain constraints (income, prices and the like). Economists 
embrace the idea because it enables them the modeling of  decision making 
in the form of  mathematical equations. The modeling gives an idea the aura 
of  “science.” The idea of  phronesis makes us realize that too much is involved 
in doing the right thing, that calculation is therefore nigh impossible, and 
modeling quite hopeless. The process of  phronesis is difficult to trace, and hard 
to catch in the form of  rules and (predictable) patterns. Rationality suggests a 
neatly ordered process; phronesis evokes the image of  a mess. 
The idea of  rationality makes perfect sense in an instrumentalist inter-
pretation of  science. When economists embraced the goal of  policy relevance, 
as they did in the thirties of  the 20th century, it made sense to assume that 
consumers, workers and businesses were rational. That assumption facilitates 
modeling of  economic processes and the models that produce the results that 
presumably enable policy makers to conduct rational policies. At least, this 
was how the idea of  rationality was presumed to work.
The idea of  rationality furthermore alludes to a prevalent notion of  
knowledge as clear propositions about the world out there. This notion engen-
ders the following misguided image: first scientists get to work by developing 
a model and conducting a few calculations, then there are outcomes or results 
in the form of  propositions that dictate, for example, the best policy to be 
conducted under specific conditions (“When the economy has such and such 
characteristics, an increase in government spending of  2.8% will bring unem-
ployment down by 0.5%”). That proposition is allegedly the knowledge that 
economists produce. This is also how people tend to think about the knowl-
edge that the natural sciences generate: they think that the results come in the 
form of  propositions that can be patented and used by engineers to design 
new technology. 
In reality that kind of  packaged knowledge plays only a subordinate role. 
Policy makers do not consider the outcomes of  economic modeling as knowl-
edge to be applied directly. There remain too many ifs and buts, and therefore 
they end up practicing what could be called phronesis: they try to make sense of  
complicated processes, taking into account different interests – and every now 
and then the opinions of  scholars – in what may appear as a messy process. 
The following anecdote underscores this observation. 
The year was 2000. The setting was the beautiful citizen’s ballroom in 
the city hall of  Rotterdam, one of  the few buildings that survived the bom-
bardment of  May 14, 1940. Cultural economists from all over the world had 
gathered for their biennial conference. They were eager to hear Rick van 
der Ploeg, a well-known Dutch-British economist, who was then Secretary 
of  Education, Science and Culture in the Dutch cabinet. Rick is a tall and 
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eccentric fellow. In informal settings he likes to poke fun and make provoca-
tive remarks. In a formal setting he is dead serious, and this was a formal 
setting. 
Rick told about the challenges he faced as a Secretary of  Education, 
Science and Culture in the Netherlands, and explained the way the Dutch 
conduct their cultural policy. He talked at length about the process by which 
the government allocates grants to cultural organizations and about the 
increasing awareness of  the economic importance of  culture and the arts. 
As the moderator of  the session, I asked him how he, in his capacity as 
secretary, had benefited from the work of  cultural economists. Did he ever 
make use of  contingent valuation studies, for example? (Those were quite 
popular at the time.) His answer was brief. “Not at all,” he said. I repeated the 
question and he repeated the answer: “I must confess that I have had no use 
for the results of  research in cultural economics.” 
I am not sure whether those listening at the time realized the importance 
of  his answer. I had expected it to hit those present with a shock. After all, 
most of  them had dedicated their lives to do the work that should help politi-
cians to improve their cultural policy. If  even an economically astute politi-
cian has no use for their work, then what had they been working for? What if  
all the research in cultural economics had been to no avail? 
Maybe Van der Ploeg had been too blunt. After all, politicians at the 
time had a keen interest in the economic impact of  the arts and the crea-
tive industries and that is what economists can measure. Then again, as an 
economist he knew all too well the serious limitations of  such measurements 
so maybe that had been a reason for him to eschew such studies as a politi-
cian. Or maybe he had encountered at the political table’s strong resistance 
to the arguments favored by economists. He would not be the first economist 
to discover the bad rap that the thinking of  economists has in the world of  
politics. I report several confessions of  economists in chapter 1 and 7 of  my 
book: (Klamer, 2007).
I conclude from experiences like these that policy making is not the 
rational process that especially economists would like to think it is, and that 
the knowledge of  current scientific practices is not all that useful, to put it 
mildly. If  you accept this, then you may go along with my interest in the messy 
practice that is phronesis. 
The idea of  rationality makes even less sense in daily life. Let us do 
an exercise to demonstrate why. Think of  an important decision you have 
recently made. What was it? Was it the choice to study at a particular univer-
sity? Perhaps it was the decision to study instead of  setting up a business? To 
get married, or to have children? Was it to hire people, or to fire them? Ok, 
do you have a decision in mind?
Now reflect on what led you to make that decision? What were the 
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important factors? What influenced you? Take your time. 
Based on various exercises like this one done in classes and workshops, I sus-
pect that you will come up with a selection of  the following factors: 
Intuition, gut feeling, the social environment including friends and family, values, expe-
riences of  others, information of  various kinds, weighing pluses and minuses, the calculation 
of  budget, the report of  a consultancy group. 
A report from a consultancy group comes closest to what could be con-
sidered the input of  science. And yet it is rarely mentioned during this exer-
cise, even when the group consists of  managers. In most cases, science has 
no influence on decisions made, at least not consciously. People who do this 
exercise recognize the characterization of  the process as complex and messy. 
Most often people will describe emotions, intuition and gut feelings. A woman 
once shared that when she had decided to pursue a master in business, she 
found herself  crying afterward. That made her realize that she had chosen 
wrongly. In many cases, people refer to their social entourage. Students often 
speak of  the influence of  parents. 
It is not very often that people speak of  their values. It takes a little prob-
ing to get to them. This suggests that people are often not consciously work-
ing with their values, but that subconsciously these values play a role anyway. 
When we discuss particular instances, people readily identify values that are 
involved. As the sociologist Max Weber would say, if  we are rational we follow 
a substantive rationality in the sense that we try to realize important values 
in the decisions we take (Weber, 1968). Procedural rationality in the sense 
of  following a strict and explicit procedure of  calculation does not apply. 
Substantive rationality appears to be more important in real life than proce-
dural rationality. Substantive rationality relies on phronesis, as it requires the 
realization of  values while weighing a complexity of  factors. 
The question of  why economists continue to be fixated on procedural 
rationality and why academics continue to crank out research papers that 
have so little relevance to daily life, I will leave for later. Though I will make 
one comment here: in academia the norm is to distance oneself  from daily 
life and from actual practices and to assume the position of  the “objective” 
spectator, or Anschauer in German. We teach students to disengage and adopt 
a distancing language or abstruse words, such as is observed in mathematics. I 
am determined to violate this norm and seek instead a type of  knowledge that 
bridges the realm of  inquiry and daily life. It is a science that is both therapeu-
tic and edifying that I seek with the intent to affect our actions. 
Creating order in the process of  phronesis 
Being about thoughtfulness, the virtue of  phronesis stimulates us to be aware 
of  what we need to know in order to do the right thing. Which knowledge 
is relevant? It does not take much to realize that all kinds of  knowledge are 
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called for; and most of  the knowledge needed is not what you learn at school 
and at university. 
Consider the woman who is heading a theatre group as the business 
director. Someone else is the artistic leader. The director comes for advice. 
She thinks that the artistic leader is undermining her authority, that he is tak-
ing too much risk with the new show and is not willing to listen to her objec-
tions. She fears for the company if  the artistic leader gets his way. What to do? 
What does she need to be aware of ? 
To evoke the idea of  rationality here is pointless. It will not help her. 
What algorithm would she use? What does she know? 
Business economics would provide better tools for her to cope with the 
situation. In business books she would learn that she is in need of  a vision 
(How does the group look at the outside world and at the future?), a mission 
(What is it about? What is the contribution the group wants to make and for 
whom?) and a strategy (How to go about it?). 
To avoid the direct association with business economics and to allow for a 
deepening of  these concepts, I propose another order and different concepts, 
even if  they overlap with the usual ones. To illustrate, as the business director 
of  the theatre group I would suggest the artistic leader to, first, be aware of  the 
ideals to strive for – hers and those of  the organization – and her worldview, 
then, to design her actions, execute those and, finally, reflect on the question 
to what extent her actions have contributed to the realization of  her ideals. 
Here are the concepts in order:
IDEALS:  These are the goods that people, groups of  people or organizations 
strive for, including the values and virtues that they want to realize. (This is 
also called the mission.)
WORLDVIEW:  This represents all the knowledge that gives people, groups 
of  people and organizations context when striving for the realization of  their 
ideals. Their worldview is their perspective on the world that is relevant for 
them, their framing of  that world, and it includes their vision in the sense of  
how they view the future. A worldview may be informed by scientific knowl-
edge, but in general will mainly consist of  anecdotes, fragments of  knowledge, 
selected information and experiences or stories. (This is also called the vision.)
DESIGN:  With their ideals in mind and with all the knowledge at their dis-
posal, people, groups of  people or organizations plan their actions. The plans 
constitute the design; it is the conscious part of  doing the right thing. When 
people decide to go on vacation, they will have to figure out how to do so. 
What they figure out is their design. (This is also called the strategy.)
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PRACTICE:  Whatever the ideals are, whatever people know, and no matter 
how thoughtful a design is, often what happens in practice is something quite 
different. Distractions, unexpected turns of  events, emotions, uncertainties 
and stupidities are all things that make real life surprising, interesting, frustrat-
ing and disappointing. 
EVALUATION or REFLECTION:  People learn from real life by compar-
ing their ideals, worldview and design with the actual practice. Such com-
parison is the evaluation or reflection. The question to answer here is how 
effective the design has been for the realization of  the ideals. Without reflec-
tion people cannot know what ideals they have realized. 
People and organizations will usually not follow these steps in this order, but 
all steps will be part of  striving for the right thing, some more expressly than 
others. The work of  coaches, therapists and consultants is to get people and 
organizations to think each step through. People who are conscious of  these 
steps and reflect on them are what Donald Schön called “reflective practition-
ers” (Schön, 1984). 
Let us look at each step more closely. 
IDEALS:  How to recognize them? 
Ideals are the goods and values that people and organizations want to realize, 
even if  they know that they will never succeed in doing so perfectly. A scientist 
has Truth as ideal, an artist Beauty, and a monk the Absolute Good or Salvation. 
Ideals express longings of  people or groups of  people (the promised land, 
the shining city on the hill, paradise), and the ambitions of  organizations (to 
create the ultimate product, the perfect technology, the ideal workplace). Our 
ideals are the goods we strive for. Some will speak of  purposes. Others will 
think of  something that is very important to them, of  something that is a good 
in and of  itself. An ideal is something we long for even if  we know that we can 
never realize it. An ideal can be a practice like researching, living a monastic 
life, making art, and exercising one’s craftsmanship. 
The business director, whom we encountered earlier, may have as an 
ideal to be a great business director. When faced with the challenge of  a recal-
citrant artistic leader, a great business director knows what to do. By doing 
so he realizes himself  as the true professional he wants to be. In case he also 
identifies with the ideals of  the theatre group, he has to figure out how to 
facilitate the artistic leader without compromising the ideals of  the group. 
Ideals comprise the values and virtues that people or organizations 
want to realize. Many companies are making their values explicit nowadays. 
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The Boston Consulting Group has as its values “Integrity, Respect for the 
Individual, Diversity, Clients Come First and The Strategic Perspective.” A 
partner of  that group once told me that they really abide to those values and 
appeal to them daily. A theatre group that I worked with figured out that its 
shared values were: “Surprise, Inventiveness, Craftsmanship and Adventure.” 
In case of  disagreements or doubts, they will appeal to those values. Whatever 
they do, it must be surprising (“so we are not going to repeat ourselves”), inven-
tive (“no, that is not new, not have seen that before”), adventurous (“shouldn’t 
we change our venue?”) and demonstrate craftsmanship (“sorry, that actor 
does not meet our standard of  acting”). Whether or not they were consciously 
working with this set of  values was not clear. Some members seemed to be 
more aware of  them than the others. 
Instruments do not constitute ideals. The hammer of  the carpenter is 
an instrument that he uses to realize his ideal (great craftsmanship maybe). 
Likewise, reputation is an instrument for scientists and artists to realize their 
ideals. A great reputation cannot be an ideal; you and I can long for it, but the 
question to ask ourselves is: “What is the reputation good for?” A dictator may 
long for absolute power but he must still answer the same question: “What is 
all that power good for?” When a firm proclaims profit maximization as its 
goal, the question remains: “What is that profit good for?” 
Ideals, therefore, are the answer to the repeated question: “What is this 
or that good for?” In chapter 7 I will try to be more explicit as to the ideals 
we may have.
WORLDVIEW:  What is the required knowledge? 
Our entire life we are in need of  knowledge in order to do the right thing. We 
do so as children (“How do I know that I will make a good friend?” “Which 
school is best?”), as founders of  a household (“Where to live?” “What job to 
seek?” “How to repair the faucet?”), as professionals (“What to know so I can 
be a teacher of  economics?”), as managers (“What strategies will work?”), 
as politicians (“In what way is the world changing and what can I do about 
that?), and so on. 
We need to “know that” and we need to “know how.” “Knowing that” is 
knowing that the world or elements of  the world work in a particular way: that 
a good conversation requires good listening, that a dropped plate probably 
breaks, that a higher price decreases demand, that a game theoretic situation 
has many different solutions, that wealthy Chinese are interested in objects of  
old Chinese craftsmanship, and that greater inequality makes people more 
unhappy. “Knowing how” is knowing how to do things, how to install a DVD 
recorder, how to make shoes, how to act and how to teach. 
When a conflict threatens, you need to assess others involved, their 
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interests, their possible reactions, their emotional involvement; you need to 
know your own motives and emotions, you need to know legal ramifications, 
and you need to be able to assess your chances of  succeeding. 
When you have a great idea for a new product, a museum, or a piece 
of  music, you need to know all kinds of  things in order to realize the idea. 
You may need to know technical things, organizational things, legal things 
or economic things. You need to know all kinds of  numbers about costs and 
revenues, about potential buyers or visitors, about the interest rate and so on. 
(Are the services of  an accountant and marketing specialists required?) 
When we work with other people, it may help to know what motivates 
them, what is important to them, and we need to know about the shared 
culture, the common interests. When we have children, we need to know all 
kinds of  things about pedagogy, and about ourselves (as I found out). And 
don’t even get me started about the knowledge that we need to sustain rela-
tionships and marriages.
When you run a company, a ministry or a country, you need to know all 
that and then some. Bring in the reports, tally the figures, show the scenarios, 
calculate the risks, get the experts in and then you may decide to go with your 
gut feeling anyway. There is probably no singular piece of  knowledge, like a 
scientific result or a fact, which will make you take the decision. It’s all too 
complex for that. 
Your worldview comprises all your beliefs about the world and your opin-
ions. It is undoubtedly influenced by your upbringing and education. The 
economics that economic students have learned frames the way they look at 
the world. People who studied psychology will frame the world differently (as 
I experience on a daily basis being married to a psychologist). Technically ori-
ented people will be inclined to perceive technical details around them, and 
artists will tend to perceive things differently from everybody else. 
What I do not know—and what no one really knows—is the role that 
scientific knowledge has. The findings of  science and the scientific perspec-
tive on things must inform our worldview. But is it the most important ele-
ment of  the worldview of  politicians and managers? What do people do with 
what they learned at university?  Do they apply what they learned later on? 
Lawyers and medical doctors undoubtedly do, even if  they have to learn a 
great deal on the job. But how about economists and historians? What can 
they put to use?
Important is also the vision that leaders need in order to lead. An artistic 
leader of  a theatre group must have an idea of  where the field is at and where 
it is heading. If  politically engaged, he better have a vision of  the political 
horizon. In a course that I give, I work with students on their vision. Each 
time I observe how difficult that is for them. A vision calls for imagination and 
36 DOING THE RIGHT THING: A VALUE BASED ECONOMY
for creativity. Extrapolating current trends is relatively easy, but to imagine a 
surprising future is an entirely different matter. What if  we were to step away 
from digital technology? What if  old traditions were to make a comeback? 
What if  “everything solid melts in the air,” as Karl Marx predicted in The 
Communist Manifesto (Marx, Engels, Moore, & McLellan, 1998).
The point of  lingering on the worldview is to be aware of  all the different 
kinds of  knowledge that are called for when we try to do the right thing. There 
is so much to know! How are we ever able to do the right thing?
DESIGN:  A matter of  planning
Once we know our ideals and know all kinds of  things that we need to know, 
we must then determine what we are going to do in order to realize our ideals. 
This is a matter of  design, of  a conscious and deliberate planning. 
So the business director will sit down, possibly with an advisor, to deter-
mine her strategy, a plan of  action. Will she first set up a meeting with the 
artistic leader, and how will she approach the meeting? Will she come with 
the numbers, with some graphs even, will she be rational or will she use an 
emotional plea? She may also decide to consult with the board of  trustees to 
secure backing in case of  serious troubles. 
When people decide to start a business, they will be asked, for example 
by the bank, for their business plan. So they will have to figure out how they 
are going to do it, what kind of  organization they need, how the budget looks, 
how many and what kind of  employees they need, how to do the marketing, 
what collaborations to seek and so on. All this planning constitutes the design. 
Designing is also what young people do when they choose a university, 
a major, or a master, or when they choose to apply for a commercial job or a 
job in the cultural sector. All such decisions make up a design for the future in 
the hope that it will facilitate the realization of  the ideals. 
PRACTICE:  To show what we are worth and to discover that things 
are different in reality from how we think they will be. 
When someone wants to be an actor, she has to act. A musician makes music, a 
leader leads, a manager manages, a surgeon performs surgeries and a mother 
mothers. We are what we do. When people want to change the world, they 
have to become active somehow. People do things, groups of  people do things 
and organizations do things. The doing of  things constitutes the practice. 
By doing things, we realize our ideals. In the doing of  things we apply 
the knowledge we have and we implement the designs we have construed. In 
practice we prove what our plans, our values and our knowledge amount to, 
that is, what they are worth. We need practice, actually doing things, to valor-
ize the relevant values. 
In practice things are usually different from what we planned and in the 
midst of  activities it is easy to lose sight of  the ideals and the design. Things 
turn out to be more complicated than we thought, and we find out that we are 
ignorant or lack the appropriate knowledge. 
Even if  we know what the right thing to do is, we still may not do it. My 
doctor tells me how to handle my backache, but he himself  does not follow his 
own advice. Quite a few economists are disastrous when it comes to dealing 
with money and, even though I know that I should plan my financial future, 
I do not do so. People put things in their mouth that they know are bad for 
them, and they hold on to a relationship that clearly does not work. We do stu-
pid things all the time and choose to be ignorant even if  we could know better. 
Yet, it is in the doing of  things that people show who they are and what 
they stand for. Organizations prove their merit and demonstrate their values 
in their dealings with their stakeholders. It is by doing things that we realize 
values in the sense of  valorizing them. 
EVALUATION or REFLECTION:  How are we doing?
Because of  all the stupidities, the ignorance, the bad and unfortunate prac-
tices, reflection is an essential part of  doing the right thing. By evaluating 
our actions we have a better chance of  becoming conscious of  what is really 
important to us, of  whether or not our worldview suffices for the task at hand 
and of  how effective the design has been. 
For companies and other organizations the evaluation is a monthly 
or annual ritual that involves accountants and sometimes researchers. 
Stakeholders expect information on how well organizations are doing. 
Shareholders want to know the amount of  profit made, employees may need 
feedback on their contribution, financers want to know whether or not the 
plans worked out and delivered the desired outcomes. 
Evaluation, therefore, serves different objectives. Stakeholders use the 
evaluation as a way of  checking or controlling the organization. The lead-
ers of  an organization need evaluations in order to know whether they did 
the right thing. That is also the function of  evaluation that individuals use. For 
them the most important question to answer is whether or not they did the 
right thing.
Governments need to evaluate, too. Politicians want to demonstrate to 
their electorates that their policies are working and therefore are in need of  
evaluations. For that purpose government agencies generate data of  all sorts 
to enable evaluations. Most famous is the number for economic growth that 
all governments generate. The number is used to determine how well the 
economy is doing and, with that, how well the government is doing. (Although, 
whether that measure is doing justice to the qualities of  an economy is ques-
tionable. Its usage has becomes a habit from which it turns out to be difficult 
to part.)
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  When it comes to organizations with ideals, such as cultural, scien-
tific, social and religious organizations, the usual methods of  evaluation are 
inadequate. Counting quantities like money generated, numbers of  visitors or 
numbers of  publications, does little for the determination of  the qualities real-
ized. The numbers do not tell of  the greatness of  the music that an orchestra 
has made or of  the importance of  the insights that the scholars of  a particular 
university have generated. And how to identify the social and societal impact 
of  organizations? When a company is intent to make significant contributions 
to a good society, we do not have adequate tools for determining whether or 
not they actually did so. 
In chapter 11 I will present a quality impact monitor that enables organi-
zations to evaluate the realization of  desired social, cultural and other quali-
ties. It is one of  the concrete outcomes of  the conceptual framework that I 
develop here. 
How phronesis works in daily life. 
You can only truly understand how phronesis works when you experience it in 
your daily life. Here is my example. It is taken from personal life, as that is 
the life that makes most sense for me. Please fill in examples of  your own life. 
Christmas was always a rough time for me and my wife. She expected a 
great deal from Christmas, whereas I was seeking relaxation. As it happened 
we had become quite ambitious in filling the Christmas days (the Dutch have 
two Christmas days.) On Christmas Eve we eat with a friend and attend a 
Christmas meeting with carols and the like. On Christmas Day we have a din-
ner for our family (with four children) and a few friends. On the second day 
of  Christmas we go to my mother’s for a dinner with my family, and on the 
day after we get everybody over again for the birthday of  my eldest daugh-
ter. The events usually turned into quite an ordeal for me. They meant hard 
work and a dire lack of  the type of  conversations that energize me. Not much 
intellectual content here. I frequently did not make it to the last event, hav-
ing declared myself  sick by that time. (A couple of  times I actually did have a 
fever.) My wife and I ended up quarreling quite a bit with her expressing her 
doubts about my efforts and commitment, and my complaining of  too much 
social stuff.  Rough times indeed. 
So one day, a few weeks before another Christmas, we decided to be 
sensible. As I had learned from Aristotle we first needed to know the good 
we were seeking to realize. So we sat down to figure out as much. (We really 
did!) We concluded that we are seeking a good family and that means for us a 
warm, open and supportive family.  I could imagine a more spiritual goal but 
this goal would do. We called it our ideal. With that good in mind we wanted 
to create good experiences for our children and friends. 
We then determined our values. She submitted the value of  “together,” 
PHRONESIS IS THE VIRTUE IN MAKING VALUES REAL 39
suggesting that it is important to her that we do things together, as a couple. 
“Together” is maybe not a real value and it could imply other values such as a 
common responsibility, but “together” it was. My impartial spectator told me 
it was right for me (while my devil’s advocate warned me that this might not 
be in my own selfish interest.) 
We subsequently settled on the value of  being at the service of  others 
(there is no satisfactory English word for the Dutch word “dienstbaar”), as we 
figured that we do all this for our children, our family and our friends, rather 
than for our own pleasure. I agreed that being at the service of  others was 
the adult thing to do, even if  I felt somewhat uncomfortable with committing 
myself. (How about my need for intellectual conversation and free time?) 
We finally agreed that we wanted to be grateful for our ability to receive 
and feed people and for them to be willing to join us. Gratitude is a value that 
comes with the Christian tradition in which I grew up, so that came easy. 
Christmas arrived and we began with our usual program. Christmas Eve 
went well. On Christmas Day I decided to read, while my wife began the 
preparations in the kitchen. After a while she appeared in the door opening 
and all she said was: “together?” The question mark in her comment was 
distinct. I rescued myself  at that point with the excuse that I was preparing 
myself  for the speech that I usually give at our dinner. But I knew that this 
excuse wouldn’t last the day, so after half  an hour I joined her in the kitchen. 
We worked hard, and I did my best to make sure that everyone was engaged 
and got what they needed. When someone appeared bored, I got him or her 
back into a conversation. I ran around with the bottle of  wine, slipped in 
complimentary remarks here and there, and took care of  the coffee. The con-
versations during the dinners were meandering as always (according to me, 
that is), yet I found that the experience was entirely different. 
When my wife and I reflected on these Christmas proceedings after the 
guests had left, we concluded that our kids, the family and our friends all 
seemed to be content, that the dinner had been once again delicious, that I 
had done my best to be attentive to the needs of  family and friends, and that 
we were so grateful that we could do all this.
I actually felt good about it all. I felt good about having done this together 
with my wife and about having attended to the needs of  my children, my 
mother and friends. Frankly, I was surprised to note how well Aristotle had 
helped us. A good source it is, at least for me. 
In the terms I am proposing here, I experienced how it works first to be 
aware of  one’s values and then to valorize them. Practicing phronesis made me 
feel content, much more so than when I was pursuing my selfish wants (as I 
did in the days after).  
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Appendix 1. The value based approach in contrast with standard 
economics
There is no way that a few words will do justice to the complex practice that 
I call here standard economics. Even so, because I use this standard econom-
ics in contrast to the novelties of  the value based approach, I feel compelled 
to undertake the hazardous enterprise of  characterizing standard economics. 
Hazardous, because being intimately familiar with standard economics and 
its practitioners, I know that they will take issue with everything I will jot down 
here. 
The characterization of  standard economics comes first. A comparison 
with the valued based approach follows. 
A picture says a great deal. If  you know right away what this picture says, 
you have encountered standard economics at school. If  you do not, you are 
a novice. 
 
Standard economics pictures the world from a distance. This picture repre-
sents the market, and makes clear that the market is the main focus, the main 
theme in standard economics. The world is divided in two: the demand side 
and the supply side, represented by the D curve and the S curve respectively. 
The picture requires quantities (Q) of  products to be traded (on the hori-
zontal axis). It attributes a central role to the price (P) (on the vertical axis).
The picture suggests that the price is responsible for establishing equilib-
rium between demand and supply.
Behind the demand and supply curves standard economics pictures 
rational individuals and firms maximizing utility or profit. 
Standard economics is based on a system of  accounting. Rational deci-
sion makers presumably divide the world in two, just as is done in accounting: 
costs and benefits, receipts and expenditures, and assets and liabilities. 
Other important characteristics are: “markets are interdependent,” “the 
price mechanism is crucial” and “rational individuals respond to changes in 
prices” (a matter of  incentives). 
The focus is on markets. Where markets fail, government actions are 
warranted, as in the provision of  public goods, controls, regulations, taxes 
and expenditures, including welfare payments, establishment and protection 
of  property rights. 
Over the last few decades, standard economics has evolved to express 
the complexity of  markets and decision making by depicting interactions as 
games, and recognizing risks, information problems and even cognitive prob-
lems that rational decision makers have to deal with. 
The value based approach is different in all kinds of  ways. What follows is a 
preliminary list. In the final chapter we can make sense of  a more complete 
list, as a reward of  the work still to be done. 
Standard economics Value based approach
Central problem: allocation of 
scarce resources  The realization of values
The economy as a system of 
markets Standpoint of people realizing values
Value based/substantive reason Instrumental reasoning: focus on meansing
Analytical and policy oriented Interpretive, edifying and therapeutic
Quantitative Qualitative
Basic assumptions/heuristics Basic assumptions/heuristics
Rational decision makers People coping while doing the right thing, practicing phronesis
A clear distinction between pro-
duction, distribution and consump-
tion 
Consumption is also production, 
co-creation
Consumers maximize utility People realize various values by way of a range of goods
Recognize only private and collec-
tive goods
Most important goods are shared
Goals are maximization of utility, 
profit, growth and welfare
People identify specific goods to 
strive for
The economy is autonomous The economy is embedded in a culture
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Appendix 2.  How about the alleged selfishness of  people?
When listening to standard economists, and to so many others, you begin to 
believe that people are primarily greedy, self-interested and money-driven. 
Apparently, when they try to imagine the inside of  the beast that they study, 
they observe greed and self-interest as what motivates people to do what they 
do. It is not what I observe. Does this make my perspective hopelessly naïve 
and unrealistic? 
Let me clarify how I get to a different perspective: 
1. I first ask whether this observation also applies to those who make the 
assumption of  selfishness: are they themselves greedy, self-interested 
or money driven? They usually respond that they are trying to do 
the right thing but that others are greedy and such. In that case we 
basically agree. The question remains why the others appear to act 
differently. 
2. When people admit to be greedy themselves, I ask them “what is the 
greed good for?” When I keep repeating that question in response to 
the answers they give, there always turns out to be some right thing 
in the end. Often people express regret for their short-sightedness, 
ignorance and stupidities that have led them to behavior that seemed 
greedy and egoistic. I then point out the inconsistency: while others 
are greedy and the like, we are not, or wish we were not. So what if  
others are like us? 
3. Why then do others seem greedy? This is what I think. When doing 
the right thing, we do need to take into account the behavior of  oth-
ers. Other people have different interests, and may have conflicting 
ideas of  what the right thing is. I want to get the best seats for my 
family and so do you. I happen to believe that being aware of  one’s 
values is critical whereas others believe that we should take things 
as they come. So we are different. And then there is a great deal of  
ignorance, unawareness and outright stupidity. You will detect it in 
me, as I believe to see it in the behavior of  you and everyone else. I 
am trying hard to improve myself  but it is not right, I think, to make 
you and other people see things as I do. So you and I will have to 
take into account that other people are doing things differently, and 
that stupidity and ignorance are, and will always be, factors in our 
interactions with the world around. However, that is not a reason to 
assume that everyone is greedy or self-interested. 
4. I will actually show in chapter 6 that the most important goods that 
we strive for, we share with others. That makes cooperative or social 
behavior the norm, and selfish behavior the aberration. 
5. When the striving for ideals is at stake, as it is for many organizations 
and certainly for cultural, academic and religious institutions, we do 
better by departing from the assumption that all involved are seeking 
profit, power or status. Even where pecuniary profit, status, atten-
tion, ego and power are in play, we may safely assume that those are 
distractions. When confronted, they usually are exposed as such and 
the right thing comes into view. 
I conclude that the presumption that people are greedy and self-interested is 
not helpful when we try to get inside the elephant. Greed and self-interest are 
false guides for doing the right thing. Even so, when we are doing the right 
thing ourselves, we need to take into account that others may seem greedy 
and self-interested. 
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 PART 2
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Part I is mainly therapeutic. The edifying part is now ahead. In order 
to make sense of  a value based economy we are in need of  concepts and 
directives for thinking about the economy. The concept of  values has to 
come first. It will become clear that the value based approach answers to 
the question “what is important?” Price, then, is not a value.  For econo-
mists this insight may be difficult to digest, so I fear.
The next step turns out to be treacherous as it takes us from the 
awareness of  values to their valorization. We do so by the realization of  
goods, and most importantly, shared goods. The latter notion is new in 
the economics literature as far as I know. It calls for the willingness to 
contribute. That, too, is a new notion. 
Some goods are more important than others. Some goods are worth 
striving for, as you will learn in chapter 7. I suggest four dimensions for 
the determination of  values, goods and goods to strive for. 
In this book sources are forms of  capital. Chapter 8 spells them 
out and introduces a new classification of  inequalities and redefines the 
notions of  richness and poverty in passing. 
The argumentation finds its closure in the model with five spheres. 
Each sphere stands for a distinctive logic by which people and organiza-
tions realize their goods. It is a significant extension of  the two sphere 
model that is standard in economics. 

CHAPTER 5
ABOUT VALUES
We value all the time. We appreciate —“Van Gogh is a great painter” —, 
we use —“With this hammer I hit the nail on its head” —, we respect—“I 
do not like him as a person but he makes a good teacher”—,we are in awe—
“This music blew me away!”; “This Rothko painting made me cry, so deep it 
went.” —, and we are considerate—“That poor artist: let’s help her out.” We 
also humiliate, mock, despise, ignore and desecrate. Moving through life, we 
simply cannot avoid valuing people, things, situations and practices. Acting 
requires valuing. 
The value based approach is about the realization of  values. It encour-
ages awareness of  the values that we ourselves and others act upon. Also it will 
make us think about the ways in which people and organizations make their 
values real. Awareness comes first. In order to do the right thing we must first 
better understand what values are all about and what we are talking about 
when we use the term.
The challenge: how to supersede merely economic or 
financial, culturalist and moral discussions of  value
The value based approach attempts to supersede and encompass the three 
distinctive and currently prevalent ways of  dealing with values. These are 1) 
standard economics, 2) culturalist accounts (as in art criticism), and 3) moral 
philosophy.
Ad 1). Standard economics equates value with price. Accordingly, when the 
notion of  value comes up, standard economists make you think of  the worth 
of  things, or their price. Price is exchange value, i.e. the value that a good 
realizes in a market exchange. Exchange value is price. It is the answer to the 
question “how much?” What matters in this discussion, then, is the pricing 
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of  things, and the willingness of  people to pay that price in order to acquire 
those things. 
Economists are sophisticated when it comes to determining the price of  
things, even if  those things are not for sale. They can even assign a price to 
human life (and show that some humans have a higher price than others, an 
outcome that has consequences in the court of  law, for example). The impres-
sion is created that everything can be priced and that price is the only value 
that counts. 
In addition to exchange value, classical economics explains also that 
goods have use value. Accordingly, goods have exchange value because they 
have use value for the buyer. Use value alludes to the usefulness of  a good. 
Standard economics abandons that notion of  value and prefers to speak in 
terms of  preferences and utility. The idea is that people prefer some things 
over others. Preference answers the question of  what people like or don’t like, 
more or less. With the motto De gustibus non est disputandum (taste is not a sub-
ject for discussion), standard economists usually presume preferences to be a 
given and do not elaborate on or explore them. The focus on price and, with 
that, on (monetary or financial) quantities is adequate for the instrumentalist 
approach that standard economics represents.
Ad 2). In a culturalist discussion, “values” usually refer to qualities of  works 
of  art, scientific contributions, organizations, cities, countries and cultures. 
Culturalists, as I indicated previously in Chapter 1, include art historians, 
anthropologists, literary scholars, historians, philosophers, archeologists and 
cultural sociologists. They tend to be preoccupied with qualities, with the rel-
evance of  things and of  human actions and relationships. In the spectrum 
of  values/qualities-prices/quantities, they operate at the opposite end from 
standard economists: the notion of  “price” is practically non-existent in their 
discourse. (Art history books rarely mention the prices of  artworks, and sci-
entists never bring up the costs of  producing a scientific article.) In light of  
the illustration in Chapter 1, we might say that culturalists focus on the home, 
and economists on the house. 
In the famous characterization of  Oscar Wilde: the econo-
mist resembles the cynic who knows the price of  everything 
and the value of  nothing, and the culturalist the romantic 
who knows the value of  everything and the price of  nothing 
(Wilde, 1893). 
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Ad 3). In moral philosophy, values have a moral connotation as in “respect,” 
“benevolence,” “solidarity” or “honesty.” In virtue ethics, values come in the 
form of  virtues and concern our behavior such as “being courageous,” “pru-
dent,” “just,” “temperate,” “faithful,” “hopeful” and “loving.” In classical 
economics, virtues played an important role. Adam Smith dedicated an entire 
book to the discussion of  Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759). Yet, standard eco-
nomics has silenced such a discussion for being normative and therefore not 
scientific. 
A value based approach integrates all three discussions of  values. It generates 
a culturalist as well as a moral exploration of  values while recognizing the 
instrumental role of  prices. When doing the right thing we have to consider a 
wide range of  values, and need to develop a sensitivity to the elusive character 
of  values and the treacherous effects of  pricing things. 
A homely example makes the point
A typical episode: 
“I want Uggs!” 
“I really need them.”
“I want Uggs.” 
I must have made a facial expression that inspired my then 15-year-old 
daughter to stress the urgency of  her wish: “I really want them.”
“180 euro?  For those shoes? Just because you want them? There are all 
kinds of  things I may want but that does not mean that I am going to buy 
them. No way. Those shoes are ugly anyway.” The last remark was unfortu-
nate. I apparently had no idea. I admitted that point but did not budge. How 
in the hell did she get the idea that when she wants something, she will get it? 
The chant “I want it all, I want it now!” ran through my head. She stormed 
off, frustrated and agitated. 
Then my wife entered the discussion. It was not simply because our 
daughter wants those shoes, so she explained to me; she needs them—for her 
social standing, for her self-confidence. I gulped but noticed that her remarks 
changed my perspective somewhat. My perspective shifted even more when 
she continued with an appeal to our responsibility for her well-being, and my 
role as her father. 
(As it so happened, I was scheduled to leave the Netherlands—where I 
live and work—for Chicago where the Uggs would be cheaper. I went to quite 
a bit of  trouble to track down Uggs in a large department store. Upon my 
return my daughter overwhelmed me with her thanks but, as I found out later, 
I had bought the wrong ones—these were the shorties. So I ended up paying 
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the full price anyway for the right ones). 
You might read this as a story of  a spoiled daughter and permissive father, 
which is fine with me. However, I beg to differ. I tell the story to illustrate the 
way a range of  values affect and emerge in an everyday situation. And to 
show that price is not necessarily the most important value in play. 
The values that operate in an everyday situation
If  we were to follow standard economics, we would focus on the price of  Uggs 
and my willingness to pay. There is not much more to say about this, other 
than that it is quite a high price to pay. We might wonder what other things I 
would have been willing to give up in order to be able to buy the Uggs. (I actu-
ally have no idea how to determine that.) A standard economist may addition-
ally point out that my preference for the Uggs is derived from my daughter’s 
preference.  That may be so, but how will that insight affect my action?  
How about the use value of  the Uggs? This is clearly more than their 
value as comfortable shoes, although comfort is surely one of  its values. 
Qualities besides “comfort” would include the “warmth” they provide, their 
“design” (which I was inclined to value negatively), and the quality of  the 
“material” of  which the shoe is made (sheep wool and sheep leather). 
My decision to buy the shoes, however, entailed more than just the values 
of  price and comfort. If  we want to hold on to the notion of  use value, this 
case suggests that there are other values operating here as well. The shoes 
are, or so it appeared, contributing to the realization of  social values, status 
in particular, and personal values, such as the self-confidence of  my daughter. 
The high price is a signal of  social values. To her friends, it signals that 
her father was willing to pay that much for her sake. (The high price is part 
of  the marketing strategy of  the producer of  the Uggs. After purchasing the 
company from the Australian inventor, the American owner convinced movie 
stars to wear his shoes in order to generate status value for the shoes. Girls like 
my daughter picked up on that value and began working on their parents to 
get them to pay the price.)
We might conclude that the purchase of  the shoes served the realization 
of  particular social and personal values, but that is not all. I evaluated the epi-
sode quite differently. In my evaluation the purchase of  the Uggs and the con-
comitant realization of  particular social and personal values is subordinate to 
the realization of  other, for me more important, values.  To me, this episode 
is more about realizing my responsibility as a parent, and the affirmation and 
realization of  my fatherhood. In this episode I was reminded of  such values 
(by my wife), and acted upon that awareness. The price of  the Uggs actually 
distracted me from the real issue, which was my responsibility as a father. 
The story does not end here. We may need the cultural context to make 
sense of  the way in which I interpreted my responsibility as a father. A father 
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in China, Uganda or Spain may have interpreted those values differently. The 
interpretation of  fatherly responsibility might be cultural, and thus subject to 
other values like honor, fairness, authority and autonomy. Furthermore, other 
fathers in the Netherlands may simply have said no to such a request; they 
may have argued that it is the father’s responsibility to convey to his kids that 
there are constraints, that we need to make choices and that choosing Uggs 
for that price is not an option. They may think that I missed the opportunity 
to teach my kid about prudence. 
Nevertheless, multiple values operate in the episode. Did I do the right 
thing? I am not sure. As the principle of  phronesis indicates, I weighed various 
values, deliberated with the various interested parties and decided to buy the 
shoes. I did not evaluate the episode with those involved, so I only can guess as 
to whether or not I did the right thing. A value based approach is not paving 
the road to secure and predictable outcomes. Phronesis has uncertainty written 
all over it. 
Is this just a homely example of  trivial moments in life? I don’t think so. 
Similar moments occur all the time in all kinds of  situations. They occur in 
personal situations. (What to do tonight: Read? Send emails? Watch a movie? 
Go out for dinner with my wife? Or all of  the above?) They occur in organiza-
tional settings. (What should a museum director do after learning that a major 
sponsor plans to withdraw: Go ahead with a blockbuster program in spite of  
the artistic and financial risks? Approach a bank with a dubious reputation in 
the hope that the bank has interest in using the reputation of  the museum? 
Or should he prepare cuts in the staff?) And they occur at the political level 
(when politicians decide to raise taxes, cut unemployment benefits or lower 
the subsidies for the arts). 
Price or value?
The challenge that I face is to articulate a conceptual framework that guar-
antees that the issues that really matter for doing the right thing become part 
of  the conversation and, consequently, that relegates the otherwise dominant 
discussion of  the transactions, the prices and anything else quantifiable to its 
appropriate, subsidiary position. 
The framework to overcome is that of  standard economics since it domi-
nates the instrumentalist phase that (Western?) societies are going through. 
Standard economics makes us think of  what we do in terms of  choices made 
on the basis of  our preferences. The value that matters here is the price that 
we have to pay, or that we receive. That value functions as a constraint; it 
limits what we would like to realize. 
When I consider the homely situation in this frame, I am to focus on 
the choice I have—buying the Uggs or not—based on the preferences that 
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influence my choice—a derived preference in this case as I have to prefer 
the preference of  my daughter—and the constraint of  the price of  the Uggs. 
Since I ended up buying the Uggs, I have expressed my willingness to pay the 
180 euros. The choice is rational because it realized the best of  all possible 
outcomes. 
The notion of  phronesis, or practical wisdom, expresses a different frame. 
It suggests that we have limited knowledge (usually not a big issue in the stand-
ard economics frame), that we grope our way around, and that we weigh 
various options and do so in response to all kinds of  values that matter to us. 
The price to pay, or to receive, is only one of  the factors in the deliberation 
that is phronesis.  
When acknowledging the notion of  phronesis, my situation makes more 
sense. It does more justice to the confusion that I experienced, the groping 
that I did, the deliberations with my daughter, my wife and myself, and the 
figuring out of  what really mattered to me. Realizing that I was willing to pay 
the 180 euros had more to do with the values of  fatherhood and responsibil-
ity than with my valuing those Uggs. Even for my daughter, I felt that other 
values were in play, in particular the values of  social status, belonging and 
self-confidence. 
Economists who practice standard economics consider all those values to be 
part of  what they call the external economy. When I point out that my value of  
fatherhood played a role, as well as the harmony in the family, they will say 
that those are external to the issue at hand: the purchase of  the Uggs. Their 
notion of  externalities works well to silence my concerns in their conversa-
tion. Yet, at the same time, it renders that conversation meaningless and quite 
irrelevant to my situation, since the values that they call externalities are what 
the interaction is all about. The value based approach that I am developing 
here includes that which is excluded by the standard economic conversation. 
About the concept of  value
The concept of  value is treacherous. If  you decide to embrace the concept, 
you have been forewarned. Values are not precise and you cannot hold onto 
them. People do not walk around with their values written on their forehead. 
(But let’s face it: the utility functions that economists prefer are just as abstract 
as values, and just as imprecise. Unlike utility value, invites more precise char-
acterization, as we will see shortly.) Even when you and I sense a value, we 
may have a hard time articulating it. When someone else articulates a value, 
like when a young fellow shouts at us something about respect, you and I may 
wonder what he means by it. (I have an idea, but does he?)
Let us try to be more specific in an attempt to further the discussion.
Values are relational concepts in the sense that they are at work in the 
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interactions among people and in the interactions between people and things 
or states of  affairs. We value things in comparison with other things, or the 
characteristics of  things. At this moment I value the taste of  coffee and, 
because I am writing, the quietness of  my surroundings. Tonight I may very 
well value a noisy party that I will attend. 
When we value something, someone, an action, a relationship or a state 
of  affair, that someone, action, relationship or state of  affair is important to 
us somehow. What makes something or someone important, are qualities of  
goodness that we identify with that something or someone. 
When I want to know your values, I will first ask you what is important to 
you. Our valuation of  things, relationships, actions and states of  affair is based 
on our values, on what we consider to be important. 
Asking the question “what is important to you” is different from asking 
the question “what do you need.” My daughter’s answer to the latter ques-
tion would surely be “I need Uggs.” Or should she rather say “I want Uggs”? 
We want all kinds of  things, but do we need them? I want an ice cream right 
now. You may want a drink. But do we need them? We need things because 
they satisfy our needs for nourishment, security, shelter, a sense of  belonging 
and, ultimately, self-actualization, in accordance with the pyramid of  Maslow 
(Maslow, 1943). In that sense when asking “what do you need,” you are made 
to think of  elements in that pyramid of  needs. 
Asking “what is important to you” directs the attention to the list of  needs 
but compels us to be more precise. It is asking for particular values. They most 
likely will still fall into the category of  need—after all, we need to realize our 
values—but are likely to be more precise, more concrete. In the case of  the 
Uggs I would have answered “being a good father,” “a happy family,” “the 
well-being of  my daughter” or “Dutch culture.” I would not have realized 
such answers if  I had been asked “what do you need?” (I probably would 
then have answered something childish like “Quietness! Just leave me alone! 
I need to write!”) 
Accordingly, preferences are not necessarily values. You may be craving 
a drink right now, and thus have a strong preference for that good, but if  I 
were to probe you on what is really important to you right now, you would 
probably acknowledge that it is not the drink itself—you may even realize that 
the drink is bad for you—and that you should prefer instead more study time, 
more brain power or something like that. Quite a few students do not care for 
reading serious books—it is not part of  their utility function—but the hope is 
that this changes, that they develop such a preference and that this preference 
becomes a value. 
In the realm of  the arts and sciences, the difference between preferences 
and values is critical. When you first attend a modern dance performance you 
might dislike it, but when you go more often, you may start liking modern 
dance and begin to value the practice. You may even want to start dancing 
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yourself. Changing preferences and turning certain preferences into values: 
that is what education is about. 
Asking for the values of  yourself, someone else, an organization or a soci-
ety, is to ask: “What is important for you, for the organization or for this 
society?” This goes beyond asking: “What do you, the organization or society 
need?” Asking “what do you, the organization or society need” goes beyond 
asking “what do you want” or, as an economist might phrase the question 
“what are your preferences.” The instrumental question is “how much.” The 
expected answer would come in the form of  a number, usually a price. The 
importance of  things is (always?) a matter of  qualities or values. 
We value not only things, but also states of  affairs, situations, practices and 
behavior. When I value behavior, a practice or an action, I consider these in 
light of  values like honesty, loyalty, sincerity, prudence, temperance, courage, 
justice, faithfulness, hope or love. When I perceive in your action the realiza-
tion of  one of  those values, i.e. characteristics that are important to me, I will 
approve of  and praise your action. In case you violate one of  those values, 
I will disapprove and may admonish you. I will do the same when I observe 
What is important for you? 
I was invited to a workshop in which homeless people in my town 
repair bicycles for ten euros a day. It was coffee time so we sat around 
in a circle with plastic coffee cups. There were around twelve of  them. 
I began asking them to tell their story. The guy sitting next to me was 
mainly depressed and had not much of  a story to tell. Another guy 
had beaten up his estranged wife and had violated a restraining order. 
As a consequence he had lost everything.  A young woman had lost a 
relationship and was subsequently refused by her mother. Another guy 
was in hiding to avoid his creditors.  I was sad to learn how people have 
to suffer such bad fate, bad luck and outright stupidity. 
 I then asked them the question: “What is important to you?” If  
I had asked them “what do you want?” they might have asked me for 
more money, for a beer or for drugs. Now they answered differently. 
The depressed guy did not respond but the next one said without hesi-
tation: “To belong somehow, somewhere.” They all answered some-
thing similar. I pressed some of  them a little and then they invariably 
mentioned the importance of  being significant to others, to contribute 
soguring out what they can do to realize their values. That is why they 
are without home, without oikos.  Giving them money or drugs surely 
does not address their problems. First we need to figure out what they 
can do themselves before we can determine the appropriate support.  
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the practices of  a family, a group of  students or an entire people. I appreciate 
the Arabs for their hospitality, Americans for their enthusiasm and the Dutch 
for their pragmatism. And I disapprove of  all kinds of  other practices that 
each of  these people exhibit. Values that connect with behavior, practices or 
actions are also known as virtues. 
When I value an object, a relationship, a community, an organization or 
whatever other thing or situation, I asses its characteristics in light of  values 
such as beauty, usefulness, friendliness, warmth, diversity. Its value depends 
on the values I hold dear. When the object enables me to realize some of  those 
values, I will like it, cherish it and maybe even adore it. When it does not, I 
will not buy it, discard it or forget about it. I will call such values either content 
values or goal values. Content values characterize the inner qualities of  a thing, a 
situation or an entity. Goal values characterize the intent of  a thing, a situation 
or an entity; in other words, the goal or desired result at which a thing, situa-
tion or entity is directed. 
Values and culture
I hold values personally. That means that I consider new insights, veracity, 
loyalty, compassion, a good painting, tasty ice cream and nice shoes important 
for myself. In the realization of  these values I may need to involve others, but 
I experience these values individually.  
At the same time, I share my values with various groups of  people. My 
academic values I share with some people—and certainly not all—in the aca-
demic community. My artistic values I share with all kinds of  people, and my 
Dutch values with the Dutch. It is in the sharing of  values that we experience 
being part of  a culture. 
You and I are part of, participate in and are subject to cultures. Being 
cultured means that you and I hold values that reflect the culture of  which we 
are a part. As a Dutchman I value speed skating (especially the 10 kilometer), 
the Dutch soccer team, Dutch history, coziness (“gezelligheid”), whereas as 
an American (my second citizenship) I value college basketball, entrepreneur-
ial spirit, an attractive college campus, driving through the countryside, the 
farmer’s market and Dairy Queen. I could think of  my love of  speed skating 
as an individual value, but it clearly is not. There is no chance I would have 
loved it had I been born and raised in Uganda or India. 
The values of  a culture are shared values; the sharing of  distinct and 
distinguishing values constitutes a culture. 
Distinguishing values
There is a temptation to discuss values in abstract terms. However, once we 
have agreed that values are in play in what we do, the challenge is then to 
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Values purged from the conversation of  economists. 
Classical economists introduced the subject of  value into the conversa-
tion of  economists. Actually, it was Aristotle who distinguished around 
350 BC between exchange value and use value. Classical economists 
picked up the distinction and used it to motivate all their intellectual 
attention for exchange value. The determination of  use value was basi-
cally left out of  the discussion. 
Karl Marx 
20th century economists have done everything in their might to purge 
the concept of  value from their conversation. They judged that the 
effort of  Karl Marx to derive an objective measure of  (exchange) value 
of  a good from the amount of  labor spent making it had failed. They 
had furthermore realized that the subjective valuation that the margin-
alists had advanced as an alternative was also insufficient in accounting 
for exchange value. 
So when John Hicks wrote his book entitled Value and Capital 
(Hicks, 1939) and Gerard Debreu a book with the title The Theory of  
Value (Debreu, 1959), they did so to eliminate the concept of  value and 
to show how a price gets established in a (mechanical) interplay of  the 
forces of  demand and supply. Debreu even succeeded to avoid using 
the term value in his book altogether. So much for a theory of  value! 
Textbooks of  economics, beginning with the famous textbook of  
Paul Samuelson (the one that I had to study), avoid the concept of  
value and speak of  prices and utilities instead (Samuelson, 1947).
Only a few economists, such as the Austrians, held on to the notion 
of  value. 
20th century philosophers, too, began to suppress and ignore the 
notion of  value in their conversations. In their analytical approach 
there was no way to articulate the conditions for such a vague concept; 
so it was left out. Postmodern philosophers do not like the concept 
because it suggests something real out there that is not. Values need 
language in order to be articulated and thus to become real, and that 
makes them suspect. At least in their conversation they do. 
I am grateful for the critical contributions of  economists and phi-
losophers. At the same time, I have become convinced that they have 
gone overboard with their dismissal of  the notion of  value. See this as 
an attempt to rescue value and bring it back on board. 
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articulate which values are in play and the strength of  their influence. In order 
to understand what drives our behavior, we must be aware of  the important 
values. When something is not right, we want to know which values have been 
undervalued or ignored entirely. The point of  the value based approach is to 
get specific about the values involved. 
One difficulty is in accurately naming values. When I resist the request to 
foot the bill for expensive shoes, the relevant question to ask is which values 
are in play. What is so important for me to disappoint my daughter? If  I am 
afraid that she is getting spoiled, then I am appreciating a sense of  responsibil-
ity. That would be a virtue. Or I may question the esthetic quality of  Uggs. 
That would suggest that I care about esthetics, a content value. 
The other difficulty is that we usually do not know right away what val-
ues are in play. In the case of  the shoe incident, I myself  tend to resist the 
comfort-seeking aspect that seems inherent to so much consumerist behavior 
and appreciate the stimulation that people can derive from reading a good 
book or attending a serious play. This distinction I owe to Tibor Scitovsky as 
he describes in The Joyless Economy (Scitovsky, 1976). Had my daughter wanted 
to buy a book or attend a play with friends, I would have drawn my wallet 
immediately. This I realize only after some probing. We usually need to probe 
our motives, our emotions, too, in order to figure out which values are in play. 
To facilitate the probing, and to remain alert to how values discipline the 
behavior of  others, it helps to distinguish among types of  values. The first dis-
tinction is one that I already made earlier: the distinction between values per-
taining to behavior or practices and values pertaining to situations and things. 
Virtues are values that pertain to behavior
Ask people about their values and they will name values like “honesty,” “curi-
osity,” “modesty,” “courage” and “prudence.” People who work in organi-
zations will name values like “loyalty,” “customer orientation,” “passion,” 
“integrity” and “authenticity.” All those values are qualities that pertain to 
what they do, to their actions, to practices they are involved in. Apparently, 
they appreciate actions that are honest, courageous, modest and prudent, and 
that express curiosity. Those values, or qualities, are called virtues. 
Virtues were a common topic of  conversation for the ancient Greeks and 
Romans. Children learned about them at school until the end of  the 19th cen-
tury. They transpired in novels such as Jane Austin´s Pride and Prejudice and in 
American television series such as The Andy Griffith Show and House on the Prairie. 
Then they were forgotten—or suppressed?—and now they are back in the 
attention of  philosophers and even some economists. Deirdre McCloskey in 
particular dedicates her magnum opus to a study of  what she calls the bourgeois 
virtues (McCloskey, 2007).
In the anecdote of  the Uggs I had to be virtuous in my role as father, to 
58 DOING THE RIGHT THING: A VALUE BASED ECONOMY
figure out how to be prudent, loving and wise. 
As Aristotle and other Greek philosophers teach us, virtues are internal-
ized behavioral values. An honest man is honest simply because he is, and not 
because he fears punishment, or expects compliments. A good friend is loyal 
because she just is, and not because she wants to be a good friend. 
Being able to do the right thing is reserved for virtuous people. You need 
to be aware of  your values; you need to assess the situation. But when it comes 
to being honest and loyal, you just do it. If  you have to tell yourself  “let me be 
honest and loyal this time,” you can’t do it quite right. 
It takes training and endless practice to get it right, to be virtuous in 
one’s actions, at least so the ancient Greeks and Roman philosophers remind 
us. They could very well be right. Most of  the training we get takes place at 
home, on the street, in the schoolyard and later at work. Others (hopefully) 
correct us when we do not get it right (“that was not honest of  you” or “you 
betrayed me, you little shit”). The culture we are part of  may help shape our 
virtues. In a culture that celebrates friendship we may learn the meaning of  
loyalty more quickly than in a culture that is more individualistic. 
Aristotle teaches us in his Nicomachean Ethics that there are four cardi-
nal virtues. They are cardinal because they inform all actions directed at the 
realization of  values. They are the following:
• Prudence: acting thoughtfully, cautiously, with foresight and taking into 
account the relevant circumstances;
• Temperance: doing not too much and not too little, knowing the right 
middle ground between the extremes;
• Courage: overcoming fear in order to do the right thing;
• Justice: doing so with regard to the feelings and interests of  others.
Later Christian theologians like Thomas Aquinas added the three theological 
virtues to complete the seven cardinal virtues:
• Faith: trusting yourself, your intuition, your background, your karma, 
the supernatural, God;
• Hope: trusting that some good will come of  your action;
• Love: feeling deeply connected with the other, others and accepting 
the other as he or she is.  
I immediately acknowledge the gross simplification of  what the virtues stand 
for. There is an extensive literature that elaborates and problematizes each 
and all of  these virtues, including McCloskey’s bourgeois virtues (McCloskey, 
2007). But I have to discipline myself  and limit this discussion to the distin-
guishing of  the virtues. For the sake of  elucidation, the following box shows 
how the cardinal virtues inform doing the right thing.
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Acting virtuously in accordance with the seven classical 
virtues. 
Take the value or virtue Honesty. Quite a few Dutch people, and 
not only they, will elect honesty as their most important virtue. 
Apparently Dutch culture highlights honesty as a virtue to strive 
for. How then to be honest?  When are you truly honest or, as 
Aristotle would put it, excellent in honesty?
You are excellent in your honesty when a) you have internal-
ized the seven cardinal virtues and b) you enact each one of  them 
in your being honest. A truly honest person is in no need of  being 
reminded of  the cardinal virtues; he or she enacts them without 
thinking about them. Most mortals need to be reminded of  the 
cardinal virtues from time to time. Claiming honesty as a virtue is 
easy, being truly honest proves to be quite a challenge as the follow-
ing considerations make clear:
• Honesty and prudence: in order to be honest in a certain situ-
ation you need to know what the situation is, what the rel-
evant factors are, and what brings about the situation. You 
may think you are honest when accusing your teacher of  
doing a lousy job or when accusing a student of  cheating, but 
is that the prudent thing to do? Are you well-informed? 
Are you aware of  the relevant factors? Have you taken into 
account the possible consequences? Being prudently honest 
implies being thoughtful and aware. 
• Honesty and temperance: You can be dishonest by not telling 
the truth. You can also be too honest; in that case you are 
rude, obnoxious or naïve. Temperance is about knowing the 
right middle ground between being too honest or not honest 
enough. When I tell my children to be honest and they in 
turn tell a visitor that she has an ugly nose, I have to correct 
them by explaining that honesty does not mean that you say 
whatever is on your mind. Finding the right middle ground 
is, as Aristotle already taught, the crux of  being virtuous.
• Honesty and courage: At times you need to overcome fears in 
order to speak the truth. When you have cheated at your 
work or cheated on your partner and you decide on the basis 
of  prudence and temperance that you have to confess your 
misdeed, you may refrain from doing so out of  fear for the 
consequences. You may get fired, after all, or your partner 
may break off the relationship. That is when the virtue of  
courage is required. Being honest needs being courageous.
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• Honesty and justice: When being honest, you want to consider not 
only the feelings of  the other to whom you are honest, but also 
take into account the interests and feelings of  others who may be 
affected. Justice is the virtue of  knowing the right proportion in 
dealing with others. When I am honest in my criticisms of  a stu-
dent’s performance, I have to consider whether I am just towards 
the other students. Maybe I should be equally honest to the oth-
ers. Or am I justified in taking an exception with respect to this 
student?  As Aristotle already points out, justice is a complicated 
virtue. 
• Honesty and faith: When being honest, it is important to 
have confidence, to trust one’s own judgment. Some may 
speak in the name of  Allah, others may pray to God, 
or meditate to find support for their being honest. Faith  
provides a backing for whatever we do. 
• Honesty and hope: Being honest in the right way should imply the 
prospect for improvement, for positive change, for flourishing, or 
self-actualization. Being honest just out of  revenge or in order to 
destroy is not virtuous. 
• Honesty and love: Most important of  all virtues, love stands for 
compassion for the other, for feeling deeply connected, for empa-
thy. Honesty out of  love is being honest with the intention to add 
to the flourishing of  those involved or affected. It is said that if  
love is the virtue in charge, all other virtues are implied. 
Being honest, therefore, is easier said than done. It requires the inte-
riorization of  all seven virtues in such a way that their enactment is 
automatic and does not require conscious deliberation. The virtuous 
person is prudent, temperate, courageous, just, faithful, hopeful and 
loving. Failing on one of  the virtues can lead to criminal behavior. A 
criminal can be prudent, temperate and courageous but fails to be just. 
In that case, he most likely also fails on the virtue of  love. 
Overseeing this, it becomes understandable why we humans are so 
often clumsy, inadequate and even stupid in what we do. I beg for your 
compassion for the way in which I handled the case of  the Uggs. How 
to be prudent, loving and wise in a situation like that? 
(An interesting issue that arises in this context is whether we can 
learn to be virtuous, whether we get better as we grow older and more 
experienced? Adams (2006) show that virtue ethicists diverge on this 
issue.)
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Values pertaining to situations, things, practices and people
The case of  the Uggs accentuates other values aside from the virtues involved. 
There is a value concerning the situation as such—how to value a request of  
a daughter and the subsequent discussion? The Uggs represent certain values 
of  esthetics but also social values (as in the status of  owning them). The case 
brought out for me the values of  fatherhood and family. 
As noted above, values are the answer to the question “what is impor-
tant.” Value surveys, like the world value survey, gather the responses of  people 
from all over the world in all kinds of  issues, such as family, religion, gen-
der, diversity, authority, democracy, environment, nature, individuality, free-
dom, discipline and justice. Inglehart and Welzel have constructed interesting 
value maps of  the world that bring out the clustering of  values (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). This tells us, for example, that Chinese adhere to Confucian 
values such as harmony, and that Americans rate individuality highly. For 
the Dutch, the differences between their values and the values dear to their 
southern neighbors, the Belgians, may account for the difficulties experienced 
in Dutch-Belgian collaborations. 
David Throsby, a fellow cultural economist, is pursuing a value based 
approach as well. In a discussion of  cultural goods, like paintings and theatre 
performances, he lists an often-cited set of  six values that pertain to such 
goods: aesthetic value, spiritual value, symbolic value, social value, symbolic 
value and authenticity. Each of  these values point at a particular quality of  
the artwork (Throsby, 2001). This list demonstrates the multi-faceted charac-
ter of  an artwork. But when we are interested in the “realization of  values” 
we are in need of  more. 
In the case of  the Uggs I was not only realizing aesthetic and social values 
for my daughter, but I also realized other, contextual values such as the value 
of  family and fatherhood. Like the buying of  Uggs, the enjoyment or pur-
chase of  artistic goods can be in pursuit of  all kinds of  values, including com-
panionship, good conversation, civilization and values not listed by Throsby, 
such as consolation, inspiration and craftsmanship.
That is why I suggest we consider a wide range of  possible values, clus-
tered across four dimensions. I have experimented with clustering in all kinds 
of  settings, for example in the context of  professional organizations and cul-
tural organizations, and am satisfied so far with its applicability. The main 
intention of  this clustering is to make some rough distinctions that will facili-
tate our thinking about and working with values. 
I distinguish the domains of  a) personal values, b) social values, c) societal 
values and d) transcendental or cultural values—transcendental as these val-
ues transcend the personal and the social, and cultural insofar as they evoke 
C2, C3 (i.e. the domains of  the arts, religion and civilization). (C1—culture as 
perceived by anthropologists—stands for social, societal and transcendental 
values.)  
62 DOING THE RIGHT THING: A VALUE BASED ECONOMY
a) The domain of personal values. 
All values are personal in the sense that individuals hold them. Yet, there are 
certain values that pertain to the relationship with oneself. Shakespeare has 
personal value to me since his plays inspire me and challenge my intellec-
tual, interpretive and emotional skills. The play King Lear has personal value 
because it now is a source from which I can draw to make sense of  situations 
(of  love and betrayal). I may value my skills, my health and my memories, 
and wished I could value my wisdom. All those are personal values. They are 
qualities concerning myself, my own individuality. 
In the context of  organizations, personal values tend to be easily over-
looked. Yet organizations clearly serve the realization of  personal values, 
such as one’s skills or craftsmanship or one’s ego. Thanks to the university I 
attended, I can realize things that are important for myself. 
In the case of  the Uggs, my fatherhood could be considered a personal 
value as it pertains to myself. Similarly, people can personally value their sta-
tus, their function, the recognition or respect that they receive.
Other personal values that are often mentioned are: health, autonomy, 
independence, authenticity, awareness, integrity, curiosity (a good value for 
an academic), tenacity, perseverance, fun, joy, personal growth, flourishing 
and so on. 
Let me point out that many of  these values are ill-defined and, when con-
sidered on their own, vacuous. “Authenticity” sounds good, but the underlying 
question is “when are you authentic.” You are actually authentic when you 
act in accordance with your values. So if  you cannot tell me what those values 
are, you cannot tell when you are being authentic. Hitler was an authentic 
individual, as was Jesus. So what kind of  authenticity do you aspire? The 
same could be said of  “integrity”: you are integer when you act your values. 
And what constitutes personal growth or flourishing? Hitler may have flour-
ished and grown personally, too. When people appeal to such “values,” they 
still need to specify the actual values that they stand for. 
b) The domain of social values. 
Values are social when they indicate qualities of  human relationships, that is, 
relationships with people we know. Friendship is a good example. Of  course, 
I hold the value myself  and therefore you could consider it a personal value. 
But the value of  friendship clearly pertains to a situation that involves at least 
one other person and therefore extends beyond myself. If  realized the value is 
a shared value: friends share the value friendship. The same applies to values 
such as family, collegiality, community, neighborhood and coziness. 
The Uggs represent a social value to my daughter, while the whole epi-
sode contributed to a social value that is (my) “family.” A Shakespeare play 
has social values for me as it enables me to contribute to a friendship—when I 
attend the play with friends—to share the appreciation of  theatre with others 
in my environment. I might also realize a social value in the form of  status 
or prestige by being able to tell others that I saw King Lear the other night.
Friendship, status, intimacy, respect, dignity, commitment, community 
and family are social values. A club, a neighborhood or a team can be impor-
tant for us for the relationships that they foster; they stand for a social value, 
too. 
c) The domain of societal values. 
Values are societal when they concern our relationships with a large social 
entity such as a society. I do not think that the Uggs episode reflects a societal 
value unless we consider healthy families to be important for society at large. 
A Shakespeare play stands a better chance of  generating a societal value as it 
represents an important thread in the tapestry that we call (our) civilization. 
Performing the play contributes to the quality of  life in the society of  which 
I am a part. I may also value its educational value for young and old, for its 
addressing themes of  hubris and loyalty that have societal importance. 
Societal values include political values such as justice, solidarity, sustain-
ability, freedom, emancipation, security, peace, patriotism and lawfulness. In 
political actions we realize societal values. When I plea for more attention for 
the arts or religion in my society, I attend to the societal values inherent to the 
arts and religion. 
Societal values include cultural values where culture refers to C1, the 
shared values of  a people. When we are considering a group of  people in 
terms of  what they share and in what respect they are different from other 
people, we will identify their shared values as cultural values. Prudence is a 
value of  Dutch culture, while pioneering is a typical American value. Cultural 
values also characterize organizations as Geert Hofstede has demonstrated 
(Hofstede, 2003). The theatre company performing the play might have a cul-
ture of  its own, and therefore operates in accordance with distinctive values. 
Think of  nations and you will think of  cultural values like hospitality, 
parsimony, fun loving, serious, prudent, exuberant, authoritarian, discipline, 
respect for elders. 
d) The domain of transcendental or cultural values.   
In this domain we cherish all those values that do not pertain to ourselves, to 
relationships with people we know or to societies at large, but rather to some-
thing abstract, some ideal, some kind of  conversation of  a practice, an idea, 
a science or an art form. These values transcend the personal, the social and 
the societal, and are therefore called transcendental values. 
Transcendental values include historical, artistic and scientific values. 
Qualities that are specific to the historical, artistic and scientific practices are 
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historical, artistic or scientific values. Shakespeare has historical value for his 
having played a role in 17th century England and having contributed to a 
tradition through the centuries since then. His artistic values are, for example, 
the literary qualities of  his texts, and the dramatic qualities that inspire liter-
ary critics to produce endless interpretations. Its scientific values come about 
in the academic discussions that his plays have generated, especially in the 
humanities. 
Historical and scientific values include the value of  truthfulness, and 
artistic values are the qualities of  beauty, the sublime, experimental and 
shocking. Other cultural values are moral values. When we consider the good-
ness, righteousness or virtuousness of  (human) actions and behavior, we take 
our moral values into account. King Lear is all about moral values such as 
the value of  loyalty, of  modesty (by portraying King Lear as a man who is 
full of  himself  at first), and of  love (Cordelia continues to love her father even 
after he has denounced her). In the dramatic moment that the father compels 
Cordelia to profess her love, Cordelia has to weigh her options. Is she going 
to succumb to the deceitful behavior of  her sisters or does she stick to her val-
ues? When this brings about the wrath of  her father, the viewer has to wonder 
whether she did the right thing. 
Moral values include honor, respect, loyalty and being just, compassion-
ate, caring, faithful and courageous. And then there are the religious or spir-
itual values. In our relationship to the transcendental—to that what is more, 
to the metaphysical—we realize values such as holiness, sacredness, enlight-
enment. Watching King Lear may give me a spiritual experience (it did … 
not), a sense of  being part of  something magnificent, of  the sublime. Young 
people say that they get such an experience at a dance party or when listening 
to music. Religious ceremonies are designed to realize transcendental values; 
some scientists do so in probing the mysteries of  life. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic values
Are transcendental values intrinsic? Are artistic values intrinsic? The ques-
tion pops up in discussions about the values of  the arts. There are people 
who adamantly defend the intrinsic values of  the art and there are those who 
deny that there are such values. I do think that there are values intrinsic to the 
arts, but to make that clear I am in need of  other concepts, concepts that will 
emerge in the next chapter. (See the section Art is not for sale.)  
How about use values? And financial values? 
Of  course, we appreciate objects also for their functional value. Food has the 
value of  nourishment and with a hammer we can hit nails on their head. 
Uggs are comfortable shoes that keep feet warm in cold temperatures. The 
performance of  King Lear has the functional value of  being theatre. A good 
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saw is good for sawing; a knife for cutting. 
When classical economists spoke about use value, they usually had func-
tional values in mind; nowadays most economists will recognize that other 
values are involved, but it is not common to make such values explicit as I am 
doing here.
Use value is practical. I value my computer for its usefulness. With my 
computer I can process this text. But that is of  another order than the scien-
tific or inspirational value that this text hopefully has for others. I do not write 
in order to use my computer; I write in order to be truthful and realize my 
values of  good writing, scholarship and our civilization. 
Use values are instrumental. You and I are dependent on all kinds of  
things due to their usefulness to us—hammers, computers, advice, haircuts, 
vegetables, cars and roads, for example. Standard economics focuses on what 
is useful and the pricing thereof. The value based approach takes us beyond 
that what is merely useful and directs the attention to what is important to us. 
How about economic values? It is common to suggest that things have 
economic value for their ability to be exchanged for a monetary amount. The 
Uggs are good for 180 euro and a play of  King Lear is good for subsidies, 
the sale of  tickets and a source of  income for the actors and other profession-
als involved in the production. Much of  the economic discussion focuses on 
those financial values, for that is the form that economic values take in these 
instances: they represent a monetary amount. So should I not include them 
as a separate category? 
In a value based approach financial values are instrumental values; they 
are functional. The reason is that a monetary amount has no personal, social, 
societal or transcendental value in and of  itself. Money needs to be trans-
ferred into some kind of  good in order to realize values that really matter to 
us. When actors use their income to buy food, pay the rent and pick up the 
tab at a restaurant, they realize the things that they want, need or find impor-
tant. The theatre company will use the revenues of  ticket sales and subsidies 
to realize a great performance of  King Lear, to create a great artistic team 
of  actors and a director and, who knows, to contribute to a rich tradition of  
theatre. Prices, or the quantities of  money they stand for, are intermediaries. 
A bundle of  money on its own is just that: a bundle of  money. It has value 
because it holds the promise for some goodies that can be acquired with it. 
Those goodies enable the realization of  actual values. People are willing to 
pay an amount of  money for a ticket because in doing so they anticipate the 
realization of  values that are important for them. The ticket itself  is just that: 
a ticket. 
A price can have social value as in the case of  the price of  the Uggs. The 
extravagant price signals among girls the sacrifice parents are willing to make 
for their daughters. It transforms the good into what is called a positional good; 
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that is, a good that conveys to its owner a special social position. 
Accordingly, exchange value or price is, as a rule, not a true value. It is the 
number that is the outcome of  rather complex processes. It serves an impor-
tant function as it tells the spenders what they have to give up in other goods 
(or values) and it tells the receivers what goods (or values) they can acquire. 
The price affects their actions; spenders refrain from spending when the price 
is too high, and the receivers will stop performing when the price is too low. 
That is more or less it. It does not tell much, if  anything at all, about the other 
values at stake. 
To both parties exchange value, or the price, has a merely instrumental 
function. It is a means to realize the relevant values. Price in itself  is meaning-
less and worthless. It is just a number. What matters to those dealing with it, 
are the values that it enables to realize. 
An important function of  price or exchange value is that of  signaling. 
An increasing price for an artwork signals that the seller anticipates a higher 
willingness to pay. When the price decreases, market participants read that as 
a signaling of  waning interest in that work. A zero price for water, that most 
useful good, signals abundant supply; a high price might mean that the water 
is scarce, as it may be in the middle of  a desert or in a hut high up the moun-
tain. A high price for a concert tells many people that they better refrain from 
attending, or it must be so special that the sacrifice has to be worth it. When 
people are not willing to pay the price for a performance, the theatre director 
may infer that a) the performance is no good or b) the price is too high or c) 
both. Accordingly, participants in the market will act on the basis of  how they 
interpret prices. 
Thinking about exchange values stimulates the makers to think of  the 
others, of  what the others value. Exchange value signifies the encounter of  
different worlds, of  the world of  making art and all other worlds, including 
the worlds of  someone writing books, or being accountable in a difficult mar-
riage, or being young and eager for some meaning in life.
But that does not render prices valuable in and of  themselves. 
Furthermore, the number that represents a price is an imperfect indicator 
of  the values realized. It leaves out a lot; it hides the values that really matter.
What, then, is the reason that exchange value receives so 
much attention in everyday conversation and in political 
discourse? 
One reason is that exchange value is a means to acquire the things that 
we want or need. If  the theatre company is not able to realize sufficient 
means for exchange, then it cannot pay its actors and will have to close 
down. 
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So what to say when the manager of  a theatre tells triumphantly that all 
performances of  King Lear have been sold out? I will first compliment him 
and then, if  I have a chance, ask him how he knows that the play has been 
a success. When he looks at me strangely, I will point out that in order to 
know about the success, he will need to know more about the values that the 
people involved have realized. How did the play work for those who watched 
it?  What has it meant for the actors? Is the government or foundation that 
provided the subsidy satisfied that its criteria were met? If  he is frank, he will 
grant that the numbers of  visitors and the receipts say little to nothing about 
those values. Might a smaller number of  visitors who were more involved 
mean more success? It is possible. So much for the numbers. 
During a dinner with colleagues I could make the point as follows (after 
they had expressed their skepticism). I first ask what the dinner is good for. 
Sure, we were in need of  nutrients, but that is not why we are sitting here. No, 
the point is that we want to have a conversation. Accordingly, the value we 
really care for is the value of  the conversation we share, the contact we make, 
the hope maybe of  a future collaboration. Those are the most important val-
ues that we take away from the dinner table. 
Yet, what counts in the statistics is the amount we pay for the dinner and 
drinks. That will be counted as consumption and that is what economic mod-
els will work with. With that amount, accountants can determine the income 
that our dinner generated for the people of  the restaurant. All that is interest-
ing all right, but it says little to nothing about the point of  the dinner and that 
is our conversation. Accordingly, the important values that we realized are 
unaccounted for and the standard economic analysis misses the point. 
Another reason is that, in an instrumentalist age, people are used 
to thinking in terms of  numbers. The big advantage of  exchange val-
ues is that they can be numbered.
Another reason is that exchange values refer to all kinds of  values 
that they command without the need to specify them. Exchange value 
is generic. So when we hear that someone like Warren Buffet or Bill 
Gates owns billions, we are free to fantasize about all the goods they 
can acquire: about the yachts they can buy, the large houses, the luxu-
rious vacations and the company of  the rich and famous. We are not 
compelled to know what values they actually realize, how warm their 
homes are, how solid their friendships and how much they are in touch 
with their deeper or spiritual self. 
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Phronesis: working with values. 
Being aware of  one’s own values and of  those of  others is one thing; acting 
upon them is quite another. We will need to evaluate and appraise those val-
ues and then figure out how to make them real. 
The problem with values is that we cannot grasp them. An artistic or 
social value is not concrete; it has no number attached. Moreover, when we 
act upon our values we are usually not aware of  them. We act, we go to a 
Shakespeare play, or stay home because we feel like it. We can try to derive 
the values that others hold dear from what they do and don’t do, and from 
what they say and don’t say. That, too, is not an easy task, as I found out in 
numerous workshops. 
It is in such workshops, as well as in everyday life, that I have discovered 
how important it is to be aware of  one’s values and to be more conscious of  
Values, (social) norms, and virtues. 
• Values are qualities of  actions, goods, practices, people and social 
entities that people find good, beneficial, important, useful, beauti-
ful, desirable, constructive and so forth. Values are personal in the 
sense that individuals experience them as such and they are social 
in the sense that values derive their impact from being shared 
among groups of  people. Veracity is an important value to me; 
it works best in conversation with people who share veracity as a 
value. 
• (Social) norms are rules that guide, direct and discipline social 
behavior. They usually are manifestations of  one value or another.
When I greet you, the norm is that you return my greeting. Such 
a norm expresses a value like politeness, or maybe even respect. In 
an artistic circle the norm might be that you do not say that a work 
is beautiful. An “uhm” or a softly expressed “interesting” works 
better. I gather that the value here is that the value of  art needs to 
be unspeakable. 
• Virtues are (internalized) characteristics of  behavior that is 
directed to the good. Virtuous is the person who acts upon his or 
her values and does so being prudent, self-disciplined, courageous 
and just. Prudence is a virtue, as is temperance, courage and jus-
tice. These are the so-called cardinal virtues that we find in the 
Nichomachean Ethics of  Aristotle. Together with the theological vir-
tues faith, hope and love, they constitute the seven classical virtues. 
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how to work with them. It is especially important when you and I try to do 
the right thing.  
Of  course, you can continue to act while remaining unconscious of  what 
is important to you. But if  you really want to know what gets others to pay 
attention to what you do, or have to offer, and what gets them willing to pay 
or to contribute, then you may be in serious trouble when you do not pay 
attention to their values. Seriously. That is what the practice of  marketing is 
all about. When you allow yourself  to participate in a leadership program, 
you will discover that it is all about awareness, mindfulness, getting in touch 
with your soul, knowing your passion or, in short, being aware of  your values. 
Working with your values is a matter of  phronesis, or practical wisdom. It 
is what we learn to practice early on, for example, in figuring out whom to 
invite to your birthday party or how to tell the teacher that she is wrong about 
your fooling around. It is what we are supposed to do better when we grow 
older and become more experienced. It is what we do all the time (whereas 
the making of  calculated choices we do rarely, if  at all any time.) 
Take the visit to the Shakespeare play. First I need to decide that the val-
ues that I will realize by going will be more valuable than the values that I will 
compromise (such as the value of  working on this book). In my case this is an 
intuitive and emotional matter. When I sense a feeling of  guilt at the thought 
of  not going and feel kind of  excited about going, then I am moved to go. 
(But because my emotions are not always that clear, and I am able to suppress 
some emotions, I have to be cautious in interpreting them.) I surely do not 
make any calculation. When I receive an email to remind me of  the intention 
to go together, I respond promising to book the tickets. And there we go. 
The real work is in the attending and during the aftermath. At least, it 
was in my case. There was the social setting that compelled me to meet the 
expectations of  my company (my wife and a befriended couple). I felt respon-
sible to contribute to the good mood in our group and that meant bringing 
in topics for conversation, paying attention to the others, remembering to ask 
how well they are doing and stuff like that. During the play I had to pay serious 
attention, and to battle the fatigue of  a day of  writing. I struggled with what 
the play meant, why Cordelia refuses to please her father, and why he was so 
unreasonable. I discovered that I got into the play and went with the flow. So 
it surprised me when my wife expressed some doubts during the intermission. 
What to say to that? I had to scramble to find the words to express my own 
experience and was relieved that I could draw from some reading I had done 
in advance—a return on investment! She was not (and never is) easily con-
vinced so I had to work really hard at it. It is a matter of  phronesis that I know 
that I need to respond well for the sake of  a good evening together. 
After the play we drove home with the other couple. I did my best to keep 
the discussion focused on the play (since other topics such as other people, 
politics or therapy are so much easier). Being able to talk about what we expe-
rienced together is not only a way to realize artistic values, but also social 
values. I tried to appeal to their experiences as therapists. Did they under-
stand why Claudia did not respond to her father´s question? Their response 
surprised me. All three surmised that the explanation was in her past. They 
noted that the mother (and the wife of  King Lear) was never mentioned but 
her absence was, in their interpretation, critical and could account for the 
actions not only of  King Lear, but also especially for those of  the sisters. They 
sensed that in the imagination of  King Lear, Claudia, the youngest daughter, 
had taken the place of  her mother. It has made her sisters jealous of  her and 
had put her in an impossible position. That was an insight to me. I tried to 
bring up the loyalty of  the Lord of  Kent, but that did not get us very far. 
Maybe it was because of  the discussion afterwards that I remembered 
the play so well. Even now I am writing about it. The makers can be pleased. 
Yet my wife confessed to me recently, that she had not thought of  the play any 
further. If  we were to do a head count of  the audience once again, her head 
should count for less than my head. 
You can explore your own actions in similar situations. It helps you to become 
aware of  the values involved, of  the values realized, of  the deliberations and 
the evaluations, and therefore of  what phronesis is all about. 
Accordingly this is what phronesis is about: 
• Identifying and articulating values. What is important to you? 
Which values matter to you? In the case of  the Uggs, I became aware 
of  my personal value of  fatherhood and the social value of  having a 
good and harmonious family.
• Being virtuous: Aspiring to do the right thing, I want to be virtu-
ous; that is, I want to act in accordance with the relevant virtues. 
Therefore I try to be prudent when necessary, temperate, coura-
geous, just, faithful, hopeful and loving. It is a matter of  being integer 
and authentic. (See also the box on being virtuous.)  
• Valuing: you need to assess the values of  the things you aspire to 
own, of  the relationships you have, the conversations you are involved 
in and so on. What am I willing to sacrifice in order to hold on to 
my marriage? How much am I willing to spend on an evening with 
theatre? What am I willing to contribute to a social cause? 
• Valorization: With the theatre I want to realize social and cul-
tural values. Valorization of  this book signifies the realization of  its 
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financial, cultural and social values. Valorization is the making real 
of  values. 
• Evaluation: How important is a value compared to others? (If  you 
cancel the appointment with a friend in order to go to the theatre 
instead, what does that say about the values of  your friendship and 
the values of  going to the theatre?)
• Transforming or changing values: I can change my values in the 
process. Having experienced a Shakespeare play, my valuation of  
Shakespeare play may increase. Some people in the audience will 
discover that Shakespeare is their thing, while others may realize that 
their expectations were not met, causing them to choose a leisurely 
evening the next time around. Like religions and universities, cultural 
organizations often have it as an explicit purpose to change the val-
ues of  people. 
This goes to show that the process of  phronesis involves a great deal more 
than the rational decision making that economic models imagine. The usual 
construction of  rational choice suggests an analytical process on the basis of  
a well-articulated algorithm and explicit numbers with a clear, unambiguous 
outcome. The process of  phronesis is more interpretive than analytical. It is 
much more allusive and therefore much more difficult to study. Phronesis is also 
much more difficult to practice. Then again, I do not think you and I practice 
rational choice as imagined in the economic model. But we practice phronesis 
all the time, no matter how complicated it is. For that is life. That is what the 
story of  the Uggs tries to tell.
Finally: do we choose our values or do we discover them? 
One reason for resistance against the value based approach is the fear of  fixed 
values, of  practices that hold values firm and absolute and impose them on 
others. It is the image of  zealots who rally under the banner of  family values, 
who destroy in the name of  Christian or Islamic values, who imprison those 
who do not subscribe to communist values. 
The need for the notion of  phronesis is indicative for the feebleness of  
values, for the difficulties of  articulating, interpreting and acting upon them. 
In reality values are the subject of  continuous deliberation. Sure, people can 
claim that they know their values; that their values are sacred and holy and 
therefore true. I would like to ask such people how do they know; on what 
grounds do they know better than others. 
At the other extreme, people deny the usefulness of  values because we 
cannot know them, their significance is contingent upon numerous conditions 
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and, consequently, there is nothing sensible to say about them. If  so, I wonder, 
how then can we act? How are we able to do the right thing, or at least able 
to have the idea that we do the right thing every now and then? Apparently, 
we are able to have a sense of  what our values are. The value based approach 
works with that sense. 
Are we then determining our values ourselves, or are we discovering 
them? Every now and then, students raise this question. Usually they do so 
because they want to believe that they are autonomous individuals and should 
therefore be able to determine themselves what is important to them. 
In that discussion I tend to stress the other option: that we discover our 
values. This position is more consistent with most beliefs, like Christianity, 
Islam, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism. But also Gestalt, Jungian and 
Freudian psychologists would suggest the same. Accordingly, you and I are 
groping our way, figuring out in all that we do, what is important to us. 
In the end I take a pragmatic position, like that of  Dewey (Dewey, 1915). 
Whether we determine or find our values, we have to cope with our values 
one way or another. As long as solving the dilemma is not critical for acting 
upon our values, I leave it—along with topics such as the free will, the proof  
of  God or the end of  humanity—to discussions during a Sunday evening 
meal. 
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Appendix 1. How to determine your own values? 
When I want people to figure out their own values, I make use of  the Aurelius 
exercise. 
The Aurelius exercise.  The exercise is named after a beneficent Roman emperor. 
In a book of  reflections he lists the people that have been important to him 
and specifies for each one the qualities that make them important to him. He 
starts with his grandfather Annius Verus from who learned “to be gentle and 
meek, and to refrain from all anger and passion. . . [from my mother] to be 
religious and bountiful [ . . .] and to live with a spare diet.” (Aurelius & Gill, 
2013) And so he continues. 
Do the same. To increase the effectiveness of  the exercise, narrow it 
down to the three or four people that are most important to you. List no 
more than two qualities for each that make them important to you. Only 
choose people with whom you have a relationship (so not the Nelson 
Mandelas, the Ghandis or the Dalai Lamas unless you have related to 
them personally). 
Specify the qualities you have listed as your values. List them in order of  
importance.
Appendix 2. How to work with your values.
Being aware of  your values is one thing, realizing or valorizing them is 
quite another. It is easy to forget your values after only having figured 
them out in the exercise that I just described. You have to work with them 
daily in order to make them work for you. Many organizations nowadays 
make an effort to specify their most important values. It happens all too 
often when I ask leaders of  such organizations what those values are, that 
they have to look them up. That means that he or she is not working with 
them. Doing some exercises is a good start, but the real exercise is daily 
practice. 
Exercise: Ask participants for situations that they were in and about which 
they have a bad feeling. It has to be a situation in which they did something. 
Then ask them to determine what they would have done if  they had acted in 
accordance with their most important values (that they just determined). 
CHAPTER 6
TO REALIZE VALUES WE NEED TO 
PROCURE GOODS, THE MOST 
IMPORTANT OF WHICH ARE SHARED
When doing the right thing we want to realize our values. In the previous 
chapter we were concerned with all the values that might come into play. 
That is the awareness part. Now we turn to what we do when we try to make 
those values real. And that requires becoming aware of  the goods that we 
acquire and generate. So we move up the awareness part. 
Suppose someone cherishes the value of  friendship and finds himself  
lonely. So he is aware of  valuing friendship. He can just live with that ideal 
but he can also  act in order to make the value real, that is, to valorize “friend-
ship” in his life. The question is then how he can do so. The answer seems 
obvious: in order to make the value “friendship” real, he needs to approach 
people to generate a friendship somehow. In that way he transforms the ideal 
“friendship” into an actual friendship. The same transformation is required 
for someone valuing personal love. Without a relationship this person does 
not stand a chance of  having love. It furthermore has to be a special relation-
ship in order to generate the kind of  love that this person is seeking. 
The point is this: the friendly or loving relationship is a good in the sense 
that it is something to gain and something to lose. This person either has such 
a relationship or not. It is a good as it services to realize all kinds of  values, like 
friendship, love, or both, companionship support, attention, and the possibil-
ity of  parenthood. Accordingly, in order to make the values “friendship” or 
“love” real, we need to acquire a good like “friendship” or “a loving relation-
ship”; a good we cannot buy and that the government cannot procure for you. 
Values need to be acted upon to become real, and an important way of  
realizing them is to acquire or generate goods. Goods enable us to realize 
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values. They can be things like a cup of  coffee or a computer, but they can 
also be intangible things, like relationships, communities, ideas and artistic 
expressions. 
Goods are good for all kinds of  things. You and I can “have” or possess 
goods, although often not in a legal sense. “Having” a relationship is the same 
as “possessing” it. People have houses and they have kids and a home. Goods 
are whatever we have that enable us to realize values. 
Really? 
This characterization of  goods may seem odd at first. It certainly is when you 
are accustomed to thinking of  goods as things you can hold onto, like a cup 
of  coffee and a computer, or when you think of  goods as things that you can 
buy or sell. 
I now will do two things to convince you that we are in need of  a broad 
category of  goods, a much broader category of  goods than what shows up in 
a standard economic account. Sure, in the conversation of  economists you 
will come across intangible goods like services (think of  a class or a therapy 
session) and the hard to grasp collective or public goods, like safety, or cul-
tural heritage. However, we need to go even beyond these classes of  goods 
to include goods such as friendship, home, society, faith, art and science. You 
better think twice before continuing from this point, since the consequences 
are far reaching for the way you and I conceptualize our world and under-
stand phenomena such as the arts, poverty, richness, altruism and so much 
more. 
The first consideration comes by way of  another reading of  
Robinson Crusoe that shows the importance of  company and con-
versation. Why not call them goods? 
Defoe´s story about Robinson Crusoe, who got shipwrecked and found him-
self  all alone as the sole survivor on an island, is standard fare in an introduc-
tory economics course. It perfectly illustrates, for example, the tradeoff that 
we need to make between consumption now and consumption later (by plant-
ing seeds from his harvest now to have a greater harvest later), investments 
and division of  labor (between him and Friday, the fellow that he rescues from 
being the meal for a bunch of  cannibals). In this reading, Robinson Crusoe is 
the archetypical homo economicus; a perfect example for anyone who wants 
to understand how homo economicus operates. 
In another humanistic reading, the story turns out to be a human drama. 
This is the story about Crusoe’s struggle with his father and his seeking faith. 
It is about the purifying experience that spending twenty eight years on an 
island can be. That is what makes Robinson Crusoe a Bildung novel. 
Though it is not so strange that economists read their perspective into the 
THE MOST IMPORTANT GOODS ARE SHARED 77
novel. Already in the very beginning of  the novel Crusoe does a cost-benefit 
analysis, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of  his stranding on an 
island. But a careful reading shows that the accounting of  Crusoe is quite 
different from the accounting that is customary in standard economics. For 
these are his lists: 
Good Evil
Still alive Cast away
Singled out to be saved from the 
wreckage
Singled out to be miserable
I am not starved Divided from mankind-solitaire
There are no wild beasts I have no weapons
It is warm I have no clothes
He could have added that he had been able to secure plenty of  supplies from 
the shipwreck, including a few bibles (which served him well in his search 
for his faith). He also found some coins in the ship, but they are useless in 
his economy. (Note that economists latched onto a story that has no use for 
exchange! Strange, isn’t it?) 
His account stresses his social situation or, better said, the lack thereof. 
All alone he is barren from any social interaction. That is why his encounter 
with another human being after a long period of  loneliness is so important to 
him. Friday is not only someone who can do his share of  the chores, but he 
is also company for Crusoe. Crusoe teaches Friday some English so that they 
can have conversations. The conversations have a great deal of  value for Crusoe, 
a social value as we can observe after the previous chapter. He feels better, 
even richer because of  them. Of  course he does. We humans are in need of  
company and conversation.  They are basic needs. 
Were you to wear the glasses of  demand and supply, exchange and price, costs 
and benefits, you do not see such things. With the value tinted spectacles, the 
values of  company and the conversations are becoming pronounced. 
In a valued based approach to economics, friendship is a good. And so is 
a conversation. They resist having them. That means they do not come free; 
Crusoe has to make efforts and some sacrifices to acquire them. And they are 
good for all kinds of  things. 
The second consideration comes after answering a question. 
I have made it a habit to ask classes of  students and audiences at lectures 
to name their single-most precious possession. Sometimes I begin by asking 
them to name their drive. In one class, every single student mentioned money 
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as the main goal. One guy wanted it to be on the record that he was going 
for lots of  money. Only one female student took exception and said that she 
wanted to be happy. The guy pointed out to her that she needed money for 
that. She had to agree to that. There we were: money is what moved them. 
And then I put the big question to them: what is your most precious pos-
session, what is the last thing you want to lose? The lots-of-money guy wanted 
to know whether it had to be something tangible. I told him that it was up 
to him. He immediately had his mind made up: his most precious posses-
sions were his family and friends. Others followed suit. One student thought 
of  her freedom, another mentioned her brains. And as almost always hap-
pens in such a round, a few named their health as their most precious posses-
sion. No-one spoke of  money, cars or something tangible. One time someone 
mentioned her iPhone but—judging by the burst of  laughter among the stu-
dents—this was clearly not a serious option. Sometimes the answer surprises 
me, like when a guy from Botswana mentioned his fear as his greatest posses-
sion. I doubt whether “fear” is a good (after all, how does it resist possession?), 
but I understood his reason for saying so when he explained that his fears are 
what give him his urge to accomplish something. 
 
So here is my question to you, my reader: what is your most precious 
possession? 
Would you even consider something that you have bought, or something that 
the government has provided? Is it something you own in a legal sense? 
Let me pause here, as I would do in class. 
Strange, isn’t it? Money may be what people want, yet money does not buy 
what is most important to them. You do not buy friends and family with your 
money. Yes, money helps to secure your health, but then again, you do not 
own your health legally. 
Leaving out what is most important to us does not make a great deal of  
sense. Standard economics does not consider family, friends, freedom and 
such as goods. The value based approach does. Doing so will change a great 
deal in our worldview. 
What are goods? 
Aristotle defined goods as “the means of  life and well-being of  men” in his 
work Politics (Aristotle & Ross, 1995). So goods would be the means to realize 
values. And so we are back to the definition I gave at the beginning. 
In the late 19th century, Carl Menger, an Austrian economist, probed the 
nature of  a good and concluded that whatever satisfies a need, qualifies as 
THE MOST IMPORTANT GOODS ARE SHARED 79
a good. That opened the way for a wide range of  goods including families 
and friendships. But he shrank away from that consequence and decided that 
economists had to restrict the definition of  good to those categories of  goods 
that lend themselves for exchange in the market place. Later, economists had 
to break this restriction in order to allow for collective goods (Menger, 1871). 
A value based approach stresses the values that goods enable us to realize 
and recovers the wide range of  goods that qualify, including collective goods 
and all the other goods that cannot be priced and cannot be bought and sold 
at a market. 
Goods need to be acquired or generated and the acquisition requires 
some kind of  sacrifice. To speak of  “having” or “possessing” a good only 
makes sense if  a good resists possession. When we happen to see a splendid 
sunset it would be strange to claim that sunset as “ours.” It would be different 
if  you have to climb a steep mountain in order to see a particularly beautiful 
sunset: in that case you might say that it is yours to cherish. In general, goods 
require an effort to acquire. We have to give something up to “have” them or 
to enjoy the benefits of  goods. Even a sunset requires some work in order to 
be able to enjoy it.
Therefore, I define goods as follows: 
Goods are tangible or intangible things that an individual, a group of  people or a 
gathering of  people possesses; they are good for all kinds of  things and their pos-
session requires some kind of  effort or sacrifice. 
Goods are important to us, because they enable us to realize values. 
The time is ripe for a general notion of  “goods.” We are already accustomed 
to thinking of  experience goods and imaginary goods. The lottery sells an 
illusion, that is, an imaginary good. And a fair or festival is all about experi-
ence. But is that really it? Just try to determine what you buy when you pay 
for a ticket for a museum. What is the good you are buying? An experience 
good? Continue reading and you will realize that it is not just that. You can be 
certain that values play a role!
Goods that are most important to me, and you.
In an earlier version of  this chapter I proceeded to list the types of  goods and 
started off with the goods that are usually recognized as such; those are private 
goods—or the goods we buy—and collective goods. Only later did I intro-
duce the shared goods. Then I realized that by doing so I went along with the 
standard scientific approach that makes us consider things from a distance, 
speaking of  “the system” or “the processes out there.”  But my approach is 
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to consider the world from the standpoint of  the subjects themselves, of  us, 
that is, as a people trying to make a life, realizing values. So I had to delete 
everything I had written and start to make sense of  the life you and I live. Let 
me give it a try.
My day starts when I get out of  bed. Please join me, and imagine yourself  
doing so also. The first thing on my mind is not that I have to buy or sell some-
thing, as the standard economic perspective would suggest. Come to think 
of  it, the buying and selling of  things is not much part of  the day of  a fam-
ily man, a politician and an academic. I am rather focused on doing things 
with the members of  my family, at the university and in the city hall. Most 
of  the time, I am engaged in conversations of  all kinds. I talk with Ph.D. stu-
dents, other students, colleagues and research assistants, and I teach classes, 
of  course. In the city hall I have endless meetings with civil servants, citizens 
and politicians to discuss a wide range of  topics. At other times I am working 
on this book, reading and writing emails and, every now and then, I have to 
cope with faculty meetings and the like. In the evening, if  I do not give a lec-
ture somewhere, have a meeting or meet with a friend, then I look forward to 
having dinner with my family. At the end of  the day I will not talk about the 
amount of  money I have earned or spent. I do not even think about it. If  I 
were to reflect on my day, I would instead care about the qualities of  the time 
spent with my family, of  the classes and lectures I’ve given, of  the interactions 
and conversations I’ve had, and whether or not I am still politically alive and 
about the worth of  my friendships. 
If  I were to follow Crusoe’s example, I would try to assess what my activi-
ties have contributed to the goods I care for, such as the good “family.” the 
good “collegiality,” the good “knowledge,”, the good “conversation,” the 
good “academic community,” the good “democracy”, the good “fairness” or 
the good “friendship.” All those goods are important for me. They are good 
for a variety of  my values. 
I do buy a few things, off and on. All the things I buy are instrumental 
and usually serve the realization of  the goods that are really important to me. 
The gas that I buy gets me to the places I need to be. The food I buy nourishes 
me so that I have enough energy to get through the day or it serves to accom-
pany a conversation with colleagues or other people. The vegetables I buy 
are ingredients for a family dinner. By paying the interest on the mortgage I 
am able to share the house with my family. Every so often I buy a book that I 
need for my research. There have been days that were all about a purchase, 
like the day I bought my house. But most of  my days are about conversations, 
teaching and meetings. The things I buy during those days are subsidiary and 
instrumental. 
During the day I also benefit from a variety of  collective goods, such as 
the roads, the sanitary sewer, the water supply, police protection, relatively 
THE MOST IMPORTANT GOODS ARE SHARED 81
clean air and the university system. I am very pleased with these goods, when 
I think about them. Usually I am not aware of  their values. They, too, are 
instrumental for the goods I really care about. I am not living and working 
for the sake of  the university. I need the university in order to have a good 
academic community, to be able to teach and to have “good conversations.” 
“Yeah, but you are privileged. You do not have to worry about how to 
survive.” This is a standard reaction. It usually comes from people who are as 
privileged as I am, in the sense that we do not need to worry whether or not 
we will have food on the table the next day and a roof  over our head. Sure, I 
would respond, when people are in survival mode, like when they are in a war 
zone, going hungry, trying to immigrate, scrounging for food, searching for a 
shelter or seeking a residence permit, it is all that is on their mind. But they, 
too, are seeking to overcome the mode of  surviving in order to “have” a life. 
Having a life implies being able to focus on conversations, companionship, a 
community, knowledge, a skill and all those things that render life meaningful. 
Accordingly, doing the right thing is about acquiring all kinds of  goods, 
most of  those—and the most important of  those—we cannot buy and do 
not own legally. Standard economics is all about private and collective goods, 
about property rights. So that domain is covered. We now need to understand 
the other goods as well. What are their characteristics? How do we acquire 
them? How do we value them? Can we order them? 
The most important goods are “shared goods”
Let us have a look at the good “a good conversation.” It happens to be a good 
that is important to me: I am always trying to make it happen, at home, with 
friends and at the university. It was also what Crusoe was looking for. There 
he was, all by himself, trying to survive, but with no one to talk to. People who 
have stranded at islands all by themselves, or who are locked up in isolation, 
are known to have a hard time being without any conversation. Alexander 
Selkirk, a well-known castaway at the time of  Defoe was actually unable to 
speak and socialize after his rescue and ended up living in a cave in his back-
yard.  He had been on the island for only five years, versus twenty eight years 
in the case of  Crusoe. The advantage of  the latter was that he was able to 
have conversations with this Friday guy, a cannibal whom he had saved from 
a cannibal feast. Even though they did not speak the same language, they 
quickly developed a language that they both could understand enabling them 
to communicate. After some time they shared feelings, discussed what needed 
to be done and so on. Crusoe enjoyed the company and appreciated the abil-
ity to have a conversation with another person. This was presumably also true 
for the other fellow. 
What does the companionship mean? Even when this person does not 
help Crusoe in adding to the amount of  goods for his consumption—he may 
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put in some work but has to eat and needs a place to stay, too—he may still 
decide that he is better off with his presence because of  the possibility of  
having a conversation with someone. He may even come to that conclusion 
in the event that the amount of  goods available for his consumption actu-
ally declines. He gladly gives up some bread and meat in exchange for the 
conversation. 
The bread and meat are private goods in the sense that he raised the 
sheep and planted, harvested and milled the grain. Those goods are his and it 
is his decision to share them with Friday. If  Friday were to grab them without 
asking, he might get angry and throw him off the island. 
The conversation that they are having is another matter, for it is theirs. 
They share the conversation. It is a joint production. Friday makes an effort and so 
does Crusoe. A conversation in which he does not participate is not the same 
as one in which he is paying attention to what the other is saying, responds 
and contributes himself  by telling things. The more effort they both put into 
their conversation, the better Crusoe will feel and the better Friday will most 
likely feel as well. (He finds himself  whistling again while walking along the 
beach and catches himself  looking forward to the evening’s meal because of  
the conversation they will be having.) It matters to him that Friday enjoys the 
conversation as well. They do not only produce the conversation together, 
they also “consume” it together.  The enjoyment is mutual. Their conversa-
tion is what he and Friday share. It is a shared good. 
Maybe it is strange to call a conversation a good at all. From an economic 
point of  view, however, it is not all that different from a good like bread. A 
conversation requires the input of  time, effort and human and social capital. 
A conversation does not come about effortlessly. It is not free either. Even 
if  the direct costs are zero, there will be opportunity costs (the benefits of  
alternative activities that are forsaken). And like bread a conversation gives 
satisfaction. Thus far a shared good is like a private good. The conversation, 
however, cannot be a private good because no one can claim sole ownership 
of  it. Crusoe cannot claim that the conversation is his and exclude others, 
including Friday, from enjoying it. A conversation is not divisible. We cannot 
say: “this part is mine and that part is yours, I give you this for that.” A con-
versation cannot be exchanged; it cannot be bought or sold. It is shared.  
A conversation is not a collective good either. A pure collective good is 
both indivisible—when you and I are the collective, I cannot consume it with-
out your consuming it as well—and non-rivalrous—my consumption of  the 
good cannot be at the expense of  your consumption. Although a conversa-
tion cannot be split up and although Crusoe cannot have the conversation by 
excluding Friday, Friday and he can easily exclude others (like the members of  
Friday’s tribe) from their conversation. Their conversation is between them; it 
is theirs. Maybe one of  them will give it up for another conversation when the 
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occasion presents itself. Crusoe may exclude Friday, as he actually did after 
being rescued. Conversations have rivalry and exclusion written all over them. 
A conversation, therefore, is a good that does accord neither with the class 
of  private goods, nor with that of  collective goods. It is a shared good. Both 
Friday and Crusoe enjoy having or owning it.  
The good “conversation” comes in different qualities, of  course.  A con-
versation with a lover will have a higher quality from one with a stranger.  A 
conversation with a colleague can go deeper and can be more intense than 
one with a layperson. And the participants may not benefit equally from the 
conversation. It helps him in his conversation if  Crusoe were interested in the 
phenomenon of  the wild man; in that case he will get one kick after another 
from talking with Friday. Otherwise he may find Friday’s talk mainly strange 
and incomprehensible. Participants may put in different efforts and therefore 
get something different out of  their conversation. It remains a shared good, 
though, as no party can appropriate it entirely or exclude the other. 
A shared good as defined here is different from the notion of  a com-
mon good, or a commons, in the standard economic discussions. Common 
goods are accessible to all—they are non-exclusive—but they allow for rivalry. 
Economists tend to see great problems for the sustenance of  common goods 
because of  the free rider problem. Take the sea, for instance. This is a good 
that all people have in common. The whales swimming in the sea are a com-
mon good. Catching them is lucrative. Here the free rider problem occurs 
because whale hunters have an incentive to catch as many whales as they 
can. When they voluntarily agree to limit the number lest the whales die out, 
individual whale hunters have the incentive to exceed that limit to have more 
than the others. They are said to be free riding (like what people do when 
they do not buy tickets for public transport). The point is important since 
common goods lose their footing in the classic economic analysis because of  
this problem.
 However, the problem does not apply to shared goods! When one party 
shirks, by pretending to be in the conversation while being instead with his 
thoughts somewhere else, the conversation will be different because of  it and 
will have less value than a conversation to which all parties contribute. When 
there are more than two parties involved, one party may shirk and let the oth-
ers do the work, but risk losing the conversation. When Friday and Crusoe are 
having a conversation, you may want to join in. Imagine they let you in and 
you subsequently shirk by not contributing yourself. Apart from what they will 
think of  your passivity, you will benefit differently from the conversation than 
they do, if  you benefit at all.  You may gain some information, some insight 
maybe, but because you will not partake in the conversation, it will not be 
yours. You can only have a conversation by partaking in it.  (Of  course, you 
can exploit a conversation that others are having, drawing gainful information 
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from it, but then you cannot go home and tell your partner about this wonder-
ful conversation you had.)
Once you have identified shared goods as goods, you will notice them all 
around. Friendship is an obvious example, as is “home,” “family” and “colle-
giality.” “Trust” is a shared good, as is “knowledge,” “music” and “art” (about 
which more later in the chapter). A “community” clearly is, and so is a “team” 
or “team spirit.” When people list their most important possessions, they are 
almost always shared. 
When I lecture I like to use “knowledge” as an example. “Knowledge” is 
presented as if  it were a package of  information, ideas, models and the like; 
as if  you can take it over, buy it as it were, to make it your own. But that is not 
how “knowledge” works. I will point out here that I try to convey knowledge 
in a hopefully interesting, maybe even inspiring, exposition. Why do I do so? 
Diagram 6-1  Private goods and services, and shared goods
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It is certainly not for the money, since the pay is usually limited. My reason 
for doing so is that I want to share my knowledge. But that is not going to 
happen if  I am the only one doing the work. The people sitting in front of  me 
are actually having to do the hard work because they have to make sense of  
the noise that I make, transform that noise into something that has meaning 
to them and appropriate that somehow. Of  course, I have to make an effort 
seeking a connection with what people already know and, of  course, most of  
what I have said will get lost anyhow. But hopefully some of  us will share part 
of  the knowledge conveyed. 
It is the sharing that renders “my” knowledge relevant and valuable. 
A shared good is usually a practice
It is not only that knowledge, like the knowledge contained in this book, needs 
to be shared in order to become knowledge; most knowledge also requires a 
continuing activity. When the general response to what you just read is “sure, 
friendship is a shared good” and that is it, then this knowledge will quickly be 
forgotten and get lost. Knowledge is an active good; it is a practice. In doing, 
the knowledge becomes valuable. So people have to think when it comes to 
the notion of  shared goods, apply it in situations, in their research, in their 
conversations. Some people need to probe it further, explore the valuation of  
shared goods, differentiate types of  shared goods and so forth. 
Friendship, too, is a practice in the sense that to sustain, enjoy and further 
the friendship friends have to do things, all kinds of  things. They may have 
to talk with each other, think of  the other, bring the friend up in conversa-
tions, share important experiences and do things together. The phone calls 
and the outings serve the friendship; they are activities intended to valorize 
the friendship. 
The practice of  a shared good, therefore, consists of  all 
activities and interactions that are directed at generat-
ing, sustaining and valorizing the good. Put differently, the 
shared good stands for the practice that constitutes it.
Think of  the concert pianist, the dancer, the craftsman: they all have to prac-
tice their skill day in and day out in order to sustain and further it. Likewise 
we have to practice our knowledge, friendships, family and art in order to be 
able to say that we “have” them. 
The (creative) commons 
The notion of  the shared good points out that when we go through our daily 
life we do all kinds of  things, go to meetings, have chats, read, exchange com-
pliments for the sake of  sustaining, furthering and valorizing shared goods of  
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all kinds. The valorizing refers to the realizing of  values, all kinds of  values. 
When going around, seeking to realize our values, we benefit from ongo-
ing practices out there. Other people have developed ongoing practices 
generating a certain genre of  music, a scientific discipline, an artistic environ-
ment, a social space, websites, some of  which will be of  interest to us. Such 
a practice is called a commons. You benefit from it by participating in and 
contributing to it. 
A commons is out there, available to anyone who is willing to make an 
effort. The traditional commons is the pasture that surrounds the village. It 
is free for all villagers to make use of.  The common room is the place where 
people get together to share conversations. The sea with the fish in it is a 
commons. Wikipedia is also, as are all open sources on the Internet. The com-
mons is optional: you have the option to make use of  it, or not. Other terms 
are a common pool resource, or a creative commons as in the case of  the arts 
(Ostrom, 1990).
We make use of  commons all the time. A painting has value partly 
because it shares with other paintings the commons of  the arts. The com-
mons of  the art, that is, the institutions, the conversations and the activities 
that constitute the worlds of  the arts, is the resource that feeds and informs 
the value of  the painting. Whether I listen to music by Pink Floyd or watch a 
Shakespeare play or a French movie, I benefit from others who like the very 
same music, theatre and movies. The entrepreneur makes use of  all kinds of  
commons, like skilled practices, a culture of  hard work and of  loyalty, a vital 
financial system, knowledge practices and so on. It is almost impossible to 
get the value of  art realized in an environment that lacks a commons for the 
arts, or to be entrepreneurial in an environment that lacks an entrepreneurial 
commons.
A commons is a practice. It is not a practice that is for sale, so it is not a 
private good. It is most likely not a collective good as it is not provided for by 
the government, and requires the participation of  many, but not all. People 
can make use of  the commons without anything in return. You and I can 
consult Wikipedia or any open source program with no strings attached. That 
is why Hardin in his famous article The Tragedy of  the Commons, concluded that 
a common is unsustainable (Hardin, 1968). The only safeguard from over-
use would be the privatization or collectivization of  the good. Privatization 
involves the creation of  private property rights (cf. the discussion on intel-
lectual property rights); such rights turn the good into a commodity that can 
be bought and sold. Collectivization implies that the government takes over 
and makes the use of  the common subject to public law. The government can 
allocate rights to usage and regulate and finance the production of  the com-
mons, which then has become a collective good. 
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But a commons can also remain a social practice, as is the case with 
Wikipedia, open source programming, and the creative commons in cities 
and other places. Even though many only make use of  such a commons, some 
people are apparently willing and able to sustain and further the commons. 
The latter contribute and apparently derive some satisfaction from doing so.
Because a commons is open to outsiders, it is not a shared good as defined 
here. A shared good excludes people who do not participate and contribute. A 
commons is shared by those working on it, participating and contributing, but 
it does not exclude outsiders from using it. 
A commons is something social. The term contains the Greek term koino-
nia, which was understood to have the following five characteristics: 
“(1) participation must be free and unforced; (2) participants must share a 
common purpose, whether minor or major, long term or short term; (3) par-
ticipants must have something in common that they share such as jointly held 
resources, a collection of  precious objects, or a repertory of  shared actions; 
(4) participation involves philia (a sense of  mutuality, often inadequately trans-
lated as friendship); and (5) social relations must be characterized by dikaon 
(fairness)”  (Lohman, 1992).
All these characteristics appear to apply quite well to the commons of  an 
artistic conversation. The artists are free to participate, (1) those who partici-
pate share the objective of  furthering the case for their art form (2) and share 
things like a (usually) informal association, coverage in certain media and a 
tradition as laid down in art-historical accounts; they will care for each other 
in some way or another (3) and within the arts the norm is to be fair in dealing 
with other participants (4). The same applies to scientists, and I gather that 
people working with open source software will recognize themselves in these 
five points. 
Ownership of  shared goods requires contributions 
How to acquire a shared good? The knowledge example and the discussion 
of  the commons already gave a clue. Let me elaborate with the shared good 
“friendship” as an example. 
Like a good conversation, a friendship has shared ownership (of  the 
friends involved), is costly to acquire (friends need to make sacrifices) and is 
good for the realization of  all kinds of  values. How do you acquire a friend-
ship? It is not by way of  a purchase: friendships are not for sale (“hey, I am 
too busy; want to take over a friend of  mine?”). It is also not driven by some 
governmental program. 
I once had an Asian student who came over to the Netherlands to do 
a PhD with me. Before he came he had been living with his family. At our 
first meeting I instructed him that he had to make friends. “How do you do 
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that, Sir?” he wanted to know. I involved other Ph.D. students to address the 
question. How do they make friends? Just asking someone to be a friend is 
not going to work. That much we agreed upon. Paying someone is out of  the 
question, of  course. 
A friendship requires the sharing of  experiences, doing things together 
and doing things for each other. That was clear to all of  us. “Friends have all 
things in common,” the ancient Greeks would say. But that does not mean 
that having a friendship is a passive thing. Clearly, potential friends have to do 
something in order to acquire a friendship. And friends have to keep doing 
things to sustain or to strengthen a friendship. That is the practice a friendship 
stands for. Aristotle pointed out that some degree of  reciprocity is required. 
One friend does one thing for the other, and the other does something else at 
another time. They need to help each other, by lending a listening ear, helping 
the other to move, making dinner, giving support and so on. All actions and 
gestures that serve the friendship somehow contribute to that friendship.
Contributions to a shared good are intended to sustain, 
enjoy and add value to a shared good. Contributions are a 
key activity in the practice that constitutes a shared good. 
In order to claim a shared good as yours, you need to have 
a willingness to contribute. 
Contributions will play a critical role in the framework that I am developing 
here. In an exchange situation, people pay an amount of  money in exchange 
for a private good. Economists speak of  willingness to pay to indicate the 
willingness of  people to pay a certain amount of  money. Willingness to 
contribute indicates the willingness to contribute to a shared good. In this 
case there is no immediate return of  something, of  equivalent values, as in an 
exchange. When someone makes a contribution to a friendship, say by paying 
a sick friend a visit, the giving friend does not get anything in return except for 
the affirmation of  the friendship. The receiving friend is made to understand 
that in order to sustain the friendship he will have to make a contribution 
somehow sometime later as well. 
To repeat: willingness to contribute differs from willingness to 
pay. In the case of  the latter, the expectation is a return of  equiva-
lent value. In case of  willingness to contribute the expectation is that 
the contribution will add values to a shared good. 
In the case of  shared goods the notions of  consumption and production—
those that do so well in the case of  private goods—fail to make sense. The 
consumption of  a private good implies the destruction of  value; you eat the 
ice cream and when you consume your computer, the price of  the thing goes 
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down. When you “consume” a friendship, its value may go up. By making use 
of  your friendship, you are actually producing it. The more time Friday and 
Crusoe spend conversing, the more likely they are to enjoy their conversation. 
Converse frequently but lightly and you have “companionship.” Converse a 
great deal and you have a relationship. Converse more and you have friend-
ship. Converse even more, and you will have love. Or not.  
Because the value of  shared goods depends on the inputs of  all owners, 
we can speak of  the co-creation, or co-production of  the good. Put differ-
ently, shared goods require some form of  collaboration. 
As I noted earlier, standard economists will subsume all these effects 
under the category of  externalities. They are, in other words, external to the 
market exchange and the pricing that a market exchange requires. To this I 
would retort that the market exchange is rather an epi-phenomenon, that is, 
external to the social practice that constitutes a shared good, or a commons. 
Standard economics misses the point entirely, and therefore cannot distin-
guish the most important goods that we try to realize each and every day. 
Valuing shared goods. 
Because shared goods cannot be bought or sold and do not have a price, their 
values are not quantifiable. But people weigh the values and the qualities of  
shared goods anyhow. They will assess some friendships to be more valuable 
than others. They will tend to contribute most to shared goods that they value 
most. At least, that is, when they are doing the right thing. 
Weighing the values of  shared goods and acting upon that is a matter 
of  phronesis. Awareness of  the values involved and all kinds of  knowledge are 
required. One challenge is the assessment of  the values that shared goods real-
ize. A good conversation, for example, is good for social values when it real-
izes warm feelings, a sense of  companionship or even friendship. It may also 
realize cognitive values when it generates new insights and ideas. Knowledge 
is required for the right contribution to the conversation and for a proper 
understanding of  the situation. 
The value of  a shared good is far from fixed. The value of  a conversation 
will change all the time. Each contribution, or lack thereof, will change its 
value, even if  in a minuscule way.  The conversation differs from the one we 
were having yesterday because of  what has happened in between. 
 I realize that these observations do not exhaust the topic of  valuation. 
For example, when people are unaware of  the values of  friendship, or family, 
they are likely to miss doing the right thing. The hard working businessman 
may later regret that his hard work was done at the expense of  his family life; 
and although he will tell everyone that he does what he does to support his 
family, he may risk losing his family for being away so often. Likewise, people 
may neglect friendships, the reading of  serious books, or a spiritual life to only 
regret doing so later.  
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That is why an important component of  the value based approach is 
awareness: we need to be aware of  our values and we need to be aware of  
the goods that enable us to realize those values in order to do the right things. 
Categories of  goods
Goods come in all shapes and forms. We buy them, acquire them by contribu-
tion and then there are goods out there to enjoy without individual effort (like 
the clean air). It appears useful to indulge in some categorization to allow for 
distinctions among this great variety of  goods. 
A few definitions
Goods are those tangibles and intangibles that have value for people, 
and for the possession and enjoyment of  those goods, people would be 
willing to sacrifice resources. Goods resist possession. Goods are good 
for the realization of  all kinds of  values. 
Shared goods are shared by a few people or a group of  people with-
out a clear legal definition of  ownership. As a rule, no single person or 
legal identity can claim ownership of  a shared good. The members of  
the group enjoy the fruits of  their shared good; they cannot exclude 
other members but usually exclude non-members. Rivalry is conceiv-
able both inside and outside the group. Shared goods come about by 
way of  contributions of  the stakeholders
Private goods are goods held in private ownership. The right of  own-
ership gives the right to exclude others from enjoying the fruits of  the 
goods and, when a market exists for the good, transfer the ownership 
of  the good to others. The ownership can be shared in the sense that 
several individuals have a legal claim to the ownership. The ownership 
is well defined legally in the sense that a court of  law should be able to 
determine what belongs to whom. 
Commodities are private goods in the situation of  exchange. In such 
a situation, goods are for sale and for that purpose are priced. 
Collective or collective goods are goods held in ownership by a 
collective, usually a state or another political entity. Their possession 
has a legal status. They are marked by non-rivalry in consumption and 
non-excludability. Their benefits are quasi universal in terms of  coun-
tries, people and generations. Global collective goods benefit humanity 
in its entirety. 
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We first distinguish goods on the basis of  ownership. Some goods we own 
privately, others collectively, the important goods we share or have in common 
with others. And then there are the goods we simply enjoy, like a service, or 
a beautiful building. This division follows closely the definitions given above. 
Accordingly, when you and I trace the goods we possess, we will identify the 
following categories: 
• Private goods include all commodities we have bought and of  which we 
have the property right. I am thinking of  my clothes, my computer, my 
car, my house, the shares I own, but also the electricity I buy, the haircut I 
received, the visit to the museum, my stay at a hotel the other week, and 
the (paid) advice I received recently on the mortgage for my house. This 
category covers the goods and services in standard economics. 
• Collective or public goods are all the goods (or practices) that I enjoy 
together with the collective of  which I am part. I am thinking of  the clean 
air that I breath, the protection I get, the peace I enjoy, the democratic 
institutions of  my country, the educational system, Dutch cultural herit-
age and world heritage, the infrastructure of  my country, and the highly 
subsidized public transport. 
• The (Creative) Commons are all the practices to which I have access, 
possibly  with some effort.  I am thinking of  all the art practices to which I 
have access, the scientific practices, street life in Amsterdam, and all kinds 
of  local practices in my hometown (such as the weekly farmers market). 
Common goods are goods that have no clear legal ownership. They 
are held in common by an unidentified group of  people, countries 
or organizations. No one can be excluded from enjoying its fruits but 
there is rivalry between potential users: when someone catches a whale, 
another cannot catch that same whale. 
Club goods are goods that can be acquired by becoming member of  a 
club. We owe the identification of  this kind of  good to James Buchanan 
(Buchanan, 1965). Club goods are characterized by exclusion (non-
members are excluded) and rivalry (there may be a waiting list). 
The (creative) commons are a source, like an ongoing conversation 
out there. People can participate in it and draw benefits from it, but 
how and to what extent depends on the conditions of  participation (or 
of  membership).  
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• Club goods are goods or practices that require membership. I am think-
ing of  my soccer club, the philosophical society that I am chairing, the 
association of  cultural economists, and the choir of  my wife. 
• Shared goods are the goods and practices that I share with oth-
ers. For me they are my family, my friendships, my colleagues, my 
team in city hall, all kinds of  knowledge and all kinds of  art, some 
music so much more than other music, certain movies, Christian 
practices, soccer games that I played, all kinds of  memories. 
Another distinction focuses on the values these goods enable us to realize. 
The question to ask here is: “what is this good good for?” When we hold on 
to the four dimensions of  values as articulated in the previous chapter, that is, 
personal, social, societal and transcendental values, than this suggest the four 
dimensions of  “personal,” “social,” “societal,” and “transcendental” goods. 
The problem is that goods are good for a variety of  values. An eggplant 
can nourish me personally, but it just as well can be good for a family meal and 
thus for social values. My philosophical practice serves maybe all four dimen-
sions of  values as it is good for my curiosity, for the community that it gives me, 
for its impact on society (awareness!) and for its transcendental significance. 
The following diagram collects a variety of  goods that appear to fit, more or 
less, under the label “personal,” “social,” “societal,” or “transcendental.” 
The criteria are that you can “possess” the good—legally or otherwise—, 
that you (can) partake in the practice that the good represents, or that you can 
enjoy its fruits or services. The listing should illuminate the immense variety 
of  goods that we can distinguish as soon as we look beyond products and 
services. 
Art is not for sale 
Let me illustrate the preceding discussion by applying the concepts to a world 
that has preoccupied me for the last twenty years, that is the world of  the arts. 
How to identify the notion of  a shared good, a commons in that world? Here, 
too, we are up against a standard economic perspective. 
One way to ruffle the feathers of  standard economists is to assert that art 
is not for sale. It was fun to assert as much in a symposium with people of  auc-
tion houses. After all, the art market is all about buying and selling art, isn’t 
it? Sure, people can buy paintings, but that does not mean that they buy art 
doing so. “What nonsense,” the auctioneers and the economists will respond. 
Having bought the painting, someone has ownership. Really? The problem is 
that they follow standard economic reasoning and therefore think in terms of  
private goods and property rights. If  they were to recognize shared goods and 
the way a commons works, they might understand the point. 
This is how I illustrate the point to my students. My question is what is 
it that they pay for when they buy a ticket for an art museum. Having other 
lessons in mind, they often mention “experience.” They think that a museum 
sells an experience good, that is, the experience of  art that they pay for. But 
they cannot pay for experience, just as they cannot buy the knowledge that the 
class conveys. So what do they pay for? 
The answer is “access”: the ticket gives them access to the museum 
and it allows them to do whatever they please during opening hours. People 
may choose to use the bathroom, to spend the entire time in the cafe of  the 
museum or in front of  a single work of  art. That is completely up to them. 
What they pay for is “access.” 
The experience comes about only by the kind of  work visitors are willing 
to do while wandering through the museum. When they walk around mind-
lessly, without making a serious effort, they will experience little to no art. 
Art requires an effort, such as looking, seriously looking, and some degree of  
reflection or exploration. Bringing in knowledge may help. Having the skill of  
looking and interpreting will contribute to the experience, too.  
The visitors may subsequently become aware that art is a shared good. 
When they appropriate the art—by doing the work—they may realize that 
they share the ownership with lots of  others. These co-owners are the cura-
tors, art historians, museum directors, artists, art critics and all those who are 
partially involved as art lovers or, like themselves, as casual visitors to an art 
museum. Art is a common practice. Art is a conversation. 
Museums choose to exhibit certain paintings—and not most others—
because they figure prominently in the conversation that is called art. Visitors 
will experience the art only if  they are willing and able to participate in that 
conversation, when they gain some understanding of  how and why an art 
object figures. That is their participation in or their contribution to the con-
versation that is art. Accordingly, experiencing art requires work, a contribu-
tion of  some kind. It is not enough to just put money on the table. Art comes 
about in a process of  co-creation. 
Art is not a product. Art is not produced. Art is not 
consumed. 
Art is a conversation. Art is a common practice. Art is co-
created or co-produced.
Because art is not for sale, I am critical of  directors of  museums and theatres 
who focus all their energy and effort on selling tickets. Because the art that 
they exhibit and perform only comes to life when the viewers are willing and 
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Diagram 6-2  Four domains of  (shared) goods 
able to contribute, they rather should focus their energy and effort to get peo-
ple to contribute somehow. They should ask themselves how to stimulate peo-
ple to talk about what they have experienced, how it will be part of  their life, 
as a shared good that they cherish. They then should develop a strategy that 
people are willing to contribute to financially or with their time and effort. It 
is in that way that they realize the values of  their venue, rather than by selling 
tickets. 
Intrinsic and extrinsic values of  art
How about the intrinsic and extrinsic values of  art? I touched on the sub-
ject in the previous chapter and announced that I was in need of  other con-
cepts to clarify the distinction. The main concepts that I needed are those 
of  art as a shared practice, as a conversation, as a practice. Some values are 
intrinsic to the practice, in the sense that they have a meaning only within the 
practice that is art. You need to be in the conversation in order to appreciate 
those values or qualities. (The next chapter picks up this point and develops 
it.) 
The conversation that is art is also good for all kinds of  other practices. It 
can be good for edifying people, for strengthening communities, for national 
identity, for the work ethics in a company, for love, for a spiritual experience 
maybe. In all those cases art realizes values of  other goods or practices, that 
is, external to its own practice. That is why they are called its extrinsic values. 
Let me collect the arguments that warrant the statement that art is not for 
sale: 
• The knowledge about art is shared, and has to be shared in order to 
be useful.
• The knowledge will be alive and active only if  it is sustained in a 
conversation.
• The conversation is limited in the sense it is generated within a lim-
ited but usually not very well defined group of  people. 
• The conversation is owned by those who participate in it.
• Ownership does not imply economic rights like the right to sell, 
but rather social rights like membership, status, recognition and the 
respect of  other participants.
• To participants the conversation is a good from which they benefit.
• Participants contribute to the conversation when they participate in 
it somehow.
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• They “produce” the conversation jointly with other participants.
• “Consuming” the conversation, in the sense of  drawing on—can 
also signify a production of—or contribution to the conversation.
• Intrinsic values are those values that are to be valorized within and by 
the practice that is art. Extrinsic are those values that the arts valorize 
for other practices. 
When in the standard economic perspective artists who forsake an income in 
order to practice their art—who seem selfless in an unaccountable way—the 
identification of  art as a conversation, or a commons, makes us realize that 
they gain a sense of  ownership of  the conversation with their sacrifices. In 
exchange for their generous gifts they gain membership and status as an artist, 
and that is apparently worth a great deal to them. But it should also be clear, 
that their work can only come alive when others are willing to participate and 
contribute to it. For art is not of  the artists and it is also not of  those who buy 
art objects. Art becomes art by being shared as art. 
The life of  goods
The example of  art alludes to another characteristic of  goods: they have a 
life (Appadurai, 1988). They come about in (co-)production, they are shared, 
other people join, and they may change hands by means of  a transaction. 
Where standard economics attempts to capture it all with the moments 
of  production, distribution and consumption, the value based approach 
alerts us to the complexity of  the processes and practices that constitute those 
moments. What indeed is consumption of  an artwork, or an eggplant for 
that matter? One needs to know what to do with either one. Chewing on the 
eggplant just purchased is not consuming it. Cooking it with some kind of  
recipe works better. And then the question remains, with who will the dish be 
shared and with what kind of  conversation. Likewise, buying an artwork is not 
consuming it, contrary to what is suggested in standard economic accounts. 
The value of  a good will be influenced by what happens in its life. When 
an artwork is sold at a high price at one point in its life, its life will be affected 
by that event. Sometimes its artistic value will be appreciated more because 
of  the high price. In that case we speak of  the crowding in of  artistic value 
because of  the high price. However, it is also possible that the artistic value 
will be appreciated less if  insiders consider the artwork to have been commer-
cialized by the high price and lose interest. Then the artistic value is crowded 
out (Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
Contested commodities
It has been pointed out that various goods are ruled out for a commercial 
transaction (Walzer, 1983). Examples include body parts (like kidneys and 
wombs), votes and children. Buying and selling of  such goods would be 
immoral. The take away is the insight that markets are limited, that not all 
goods are to be commodified.
This chapter aimed to demonstrate that the most important goods can-
not be commodified because they can only be acquired by means of  contri-
bution and have to be shared with others. The key insight is that the claim 
that all goods in our financialized world are getting commodified is a gross 
exaggeration.
Then again, body parts, votes and children are potential commodities 
because they can be priced and exchanged for a monetary amount. The ban 
on their exchange betrays a valuation, a condemnation of  highlighting the 
instrumental values of  such goods. Such condemnation is cultural. At other 
times and still in some parts of  the world, pricing children is accepted prac-
tice, and so is buying votes and selling one’s kidney or renting out one’s womb 
for a price. 
Why cooperative and social behavior is normal and selfish behavior less so 
Listen to standard economists and you start to believe that we are all selfish 
people who are always out for personal gain. Even the warm, compassionate 
person turns through the glasses of  standard economists into someone who is 
simply incorporating the utility of  others into her own and subsequently tries 
to maximize her personal utility, just like every other normal egoistic person 
does. From a standard economic perspective, cooperative and compassionate 
behavior is an anomaly that is hard to account for.  
Cooperative behavior becomes normal and easy to account for when 
we bring shared goods into the picture. In striving for a good life, people 
need to make contributions to a range of  shared goods. They contribute to 
their family, to their friendships and show social behavior in order to sustain 
“trust,” “collegiality” and other shared goods. In addition they participate in 
or contribute to one commons or another. Scientists will go out of  their way 
to participate in and contribute to the commons that is their discipline; so do 
musicians, actors and visual artists. Furthermore, people make great sacrifices 
to be part of  a religious practice, for example by becoming a monk, by invest-
ing a great deal of  time, or by donating large sums of  money. All this shows 
up as social and cooperative behavior. It is social because it is meant to realize 
a social or societal good. 
Whereas standard economists are puzzled by so-called altruistic behavior, 
in the value based approach much of  such behavior is understood as valor-
izing certain values by contributing to a shared good. Soldiers who are willing 
to sacrifice their life, do so because they want to do their part in sustaining 
“democracy,” “freedom,” “my people,” “my nation” or whatever value they 
see realized in the territory or nation that they fight for. People who give up 
a career for the sake of  assisting poor people contribute to the societal good 
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“solidarity” or “justice.”
The standard economic perspective is blind for social behavior because it 
only distinguishes private and collective goods. It is for this reason that it con-
veys the impression that people are mainly self-interested and inclined to free 
ride when and where they can. And sure enough, herdsmen may overgraze 
the common grazing ground and factory owners will pollute the air when 
they can. Then again, skilled people contribute to the development of  open 
source software, correct entries in Wikipedia, join local political parties, serve 
on boards of  sport clubs, volunteer as teachers in homework classes, organize 
neighborhood feasts and join the church choir. British and Japanese people 
queue at stops of  public transport and Japanese people will not even consider 
dropping a cigarette butt in a public space. Social behavior is quite normal 
and that is because shared and common goods are common. They even make 
up a big part of  our daily activities. 
What motivates social behavior is a sense of  ownership, to be able to say 
that the commons or a shared good is “mine” or “ours.”  The more intensely 
ownership is experienced, the greater the sacrifices people are willing to make. 
Asocial behavior would be the shirking of  social responsibilities. People 
may deny shared ownership to justify not contributing.  Or they may think 
that they get away with asocial behavior. Whether or not they do, depends 
on qualities of  the social environment in which they operate. The correction 
will be social and will come in the form of  disapproval and social exclusion. 
American culture is such that people are frequently asked what they do for the 
common good. Having answered a few times “nothing at all” may be enough 
of  an incentive to donate a sum to a good cause or join a board of  a social 
or cultural organization. Most cultures reward social behavior by awarding 
distinction or reputation. The Dutch King hands out medals.
More importantly, ownership of  social goods and being part of  a com-
mons give satisfaction and add to a sense of  a good life. As we noted earlier, 
people mention shared goods as their most precious possessions. Realizing 
such goods must feel good. And the realization is only possible—so we found 
out—by contributing and participating, that is to say, by social behavior. 
Here phronesis operates, too. We need to weigh the value of  one good 
against another and we need to figure out how much effort is needed to sus-
tain a sufficient sense of  ownership. We can sacrifice too much, or too little. 
How much effort do we need to invest in order to sustain the respect and love 
of  the others? There are trade-offs. When scholars put more energy into fam-
ily life, they can contribute less to the commons of  science and, in doing so, 
may lose out in terms of  reputation and satisfaction as scholars. They have 
to weigh their options, may even make some implicit or explicit calculations, 
yet are cooperating and contributing either way. That is, they have to take 
others in the commons into account in order to know whether what they do 
constitutes a contribution.  
To repeat: private and collective goods are instrumental
All this does not mean that the notions of  private goods and collective goods, 
and the exchange in market places are of  no consequence. The buying and 
selling of  art objects, the pricing of  paintings, the attribution of  property 
rights, the selling of  tickets, the claims and challenges of  authenticity, they 
are all instrumental for the realization of  good art. It is good that economists 
and legal scholars pay attention to that instrumental part of  the world of  arts. 
However, that instrumental side is just that: it is instrumental. Most important 
for the realization of  the values of  art are the conversations, or the commons, 
that constitute art. Most relevant is the way art is realized as a shared good. 
And that is not done by buying art, but by contributing to art. 
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CHAPTER 7
THE GOODS TO STRIVE FOR ARE OUR 
IDEALS 
“I see us free, therefore, to return to some of  the most sure and certain principles of  
religion and traditional virtue—that avarice is a vice, that the exaction of  usury 
is a misdemeanor, and the love of  money is detestable, that those walk most truly 
in the paths of  virtue and sane wisdom who take least thought for the morrow. 
We shall once more value ends above means and prefer the good to the useful. We 
shall honor those who teach us how to pluck the hour and the day virtuously and 
well, the delightful people who are capable of  taking direct enjoyment in things, 
the lilies of  the field who toil not, neither do they spin.” 
(Keynes, 1963, pp. 371-372) 
Keynes is a great economist. And he is a great writer to boot. His writings 
certainly belong to the sources that have inspired me in the current inquiry. 
He has led me to think about economics as a moral science, as a science that 
studies the realization of  values. In the citation above, he appeals to “the most 
sure and certain principles of  religion and traditional virtue” and longs for the 
day that we will “value ends over means.” More than 60 years later the time 
has arrived to focus on the ends, or the goods that we are seeking.
In the preceding chapters we have already taken big steps in the right 
direction. The first step was to recognize that culture, or the content, is what 
our lives, organizations and societies are about. Income, production, wealth, 
profits and commodities are all instrumental. Culture is about values. We con-
cluded, therefore that our actions and those of  the organization and societies 
of  which we are a part, are all about the realization of  values. 
In order to make values real we buy, receive or contribute to goods of  all 
kinds. So we are privy to “conversations”, “relationships,” “public spaces,” 
“knowledge of  all kinds,” “arts of  all sorts” and a wide range of  commodities. 
The questions that we must now face are: “what are all these goods good for 
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in the end?” and “what purpose or end do they serve?” 
The questions address the claim of  Aristotle that all our activities are 
directed at a particular good (see chapter 1). In the current instrumental-
ist mindset, the knee jerk reaction to the question is that the good to which 
Aristotle is referring is subjective and impossible to define. How could we 
possibly know? What you are striving for is your thing. I have my thing. End 
of  discussion. 
In the instrumentalist mode, this conclusion would justify the focus on the 
means, like economic growth, profit and such. I am not sure where the post-
modernist conclusion takes us, other than to the realization that everything is 
complex. I propose instead that we take on the challenge to explore the goods 
that people strive for in order to be concrete and articulate what they might 
mean. It cannot be done, you say? Let’s find out, shall we? 
Aristotle takes us beyond the Maslow pyramid
The exploration starts with the presumption that some values are more impor-
tant than others and that some goods or practices are worth more than others. 
Values and goods have a hierarchy. 
One good leads to another, one good serves another. Money is good for 
all kinds of  things, things like a car or a yacht. A car is good for all kinds of  
things, and so is a yacht. When a car or a yacht is good for impressing peo-
ple than that must be good for something else, like self-esteem. Self-esteem 
is more important than the recognition of  other people. It is a higher value. 
The question then is whether self-esteem is needed to realize an even higher 
or more important value. 
Most goods and values are instrumental in the sense that their realization 
serves other goods and values. We want to be honest, courageous and loving 
as a means to some end. We acquire food, a house or a theatre ticket for other 
purposes than for the possession of  such goods. We own a house in order to be 
able to create a home. The house is an instrument for the attainment of  our 
goal, i.e. a (good) home. But the home in turn may be good for something else, 
like love and care. The food is good for a family dinner and a ticket is good for 
access and for a special experience.  Aristotle suggests that we look for, or be 
conscious of, the ulterior purpose of  whatever we do. 
When I discuss these issues in seminars or lectures, it is inevitable that 
people associate what I am explaining with the Maslow pyramid. It is the 
hierarchy that they are reminded of. However, Maslow evokes a hierarchy 
of  needs, not a hierarchy of  values (Maslow, 1954). Starting at the founda-
tion with basic needs such as food and shelter, we move up the pyramid by 
way of  the needs for safety, social needs, the personal need of  self-esteem to 
the ultimate need of  self-actualization. The pyramid suggests that self-actual-
ization is the ultimate. This framing must have had a great influence—I can 
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only dream of  having the impact that Maslow has had. Even students are 
influenced by it, so I learn in my classes. That is to say, they refer to Maslow. 
Whether they apply it in their daily lives, is another matter.  I usually try to 
unsettle them with a few questions. 
My questions are: “what does self-actualization mean?” and “When do 
I actualize myself ?” The questions usually do not get any kind of  answer. 
The discussion ends here. Self-actualization it is. But is it? If  self-actual-
ization implies the realization of  some values or goods, surely we need to 
know those values and goods in order to be able to identify the possibility of  
self-actualization.  
The same follow up question can be posed when people proclaim that 
they are seeking “authenticity,” “personal growth,” “utility” or “happiness” 
when asked about their goals in life. Even though those terms tend to make 
an impression on audiences, they are empty terms. They do not tell us for 
what goods or values they stand. An Adolf  Hitler may have been authentic 
and happy; he may have actualized himself  and may have experienced per-
sonal growth, but I doubt that people have a life like his in mind when they 
use these terms.
Aristotle presents a so-called teleological perspective on human action. 
We humans do things with a telos, or purpose. Whether we are chatting away, 
meandering, goofing off or playing a game, there is some purpose lurking 
somewhere. Maybe we are seeking company, or relaxing in order to gather 
the courage to begin an important task. Or perhaps we are engaged in a 
practice that is important to us in and of  itself. The telos is the answer to the 
repeated question “what is it (the practice, action or good) good for?” The 
final answer is an expression of  the ultimate meaning of  actions and of  lives. 
The instrumentalist thinkers pur sang, standard economists, point at util-
ity and welfare as the purposes of  what we do. So apparently we as consumers 
are seeking the maximization of  utility, or happiness, for that is considered to 
be a synonym. However, “utility” is an abstract notion with no content. If  we 
answer the probing question each time with: “it adds to my total utility,” then 
the answer becomes meaningless. Even if  we add the notion of  happiness, 
we do not say a great deal more. Am I going to a Shakespeare play because 
that adds to my utility and makes me a little happier? I have actually no 
idea myself  if  it will make me happier. Maybe I will be disappointed. Maybe 
Shakespeare will depress me with his somber message. 
No, I rather think that I go because of  values that I hold. To make those 
values real, I need to bring about goods, as we saw in the previous chap-
ter. Some goods mean more to me than others. So you see me going to a 
Shakespeare play one evening rather than hanging out at home or working on 
this book. In that way, I make an effort to realize qualities that are important 
to me. 
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The same problem arises with “welfare” as a purpose. If  it is the outcome 
of  adding up all individual utilities, it is not only vague but also meaningless. 
If  welfare consists of  all those goods, the value of  which can be counted in 
monetary terms, we still have to answer the question of  what all those goods 
are good for. When we try to answer that question we inevitably end up with 
goods that cannot be quantified. 
The teleological perspective that Aristotle invites us to take, encourages 
us to be explicit about our most important values and consequently about the 
goods to strive for in order to realize those values. The question to ask, then, is 
what is what you do good for? Another way of  putting the question is “What 
are your ideals?” Or: “What is your contribution?” “To which end do you 
seek to contribute?” Even a simple “Why?” could do the trick.  All of  these 
questions are asking for the telos. 
I have been asking these questions during the last few years whenever I 
get a chance. I pose them to leaders of  artistic organizations, to bankers, to 
civil servants, to colleagues, to friends and to students. The question also came 
up during a session with the partners of  a law firm. 
   
Resistance at a law firm
It was Klaas van Egmond that posed the question, once a leading figure on 
environmental issues in the Netherlands, and now a professor. His actual 
question was:  “What are you here on Earth for?” He used his entire body 
to add an exclamation mark to this question. The partners of  the law firm, 
who had gathered to reflect on their business, looked at him as if  he came 
from Mars. They were not used to being addressed in this way. Lawyers are 
known to resist discussions of  their values and to object to big questions. Van 
Egmond repeated the question. 
I know these partners quite well. I collaborated in a Ph.D. research into 
the cultural capital of  the firm. My Ph.D. student and I already had figured 
out that this law firm struggled with what we had identified as a creativity gap. 
The partners sought more intellectual challenge and wanted more inspiring 
work than what they experienced. That did not surprise us. It is quite well 
known that firms of  professionals grapple with the creativity issue. Yet what 
did surprise us, was that they were not really interested in dealing with the 
problem (or “challenge” as they prefer to call it). They were only interested 
in knowing how to increase their profit share. (As is common in law firms the 
partners receive equal shares of  the total profit, regardless of  the individual 
contributions everyone makes.) Each time we turned the conversation to some 
topic or another—the lack of  cooperation, the need for more feedback, the 
improvement of  acquisition, social responsibility or their childish behavior—
their faces would darken after a while and the same question would pop up: 
how is this going to increase our profit share? 
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Before Van Egmond put his question to them, I had tried the same by 
asking what is most important to them. One of  them responded without hesi-
tation: my profit share. Others nodded. Nobody took exception. As I have 
explained before, profit cannot be an ultimate goal. It is certainly not what 
anyone is here on earth for. The question to ask is: what is the profit share 
good for? If  the answer is “more profit” the next question is: what is more 
profit good for? This probing did not work, though. They diverted the ques-
tion, as lawyers are trained to do. 
We did not give up; we tried all kinds of  strategies. We had them watch 
The Return, a Russian movie (by the director Andrej Zvjagintsev) about a father 
who goes on a trip with his two sons he has not been with before. The movie 
tells what it takes for the father to realize what the values of  fatherhood are 
and, for the boys, what it is to be a son. The ending is dramatic and got them 
silent for a while. But when we tried to discuss the meanings, some of  them 
objected. This is not a classroom, they pointed out. I pushed on and found 
out that most of  them had identified with the rebellious youngest boy in the 
movie. How about the father? Isn’t that the role they have in their firm? Isn’t 
their problem—sorry, challenge—that they need to figure out what it means 
to have a leading role and to take on the responsibilities that resemble those 
of  the father in the movie? 
I asked them to read Aristotle, on the goods to strive for and on the vir-
tues. The discussion was interesting, but I was not sure that it changed any-
thing for them. We organized feedback sessions; those seemed to work. They 
especially appreciated to hear from colleagues about their strong points. And 
then we did a field exercise: we put them in cold weather in leaky tents with 
basic Dutch food to get them to tell their story. How did they become lawyers? 
At first I was confused. Some spoke of  how the law had struck them 
and how the law continued to fascinate them. But most had wanted to do 
something else and ended up studying law by accident or for lack of  a better 
alternative. A couple even detested the law and found it boring. How would 
these latter people survive in the law, I asked myself ?  But as I listened to their 
stories, it struck me that they were lawyers for different reasons. Some of  them 
were in it for the law. They were fascinated with the law and wanted to con-
tribute to its advancement. A few were into the law for the excitement; they 
were like sportsmen who do everything they can to win, a case in their case. 
Most of  these lawyers, however, respond to the archetype of  the helper: they 
derive satisfaction from being able to help people in distress. They want to see 
their client satisfied with their advice.
Even while I doubt that we are at the end of  the road with these answers, 
the experience convinced me that probing does get us closer to the ultimate 
goal. Keep probing is the motto. Keep asking what is “helping” or “winning” 
good for. Needless to add, profit is not an answer. 
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The goods to strive for embody the most important values 
Is helping people a good in and of  itself ? What is the helping good for? What 
is the good that “winning” or “personal growth” —to take another frequently 
mentioned goal—good for? The probing has to continue. How far can we 
get?
I was visiting a Brazilian colleague and was introduced to his 14-year-old 
son. The kid looked pretty composed so I thought “what the heck” and asked 
him what was most important to him. He was quick with his answer: “money, 
history and my family.” His father was sitting right there, so I let the “family” 
for what it was. His father was clearly pleased with that part of  the answer. 
How about history? Well, he really enjoyed the subject and would want to do 
more with it. How about the money? What is that good for? “Oh, then I can 
travel,” he replied. “So, it’s not about the money, but about traveling,” I con-
tinued. “And what is the travel good for?” “To meet different people.” “Oh, 
so it’s not about traveling per se, but about meeting different people.” For a 
14 year old this seemed good enough. We had moved already two steps away 
from the instrumental value that money held for him. 
Another example: How about the goods that a school is to strive for? 
Does a school have ideals? I tried to determine them with teachers and direc-
tors of  a high school.  The directors told me that the good that they aim for 
is the satisfaction of  their pupils. “And that of  the parents,” someone added 
with the approval of  others. I began probing. How about the teachers? What 
might be the good they are striving for? They agreed with their directors that 
it is the satisfaction of  the pupils and their parents. I suspected that they had 
previously done a workshop in marketing or something like that. Everything 
they did was directed at their pupils. I kept probing. 
I offered alternatives. How about good teaching as a good in and of  
itself ? After all, Aristotle mentions an activity as a possible good. The previous 
chapter identified practices as a good. Might a school be about great teach-
ing? Is the practice of  good teaching something to strive for? The directors 
shifted in their chairs, but I saw some teachers lighting up at the suggestion. 
How about being a good school? Could it be that a school is a good in 
and of  itself ? (When directors start speaking of  their school as a business, 
with parents and their kids as customers and with diplomas as its product, I 
am inclined to ask everyone to take a deep breath. Might a school not be just 
that: a school?) Maybe not, but what if  we think of  learning as a goal in and 
of  itself ? The school could be considered contributing to that goal. 
But what is the learning good for? I suspected that I lost the majority 
of  the teachers at this point. There were no reactions anymore. I had to do 
the probing myself. Might there be an ulterior purpose? Might it be that a 
school can aim high, and even should do so? Might it be that a good school 
contributes to the shaping of  a good society, by empowering its students? And 
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how about the idea that the school stands for the civilization? After all, with 
the help of  the teachers, students get acquainted with all kinds of  knowledge, 
works and traditions that our civilization has brought forth. 
By then I had lost most of  them. Would it make a difference, I wondered 
afterwards, with just a few interested teachers, to have civilization as a good to 
strive for? Would a shared awareness of  that as a good affect the choices that 
the directors and teachers make? Would it affect the curriculum? We guessed 
that it would. 
I am inclined to forgive the partners of  the law firm for not realizing their 
goals. They can claim, after all, that they are just seeking profit. Yet, even they 
are in need of  goals that go beyond the profit, so we found out. Yet it came as 
a surprise to me to discover that people of  idealistic organizations also have 
difficulty articulating the goods that they strive for or the contribution that 
they seek. You would expect that the so-called nonprofits are clear about their 
goals, as they need to make clear what it is they strive for if  it is not profit. 
They often are not. In the literature on the non-profit sector the question 
about the goal is a critical one. Economists see a goal as something that can be 
maximized in order to construct their models. Yet what non-profits are maxi-
mizing remains unclear. Is a theatre maximizing the number of  seats filled? 
Is a theatre group maximizing attention? See for example Netzer, Non-profit 
organizations and Drucker, Managing the Non-Profit Organization (Netzer, 2011; 
Drucker, 1992).
In a project that is directed at the evaluation of  theatre groups, I needed to 
find out the goals of  a theatre group. What is the theatre group after? Making 
great theatre, maybe? So what? What is that good for? Once the probing 
begins, other possible goods quickly pop up. One theatre group I worked with 
wants to sustain the rich tradition of  Dutch theatre.  Another theatre maker 
ended up with justice as the good to which she wanted to contribute in the 
end. Very often theatre groups are seeking to challenge their audience. They 
are like missionaries seeking out lost souls to show them how much watching 
their plays can mean to them. The answer visibly pleases them. However, it 
provokes the inevitable follow-up question: what is the challenge good for? 
The answer is not obvious. Disturbing and shocking people or changing their 
minds are not activities that are good in and of  themselves. Maybe the makers 
will be pleased to see their visitors shocked and disturbed for the remainder of  
their lives after having watched their play, but I doubt that they will get much 
support if  that is the intended purpose. They must have something else as the 
contribution that they want to make in the end. 
As a rule, cultural organizations want to do more than only sustain their 
art; they seek to bring about change in their art form—to do something that 
has not been done before—and they also seek to change the valuations of  
certain stakeholders (such as adolescents and students) by seducing them to 
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appreciate something that they did not want to see or recognize before attend-
ing. Such organizations have lofty goals. Suggesting that they are about maxi-
mizing the number of  tickets sold or the size of  sponsor deals does not do 
justice to what they are striving for. Granted, they need to be specific about 
those goals also, especially when they want to get people to make donations or 
to contribute somehow. They furthermore need to be clear on their goals, or 
the most important qualities that they want to realize, in order to determine 
whether they are doing well, or not. Otherwise they risk that an evaluation 
focuses on instrumental values such as the number of  performances, the num-
ber of  visitors, or the percentage of  total income that is earned income. 
The probing for the goods to strive for also applies to persons, or agents, 
as economists are used to calling persons. Again, they may be striving to real-
ize all kinds of  goods. They may seek having a good family, and they may 
seek a personal good like dexterity. People like you and I like to do things we 
are good at. A musician wants to play well, an actor wants to act well, and a 
teacher wants to teach well. They all may seek to make contributions to some-
thing greater, like music, theatre, or education. People join political parties in 
order to participate in the striving for a good society. 
I interrupted my writing to get a cup of  tea, have a bite to eat, let out the dog, 
and fetch the newspaper. There it was on the front page: Nelson Mandela had 
died. This South African, black freedom fighter had become a living legend. 
People name him, along with Gandhi, when they are asked to name inspir-
ing and good people. Mandela and Gandhi are both examples of  individuals 
worthy of  admiration for their goodness. I feel the same way about them, 
even if  I am conscious of  their less admirable traits. They stand for something 
important for me, too. 
I read the coverage of  the story and then the famous speech of  his that he 
made during the trial that got him convicted to imprisonment for life. Then it 
struck me. This is what he said: 
“I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domi-
nation. I have cherished the ideal of  a democratic and free society in which all 
persons will live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal 
which I hope to live for and to see realized. But my Lord, if  needs be, it is an ideal 
for which I am prepared to die.” 
(Mandela, 1964)
And this is what I wanted to express here: the importance of  articulating one’s 
ideals and to do so with conviction and passion. That is what Mandela did at 
the moment he was facing a life in prison or execution. His ideals of  a demo-
cratic and free society, of  a society in harmony, express the goods to which he 
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was dedicated, to which he wanted to contribute everything in his power, and 
for which he even was willing to sacrifice his life. 
Sometimes I ask myself  and my students the question: what would we 
be willing to sacrifice our lives for? Is there an ideal for which I would give 
my life? Would a theatre maker give up his life in order to make his art—as 
the celebrated director Andrei Tarkovsky did when he decided to shoot his 
famous movie “Stalker” in a seriously polluted area? (He, his wife and the 
main actor died of  the same lung cancer.) 
I realized that I would have ideals to die for when I was walking with 
my family in the mountains of  Montana the day after a bear had attacked a 
couple. What would we do if  we ran into that bear? Running would be point-
less, as would climbing in a tree. We agreed that we would have to lie down. 
The youngest would go first, on top of  her the next child, then the next one, 
and then my wife. Guess who would have to use his big body to protect them 
all? That was the idea. It was me who launched it and it felt right. What I 
would have done in reality, we may never know. Yet I realized then that some 
“goods” are more important than my own life. They still are. (Although would 
I be willing to risk imprisonment or the intellectual death penalty that comes 
in the form of  derision or, worse, indifference? I’m not sure at this point.) 
Doing the right thing is presumably what makes people feel good about 
themselves and what is worthy of  respect and admiration. When the econo-
mist wants to know how to model the striving for goods, I give up. Then 
again, why would that be the thing to do? Would a model help in figuring out 
what the right thing is to do? Is modeling the right thing to do when we want 
to make sense of  the cultural sector? In the next chapter I will address the 
issue in more detail. The desire to do the right thing is what makes people and 
organizations look for the goods they are striving to realize.  
During a class discussion a student pointed out that the question about 
what he would die for, disturbed him. People risk their lives for stupid reasons. 
Giving up your life for some idea, may be stupid, too. I sensed that he was 
speaking from experience. The student next to him helped me out. He sug-
gested that the better question to ask is: “what are we living for?”  The class 
gave a sigh of  relief; we were back to the question with which we started: 
“what are we here on earth living for?” 
We agreed though that living for one’s ideals may require sacrifices. The 
first student agreed with the term “sacrifice.” 
(Economists may respond by pointing to the concept of  welfare, or that of  
capabilities. They may be right in the sense that these concepts have a func-
tion in determining the right policy—although how that actually works is far 
from obvious—but they do little to help people like you and me or organiza-
tions such as a museum or a theatre company in determining what to do.) 
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So it is about purpose, telos or ideals.  
A friend of  mine, who practices Zen, keeps telling me that the purpose is not 
to have a purpose. His idea of  a good life is to let go, to drop goals and desires. 
His remarks have an influence on me. The influence gets even stronger when I 
am reading Zhuangzi, Lao Tzu, and other great eastern thinkers, or the west-
ern mystic Eckhart or philosophers like Kierkegaard. In the end my friend 
is right. When we keep probing and press on asking “so what?” and “what 
for?” we all probably end up with the insight of  wise gurus such as Buddha 
and Jesus. 
In the meantime I have to teach classes, father my children, enter discus-
sions about doing the right thing and I am doing so with a clear purpose, and 
with ideals in mind. I do need my moments of  letting go, of  silence and peace, 
of  nothing. What are these good for? In my case, I still need those moments 
in order to gather strength to do the right thing, such as fathering and teach-
ing well. Mandela needed to state his ideals to keep his faith during his time 
in prison and afterwards to be a leader in South Africa’s time of  transition. 
Even in the quest for a state without aim and without ego, I detect an ideal, a 
striving of  some sort. It gets my friend to meditate, for example, and to have 
sessions with Zen masters. 
The practice of  Zen is helpful to keep in mind when we look for the 
qualities and goods that are most important to us. It is not said that the pur-
pose is something out there, some dot on the horizon, something that we have 
to reach out for and never will grab. The purposes can also be a practice in 
which we are involved, like the practice of  Zen, or the practice of  art. The 
purpose is then intrinsic, that is to say, intrinsic in that practice. 
Even when people are unaware of  the purposes in their lives and organi-
zations, it does not mean that they act without purpose or ideals. In a modern 
instrumentalist mindset there is no need to articulate the purpose or ideal. 
As Charles Taylor points out, the consequences of  an instrumentalist frame 
is that we are allowed to eschew naming our objectives (Taylor, 1991). He 
calls it the ethics of  inarticulacy (Taylor, 1989). Instrumentalist thinking is 
satisfied with goals like welfare, profit, or happiness. People of  a commercial 
organization will say that profit maximization is their aim. When asked the 
question: “what is profit good for?” they will answer: “for the sustainability of  
the organization.” The inevitable next question is “what is that good for?” And 
that may prod people to become aware of  what is most important to them, of  
their ideals, of  their most important practices. 
The prodding may be thwarted by a lack of  awareness; it may evoke 
resistance. People are good at discussing processes, targets, results, returns, 
means and instruments and not good at all at pointing out what their lives 
and their actions are all about, what they are good for.  The lack of  aware-
ness of  the ideals that people strive for shows in the mission statements of  
THE GOODS TO STRIVE FOR 111
organizations. Usually they state what they do, or would like to do. They do 
not state what they do it for, what the intended contribution, or the goal is. 
The mission of  a quite well known museum reads: “to show great art.” That 
makes clear what it is doing. The question remains: “What is that good for?” 
Donors, for example, would like to know the answer. Mission statements have 
to articulate the ideals of  the organization, the contributions it seeks to make. 
The importance of  articulating the goods or ideals to strive for
For the ancient Greeks honor was a good to strive for. Homer made that 
ideal patently clear in his epic poem about the battle between the Greeks and 
the Trojans. It was an ideal to die for! Plato wrote in the Republic: “in the 
world of  knowledge the idea of  good appears last of  all, and is seen [...] to be 
the universal author of  all things beautiful and right” (Plato & Jowett, 1941). 
In the Thomist tradition, that ideal became the life of  the righteous. The 
Christian culture added also the ideal of  salvation or entry into the paradise 
of  God as the aim of  the life of  the righteous. The Buddha had articulated 
the ideal as enlightenment. 
Questions linger. What is honor good for? What are salvation and enlight-
enment good for? 
Taylor argues that those of  us living now, too, are in need of  articulat-
ing the goods to strive for: “articulation is a necessary condition of  adhesion; 
without it, these goods are not even an option” (Taylor, 1989, p. 53). He also 
states: “A vision of  the good becomes available for the people of  a given cul-
ture through being given expression in some manner” (Taylor, 1989, p. 91). 
He thinks that if  forced, we can articulate some of  those goods. In the context 
of  Western civilization we would come to articulate goods like 
• freedom,
• inner depth,
• nature as source of  good,
• authenticity and individualism,
• benevolence, and
• ordinary life. (Taylor, 1991)
All these strike a chord with me. Do they do so with you? “Ordinary life” may 
seem a strange item in this list, but when I think of  the themes in the visual 
arts (Titian, Rembrandt, Vermeer and so on) from around the 1600s, it begins 
to make sense. And don’t we tend to celebrate ordinary life nowadays? In my 
own country, the Netherlands, the dedication to ordinary life has a religious 
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character, indeed. Authors who depict ordinary lives do well. With Keynes 
in mind, I recall the early 20th century philosopher G.E. Moore, who appar-
ently influenced Keynes with his claim that the highest goods to strive for are 
personal relations and the contemplation of  beauty. Personal relations are a 
big part of  ordinary life.
Taylor calls the special goods hypergoods. They are goods that “not only 
are incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint 
from which these must be weighed, judged, decided about.” (Taylor, 1989, p. 
63) The Roman orator, politician and philosopher Cicero coined the notion 
of  the summum bonum to indicate the end that is an end in itself  (Cicero & 
Gardner, 1958). In the term that I used to characterize the process of  phronesis 
(see chapter 4), these goods are the ideals that people, organizations and socie-
ties strive for. 
But is authenticity such a good? When are we authentic? And when are 
we benevolent? How would we determine that we are free? Taylor’s list is, 
as he himself  recognizes, not very helpful. Taylor sees its shortcomings, its 
vagueness, as symptomatic for the prevalence of  the instrumentalist mindset. 
It would stand in the way of  a clear view on the goods that people, organiza-
tions or nations strive for. 
Getting to articulate the goods: some exercises. 
Naming the ideals is difficult. That should be clear by now. Whether I am 
talking with lawyers, people of  cultural organizations or people in general 
(economists are another matter), they may agree that the striving is for some 
ulterior goods, but when I ask what those goods might be, a deafening silence 
invariably follows. I am sympathetic as I experienced difficulties myself  in 
naming the goods I am striving for. 
In the case of  individuals, it helps to ask what is really important to them. 
The question that I like to pose to people is: “What is your most valuable pos-
session?” The answers are a good indication of  the goods they strive for but 
quite often people still point at something instrumental like “health.” Health 
is like money: it is good for all kinds of  things but we do not live in order to be 
healthy. The question remains: “what is your health good for?” The sugges-
tion is that being healthy enables us to do things that are important for us, to 
realize our real goals, that is. 
However, also asking for the most valuable possessions provides only par-
tial answers. People will most often mention their children (usually accompa-
nied with the question “Can I call them a possession?”), their freedom, their 
mind, or their health. Is that all? How about their faith (for those with a faith), 
their society or their talents? 
Another way to get an inkling of  the ultimate goods is to ask people to 
design and articulate their utopia, or their ideal world. Our utopia tells us 
something about what we like to think away, or suppress, and what we long 
for. When my students articulate a world in which everyone loves each other 
or a world of  tranquility and peace, they express their anxiety about the con-
stant exposure to an abundance of  information and the endless interaction by 
means of  the social media. 
I once used the latter exercise in a leadership program for people of  a 
technical university. It had been difficult to get them to talk about their ulti-
mate goods. When I spoke of  transcendental goods they looked at me help-
lessly. They really had no idea what transcendental meant, and even less of  a 
clue what transcendental goal they could be pursuing. They were too down to 
earth to be able to imagine anything transcendental. 
When they shared their utopias I was struck by a feature that they almost 
all had in common. All their utopias had scientific research as a core activity. 
One professor of  aviation technology had imagined a world of  a small organi-
zation that was all about scientific research. The scientists constituted the core; 
everyone else was subservient to the goal of  scientific research, including the 
managers and students. The latter were all curious and eager to learn from 
the scientists. There would be no grading of  exams, as that would distract 
from the real work. Students would be like apprentices. Another colleague 
spoke of  the perfect machine that would solve all his problems. 
It suddenly occurred to me that absolute knowledge, or truth, is the tran-
scendental good that these people are striving for. Even though their work 
is intended to have practical applications, it is the pursuit of  some absolute 
truth or another, of  the perfect machine, of  the perfect solution to a technical 
problem, which is the highest good to them. Pursuit of  that good accounts for 
the passion and dedication that characterizes their work. 
Praxes are practices to strive for
Articulating merely a good to strive for may be too confining. At least, so I 
learned during the exercises. My Zen friend also already shared his hesita-
tion. I see the point. After all, what do people mean to say when they identify 
“honor,” “salvation” or “enlightenment” as the goods they strive for? What 
do craftspeople mean by saying that they want to be excellent craftspeople? 
In the previous chapter I already suggested that the valorization of  a good 
involves a practice or even multiple practices. Put differently, a practice stands 
for a good. In order to have a valuable friendship we do all kinds of  things. 
The summation of  all kinds of  activities constitutes a friendship. Likewise, the 
striving for honor shows in all kinds of  activities, like doing the right things 
and challenging, or even having a duel with people who have dishonored you. 
Striving for faith implies going to church, temple or mosque, meditating, pray-
ing, studying sacred texts and so on. Striving for truth requires endless hours 
spent in labs, at the library, in seminars, in the study at home and numerous 
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conversations with colleagues. Striving for love calls for lots of  relational work, 
doing good deeds, and battling one’s ego. It is in the doing that the good is 
being realized. You do not have love, you do it. 
I will call a practice that is directed at a good to strive for, at the realiza-
tion of  a hypergood, ultimate good, or summum bonum, a praxis.  That good 
is intrinsic to the praxis, generating intrinsic values. Of  course, a praxis can 
be good for other things, for other values, but its defining characteristic is the 
ultimate good it stands for. 
A praxis is a practice that contains the purpose in itself, 
and is, therefore, the good to strive for.
Take the practice of  excellent cello players, like Yo-Yo Ma, Mstislav 
Rostropovich or Jacqueline du Pré. Their play has delighted and moved 
many people; and it was good for generating an income for themselves and 
Diagram 7-1 From practices to praxes
many others. Cello players play and do whatever is needed in order to play, 
including endless practicing, taking care of  their body, listening to music, to 
other cello players playing, teaching and, yes, performing. Their playing cello 
becomes a praxis when the exercise of  their craft, the perfection of  the play, is 
a purpose in and of  itself, regardless of  the income. The true craftsman plays 
foremost for the purpose of  playing right, regardless of  the external effects 
(Sennett, 2008). Playing well, excelling in playing, is what gives the craftsman 
satisfaction. Craftsmanship is a praxis. So is religion, and science. Art, too, 
can be a praxis. And so might parenting be, I think. And teaching, ideally. 
Thinking of  praxes to strive for creates space for placing and identifying 
the goods to strive for. When engineers strive for the perfect machine, they do 
not need to define what that machine is like; they just have to recognize the 
range of  activities that are geared to and constitute their praxis. Striving for 
the holy grail of  whatever kind implies a certain range of  activities, a practice 
that is a praxis because the ideal to strive for is inherent to it. 
Four dimensions of  goods to strive for
On the basis of  endless exercises of  this kind, I came to identify four dimen-
sions of  ultimate goods to strive for, or four praxes. The division concurs with 
the one I introduced earlier for the different kinds of  values we hold and goods 
we possess. The diagram below provides a summary. The two dimensions on 
the top comprise lofty goods and praxes. They make for the grand gestures, 
the reaching out to the greater goods or the sacred goods. The two clusters at 
the bottom comprise the personal and the relational goods and praxes. The 
goods or praxes included are, so I postulate, are the ultimate answers to the 
question “What is this or that good for?”
The social domain is the lower right cluster. It comprises social goods 
to strive for or to contribute to. Social goods are usually concrete relationships 
and include a family, a relationship with one’s children, a friendship, a close 
community and a strong team. In our striving we seek better qualities, as in a 
“better” family, a “better” relationship with the children, a “closer” commu-
nity, and a “stronger” team. The goodness manifests itself  in the realization of  
social values such as loyalty, collegiality, intimacy, coziness (to name a typical 
Dutch social good), status, social identity, membership of  a club, recognition. 
A “good” family is a praxis with the “better” family as the good to strive for. 
People, who say that their friendships and their children are most impor-
tant to them, will do all kinds of  things for the sake of  these social goods. 
These goods must also be good in and of  themselves in order to qualify as 
ultimate goods. If  there still is a next answer to the question “what are they 
good for,” then they are instrumental or subsidiary goods. 
As social beings, social goods are common ultimate goods that people will 
name when they are being probed for their purposes. Although the idealist 
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in me wants to continue probing, the pragmatist in me recognizes that social 
goods signify to numerous people ends in and of  themselves. Maybe there is 
a good that having my children is good for, but that good is not what I need 
to consider. I would add that my desire is that my children will be happy and 
find a meaningful purpose in their life. I do not really care about what that 
purpose is, as long it is heartfelt. 
Could a group of  people, a community be a good in and of  itself ? Who 
am I to say? Who are you to say, for that matter? People tell me that they 
would do anything for a community to which they belong. Musicians who 
play together, care deeply for what they share, for their shared good, that is. 
They may be horrified at the suggestion that they need the group to distin-
guish themselves and to gain an income. They experience the group as an end 
in and of  itself.  As far as they are concerned, the probing stops at the group.
From Taylor’s list of  modern goods to strive for (see above) only “ordi-
nary life” would qualify as a social good and even that categorization is not 
all too clear. He has missed personal relationships and, in particular, families.
The personal domain directs us to the personal goods that we as individu-
als can strive for. They are goods that are ends for their own sake. We may 
strive to be a good father or mother, a good friend, an excellent craftsman or 
professional, a great musician or surgeon, a wise or happy person or someone 
who is good at enjoying the good things in life or at helping or loving others. 
Being a good father or an excellent craftsman is a good since it requires effort 
to acquire the good and we risk losing it when we do not invest enough effort 
and attention. These goods may have a bearing on the social, societal and 
transcendental goods but they are personal because they are especially impor-
tant for a person. Taylor lists inner depth, authenticity and individualism as 
personal goods. Maybe freedom could qualify as well if  the freedom is strictly 
personal. Autonomy may be another term for such freedom. Experiencing 
autonomy could then be an ultimate good.
I would like to be a good father, a good spouse, a good teacher, a good 
intellectual, and I long for being a wise person. These are my personal goals 
because I do not share them with others. My wife appreciates my desire to be 
a good spouse and a good father but will say to you that my goals of  being a 
good teacher and a good intellectual conflict with my wanting to be a good 
father and spouse. It is really a personal thing. My Zen friend tells me that his 
life is all about realizing inner freedom. I have difficulties imagining what that 
means but observe that he experiences this deeply. I myself  observe that I do 
all kinds of  things in order to realize these personal goals, and intense emo-
tions are engendered by me either realizing or failing to realize these goals. 
When a lecture does not go right I usually feel lousy afterwards. And when a 
daughter tells me that I am a bad father, I feel terrible. 
Diagram 7-2 Four domains of  ultimate goods and praxes to strive for
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Similarly, craftsmen derive the greatest satisfaction from exercising their 
skills well.  My dentist derives great joy from getting my teeth right; the more 
difficult the job, the greater his satisfaction can be. Craftsmen have as a per-
sonal goal to develop their skills in such a way that they can be excellent crafts-
men. An actor wants to act well, a musician wants to play at her best, and a 
director wants to direct a great piece of  art.  Excelling in one’s craft is a praxis 
as the purpose is excelling. 
Young people will say that something like having fun is their personal 
thing. But is it? I suspect that fun is rather something that they want to share 
with their friends, so I would call fun a social good. If  so, fun cannot be a 
hyper or ultimate good no matter what people say. Then again, who am I to 
state so for another? A doctor, who was doing a course with me, resisted my 
pressing for his goods. He just wants to enjoy life and likes to eat well and 
spend good times with his family. At first I was taken aback. Then I wondered 
how he would be remembered by his children? Might it be as a man who was 
able to enjoy life? He thought so. Well, then enjoyment may be the personal 
good that he is striving for. (It would be a good goal for me, too, I realized.) 
Could it be that the collection of  personal goods that we are striving for, 
constitutes our identity? I will leave this question for now (but cannot resist 
implying that the answer is affirmative).  
 
In the upper-right quadrant, you find the societal domain with the societal 
goods or the common goods.  These are goods that large communities 
such as nations, or even humanity at large, have in common. People or organ-
izations (like political parties and movements) can strive for world peace, jus-
tice, a sustainable environment or human rights and will do anything in their 
power to contribute to the realization of  these goods. . When they experience 
peace, justice, a sustainable environment, or human rights, they can say that 
they have realized their ultimate good. Other people or organizations may 
want to contribute to societal goods such as “national identity,” “patriotism,” 
“democracy,” “civilization,” “political freedom,” “equal rights” and “educa-
tion.” Taylor lists only benevolence as a societal good to strive for, although 
freedom could be included as well if  understood as political freedom. 
All such goods are different from social goods because they concern a 
society or the world. People do not need to know each other to share societal 
goods. 
Artistic organizations are challenged to articulate the societal goods to which 
they seek to contribute when they apply for public funding. This proves not be 
easy. In the Netherlands, there was a period that they resorted to articulating 
the economic impact of  their activities. But the economy is not a goal in and 
of  itself; income and economic activity are instrumental to generate other 
goods. So the appeal to economic impact only suspends the question for the 
ultimate societal impact. Possible goals to strive for are a strong cultural qual-
ity of  a society, or a rich civilization. 
Politicians have the intent to contribute to societal goods, so are envi-
ronmentalists, human rights advocates, soldiers, freedom fighters, and people 
who are conscious of  being citizens. 
The upper-left corner directs us to goods that transcend the social, the per-
sonal and the societal and are artistic, spiritual, cultural, scientific and other 
mental goods. I call them transcendental goods as they point to a meta-
physical entity, to the mental space, to values that transcend the social, the 
societal and the personal. They are like the Holy Grail that we humans pur-
sue without ever being able to get a hold of  it. The search for meaning of  life 
usually ends somewhere in this dimension. 
Nature as a source of  good, on the list of  Taylor, could be thought of  as 
a transcendental good if  nature is a good in and of  itself. But because nature 
is not a good to be realized as such, it might make more sense to think of  it as 
a praxis, as all activities someone may undertake to experience nature, to be 
one with nature, to admire nature. This includes hiking, studying natural life 
and joining Green Peace. The same considerations apply to cultural goods, 
that is, goods with shared artistic, historical, or symbolic meanings. They are 
transcendental goods when they are good in and of  themselves. You might 
say that in that case they have an intrinsic value. They constitute a conclusive 
answer to the repetitive question “what is this or that good for?” Cultural 
goods usually come about in practices that become praxes when they contain 
or generate the good to strive for. 
In the end all probing gets us to name a transcendental good. Often such 
a good is not experienced as a goal to pursue. The experience of  the transcen-
dental dissolves all desire and makes each purpose purposeless. The lesson of  
Tao is that we are either on our path or not. It is not something we can aim 
for. The wise men and women will tell us to let go, to cease aiming, and to just 
be. Such way of  being will show up as a practice, or praxis involving meditat-
ing, reflecting, being silent, showing compassion and so on. 
I am experiencing myself  a quest for spiritual meaning in my life, for 
the experience of  the inner voice as I find them in the Deeds of  Augustus 
and Etty Hillesum (a Jewish woman who accepted her fate of  getting killed 
in the Holocaust and who wrote a most inspiring diary about her last years.) 
(Augustine, 1963; Hillesum, 1981). And I recognize the search for absolute 
Beauty and Truth in the work of  artists and scientists. And when I read The 
Chosen by Chaim Potok, I recognize the total dedication of  Talmudic scholars 
to the coming of  the Redeemer, and to experience the divine light in eve-
rything and everyone. That dedication, realized at great expense and with 
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major sacrifices, moves me to tears. So does the passion and dedication of  
Nelson Mandela, or those of  a good craftsman or a good mother. You see: all 
this constitutes my transcendental praxis. 
Priests, monks, nuns, imams dedicate their lives to the realization of  tran-
scendental goods. They do all they can, at least in principle, to contribute to 
the transcendental dimension in such a way that others can benefit. The same 
applies to some artists and scientists, musicians, healers, seers, gurus and so 
on. 
Questions and issues
While writing and when laying out these four dimensions of  goods to strive 
for, I am confronted with doubts, often my own, and with criticism, usually by 
others. I list these with my reflection. 
- No final truth here 
I have found these four dimensions useful to prod people to articulate their 
ideals, the goods to strive for. I still have to encounter a serious challenge of  
groupings. But I am far from sure that this is it, that these are the dimensions 
and that these are the only goods to choose from. 
- The probing can continue endlessly
One objection that I often get is that with further probing, personal, social 
and societal goods may turn out to serve other goods anyway, and then espe-
cially so for transcendental goods. Indeed, I may wonder myself  what having 
children is good for, or what social justice is good for. All these goods may be 
mere earthly distractions that dwarf  by comparison to the importance of  lofty 
pursuits such as Truth, Beauty, God’s grace or Enlightenment. 
I propose to be pragmatic in this. When people or organizations have a 
clear sense about the goods they are striving for, and feel satisfied with them as 
the final answer to the question “what is this or that good for?” then I would 
settle for such goods. Apparently, their pursuit provides guidance for daily 
activities. 
Helpful may be the focus on praxes. When we can articulate a praxis, we 
may leave unsaid what the good is that such a praxis stands for. 
- No direct role for markets 
Ideals are not for sale and cannot be bought. 
- No direct role for states
Ideals are not provided by states. 
- There is no must involved
Nobody must define his or her ideals. There is no obligation. In some posi-
tions, in some situations articulating them can be a big help, for example 
when the position requires leadership. 
- Articulation of the ultimate goods is therapeutic and edifying.
The therapeutic part is the questioning and the confusion that the questioning 
brings about. The edifying part is the offering of  the four dimensions with the 
invitation to fill them in somehow, and the sense of  direction that is the result. 
It works the same way when people in organizations undertake this exercise. It 
is basically the determination of  the mission of  the organization; the mission 
is the shared goal or intended contributions.
 
- Articulation of the ultimate goods can be instrumental, too.
Being able to articulate one’s ideals or ultimate goods is good for the acquisi-
tion of  funds. Donors respond to such an articulation. 
- When the articulation of ultimate goods is merely instrumental, it 
is a lie.
When someone talks about love as his hypergood just to seduce another, he or 
she is dishonest. And when the people of  an organization determine a mission 
for the reason that it sells well, they are lying to themselves and others. 
- When you do not know what your contributions have been, just try 
to figure out what people would say about you at your funeral. 
This is good question to ask yourself  anyway. 
- When you are not satisfied with your ideals or your contributions, 
you might reconsider what you are doing. 
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Appendix: the utopia exercise to determine the goods to strive for 
By articulating your ideals first, then figuring out what you need to do to strive 
for those ideals (the design) and then doing so, you may improve your life! You 
may, for example, discover what satisfaction shared goods provide, or—as is 
certainly so for me—need to figure out which transcendental ideals are worth 
living for. 
For that purpose I often apply the utopia exercise: Articulate your Utopia. 
First I share a few utopias. I pick some elements from Moore’s utopia, I 
tell about a Chinese utopia of  a serene world with no change, I describe the 
utopia of  Ayn Rand in Atlas Shrugged in which everyone is rational and honors 
quality and excellence, and I close with the utopian world of  Julian Barnes in 
which he imagines what would happen should all our desires be met, immedi-
ately (see his A History of  the World in 10 1/2 Chapters) (Barnes, 1989). I do this 
to tickle the fancy of  the participants. I encourage them to use their fantasy 
and to radicalize the features that are important to them. So if  they long for 
a world in which everyone loves each other, imagine a world in which eve-
ryone actually loves each other. How would that world look? What do those 
people do in case their interests clash? What if  someone wants a world in 
which everyone is equal? Great, then imagine such a world. How do families 
look? In our world, inequalities begin with the assumption that the families 
in which people grow up are unequal. How to remedy that? How would the 
politics look? Would you have people be selected as governors in a lottery, as 
in Moore’s Utopia. How is work arranged? How are the goods distributed? 
How about the role of  the sciences and the arts? (In the Chinese utopia, there 
does not seem to be a role for them, in order to safeguard the serenity).
After these introductions I ask the participants to imagine their own uto-
pia. I prod them to include issues such family life, work, distribution, politics, 
the arts and the sciences, the outside world, possible enemies and technology. 
And I insist that they illuminate their own role in their utopia (as many tend 
to forget all about themselves). 
After they have designed their own utopia (that takes some time, and on 
occasion I make use of  some time in between sessions), I make small groups 
of  three or four people. I l ask each one describe his or her utopia and let the 
other two or three figure out what values and goals are becoming manifest in 
that utopia. What is most important for that person according to his or her 
utopia? Equality? Love? What else?  Our utopias reveal our desires and those 
are usually informed by our values. The difficulty, so the participants will 
experience, is to distill the values and especially to characterize and articulate 
them. It is best to have one person keeping notes and give those to the author 
of  the utopia. Then the next person gets a turn. 
I like doing the exercise with people in organizations. Lawyers who insist 
that money is the only thing that counts, reveal in their utopia that they care 
about other things. They then imagine something like a small office in which 
collegiality is very important and that allows for meaningful relationships with 
clients. They imagine a good balance between family and working life, and 
turn out to be important to their communities.  
When leaders of  universities dream about the ideal university they invar-
iably imagine small communities, intensive interactions among faculty and 
students, and an inspiring atmosphere. Why then, I ask, are you pursuing 
big universities and why are you focusing on increasing financial returns, and 
why do you care so much about the rankings? While they can readily cite 
economic and political pressures, it appears that they act in conflict with their 
own values. 
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CHAPTER 8
THE SOURCES FOR DOING THE RIGHT 
THING; 
ABOUT RICHNESS AND POVERTY
It had been a good event. More than 300 people had showed up to attend a 
lecture of  my friend, among them a few colleagues and Ph.D. students. She 
had done very well and received a remarkably long applause. On the way 
home we discussed how privileged we felt. Here we are, doing the things we 
really love doing—thinking, writing and discussing ideas with others. In this 
instance, she was particularly blessed with all the interest she was getting for 
her ideas. 
I was working on this chapter at the time and brought up the subject of  
our sources. What sources does she possess that enable her to have experi-
ences such as an evening like this one? We quickly agreed on sources such as 
her stock of  knowledge (she keeps amazing me with how much she knows, 
how much she has read), her strong skills in rhetoric including the reper-
toire of  arguments, examples, anecdotes, jokes, metaphors and so on, her 
reputation (or ethos as the rhetorician would say), and her social network. 
She wanted to add “emotions” arguing that you need to have empathy, love 
maybe, to be able to do what she is doing. I was not sure at first, but maybe 
she does have a point, I now think. We also discussed the source “memories.” 
Her knowledge is based on them but there are all kinds of  other memories, 
such as the memories of  hundreds of  talks like this one that enable her to do 
so well. Memories constitute her experience. Then she has her talents, her 
intellect, her background with several gifted people in the family, including a 
father who was professor at Harvard, and a mother who was a talented opera 
singer and developed into a poet. They were gifts, you might say. Her oikos 
is a more delicate issue, as she is living by herself. Even so, she has a strong 
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relationship with her mother and her siblings. And she has “homes” all over 
the world, places where she is always welcome. Like my home. These are 
important sources for her, too, as they give her the warmth and the emotional 
support that she needs as a base for her performances. 
We paused a little and then I pointed out that we had not talked about 
her house, her financial assets, and other possessions that she has bought in 
exchange for money. This is strange, I wanted to say. She is an economist 
after all. She had just been preaching the virtues of  the market. Yet for her 
performance, the sources of  the market had been of  little to no relevance. 
In a relaxed setting, sitting at my kitchen table, sipping tea, she could easily 
acquiesce. “I see your point,” she said. And then she was ready to go to bed. 
How rich are we? How poor? 
In order to realize values we are in need of  goods. That is what we noted 
in the previous chapters. Having a family enables us to realize the values of  
family, care and support. Having is a matter of  owning or possessing. I do not 
think of  our legal possessions only; I expressly point at all the goods we own 
that do not have a legal entitlement. My friend has no intellectual property 
right on her rhetoric, yet it is highly valuable to her. 
Walking down this lane of  values and goods we run into the question: how 
much are goods worth? What are they good for? If  my friend has a great stock 
of  shares and cash, she would be considered rich. But how about my “home,” 
my “family”?  They are priceless, I am inclined to say. How does “owning” a 
family compare with owning a pile of  money? What makes someone richer? 
According to the standard economic definition the richer one has the pile of  
money, barring further information. But is she? She often remarks that she 
envies my household with all those wonderful kids, a good relationship, many 
visitors and so much going on. Would that make me richer? Then again, she 
is much more well-known than I am. Her lectures draw large crowds and her 
books get reviewed in the New York Review of  Books. Would that make me 
poor by comparison?
How about the lawyer with whom I was in conversation? He is loaded, as 
they say. He has a large house and an even larger bank account. He drives an 
expensive car and has a second home somewhere. Yet our conversation was 
about his worry that he was missing out on some important things in life.  In 
his youth he had wanted to live a free life as an artist and as an intellectual. 
He had wanted to travel to discover the world. His job now takes him all over 
the world, but that is not the kind of  travel he had dreamed of. We came to 
this subject after I had asked him what he considered to be his most import-
ant contributions thus far. The question had embarrassed him as it made him 
realize that he would not consider the big deals that he has made to be real 
contributions. It actually was starting to bother him that he works with and for 
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people who are preoccupied with money.  
“How rich do you feel?” I asked him. “You really want to know?” he 
turned to me, “I tell you, all that money, it does not mean much to me. What 
I really care about are my kids and my wife.” When I pointed out, that he 
was doing everything to stay away from them, with all his travels and 18-hour 
working days, he sighed. I got even worried that he would become despon-
dent. He was not doing justice to all that he possessed, I thought.   
A few weeks before this conversation I spoke to an artist at the opening 
of  an exhibition. We came to the topic of  money. I asked him what he earns 
with his artwork. He could not tell me. His income fluctuated a lot from year 
to year. The last years had been tough. People are not inclined to buy art, he 
noted. He was not complaining, familiar as he is with the alternating highs 
and lows. “How do you do it with your family,” I wanted to know. “Do you 
take vacations?” “Sure, we go on vacation,” he responded and continued me 
to tell how they were celebrating their vacation with the little money they 
have. “You know, we visit these rich places, watch people hanging out at lux-
urious restaurants, being bored, and then go to the supermarket, buy us some 
wine, bread and cheese, and find a beautiful spot in a park or at the seaside 
and have a real feast.”  He laughed. “You know, we create our own luxury 
with the wine, the bread and the cheese and a wonderful spot. I actually pity 
those people who are spending a lot of  money and remain bored.”
So who of  the two is richer, the lawyer or the artist? In terms of  money, 
the answer is obvious. But that does not appear to be the right answer. I do 
not think that there is an objective standpoint from which we can compare 
both lives and determine that one has greater richness than the other. It all 
depends on what we value. The artist appears to be more authentic as he is 
living what is important to him while the lawyer seems to long for the life that 
he dreamed of  in his youth. The artist “has” creativity as a source; the lawyer 
“has” his expertise and a large and powerful social network. 
In the standard economic conversations, we learn to quantify all pos-
sessions in amounts of  money. That enables a comparison. If  we were to do 
so for the artist and the lawyer, we would have to conclude that the latter is 
worth a great deal more than the artist. But is that right? Do his quantitatively 
superior possessions enable the lawyer to realize a better life than the artist? 
We can pose similar questions for organizations or communities (such as cities 
and nations). What does one university have that another does not?  When 
we turn to the financial endowments of  universities, we have to conclude that 
some (like Harvard and Stanford) are much richer than others. But what does 
that say? How to bring European universities into the equation? They do 
not have endowments, but have government support instead. Furthermore, 
large endowments are also the sign of  an engaged and well-connected alumni 
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community. Could that community be the real source of  wealth? (Managers 
of  European universities only recently have discovered this source; they may 
need it now that popular support for generous financing of  universities is 
waning.) For a scholar the richness of  a university rather shows in the quality 
of  colleagues, the intensity of  research seminars, and the curiosity and talents 
of  students. It is the culture of  a university that matters most, I would argue. 
Companies like Google do not do so well because of  their physical assets 
like factories and computers, but because of  the reputation that they have. 
Reputation (or brand recognition as marketing specialists would say) accounts 
for attention, and attention is good for lots of  income by way of  advertise-
ments. (Google offers attention space for other parties eager for attention to 
their offerings.) 
Cities like New York and Amsterdam have sources that other cities do not 
have. Those sources attract tourists, intellectuals, artists, entrepreneurs and 
head offices of  big firms. They have economic capital, economists would say, 
since they are able to generate income. But they have so much more than that. 
Amsterdam has, for example, the red light district, coffee-shops, the Anne 
Frank House, the canals and a few important museums. All those sources are 
good for large crowds of  tourists. New York has “energy,” an excess of  virtu-
ally everything, from stores to jazz clubs, from galleries to dangerous neigh-
borhoods, Central Park, and also quite a few great museums. Amsterdam 
lacks a “Broadway” and has not many important galleries. Does that make it 
a poorer city? I do not think a definite answer is called for. People will weigh 
the qualities and will decide one way or the other. The point that I want to 
make is that a city owns all kinds of  sources and that many of  those sources 
are immaterial, and impossible to capture in monetary terms. 
The same point applies when we compare countries. Uganda does not 
have the infrastructure that the Netherlands has. At night the streets are dark 
and risky to walk on because of  the many cracks in the pavement. It lacks a 
good health care and it is well endowed with civil servants and politicians that 
the Dutch would consider corrupt and unreliable. Yet, as the Ugandans will 
point out, they have rich local cultures, with a strong sense of  tradition that 
the Dutch lack. In addition, Ugandans enjoy a much richer family life than 
the Dutch do. They consider all those senior Dutch people living by them-
selves to be a sign of  poverty, social poverty that is. And yes, the income of  the 
Dutch is ten times that of  the Ugandans. Then again, how do the cultures of  
both countries compare? 
Stocks and flows
All these examples point at an important element of  the design in the actions 
of  people and organizations. When doing the right thing, we do not only 
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need to realize which goods to strive for, we also have to figure out how to 
do so. According to the scheme of  phronesis (see chapter 4) this is a matter of  
design. The examples point at the importance of  something like “stocking 
up,” “accumulating” or “investing in” something like capital, power, resources 
or sources. 
We do what the squirrel does, stocking up nuts in the fall in order to be 
able to make it through the winter. The stock of  nuts provides a flow of  nutri-
ents throughout the winter. Robinson Crusoe invested his time and material 
to make himself  a dwelling that could provide him a “flow” of  protection and 
comfort for the years to come. He also stocked up seeds to secure a future flow 
of  food. 
The distinction between stocks and flows is the basic principle of  account-
ing. Balance sheets report the stocks (including the debts that are negative 
stocks) and income-cost statements report the flows coming in and going out. 
The balance sheet shows the net wealth as the result of  positive and neg-
ative stocks. The income-loss statement shows the profit (for organizations) 
and savings for social organizations, people and communities. This way of  
accounting for stocks and flows frames daily life. It makes us think of  what 
we own and owe, and of  the amounts that we receive and spend. It generates 
a fascination for the outcomes: net worth on the balance sheet and profits or 
savings on the income-loss statement. 
Related to the distinction between stocks and flows is the distinction 
between investing and consuming. When the squirrel adds nuts to his stock, 
he is investing.When he takes a nut from the stock he is consuming.  At least, 
this is the framing of  accounting.
So when are you and I investing and when are we consuming? It all 
depends on what we count as our stocks. When we consider the examples 
above, we will quickly figure out that the stocks that usually appear on the 
accounts of  accountants and economists are only a small fraction of  the 
stocks that matter in the end. The reason is that they limit themselves mainly 
to the stocks that have been acquired by means of  exchange. So they count 
material goods such as buildings, machines, computers and the like and 
financial capital such as bank accounts, shares, bonds and the like. Buying 
buildings and stocks should then be considered investments. Using a building, 
wearing it down in the process, should be consumption. 
But what if  a family is to be considered a stock, or the atmosphere in a 
town, or the culture of  an organization? Then spending time with the family, 
organizing a festival in town, or having a company outing should be consid-
ered investments, too. Is reading this book an investment or consumption? It 
all depends on what you count as your stocks. If  you think of  your knowledge 
as a stock, then reading is an investment. If  you are just passing time and 
enjoying yourself, you better think of  this activity as consumption. 
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How to speak about stocks? Capital, power or sources? Source it is. 
There is more to say about the words we use. Economists like to speak of  
capital when they refer to stocks. So we speak of  economic capital when we 
refer to all those stocks that can generate a form of  income, such as the stocks 
of  buildings, machinery and the like. We speak of  human capital when 
we refer to stock of  knowledge and skills. Individuals can have such capital 
but so do organizations when you think of  the knowledge and the skills of  its 
employees. More recently the concepts of  social capital and cultural cap-
ital have entered the scene. Social capital refers to the economic relevance 
of  social contacts and relationships, or the social network.  Cultural capital, 
as introduced by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, refers to the cultural 
baggage of  people, including their diplomas, as well the stock of  monuments, 
museums, churches and other cultural assets (Bourdieu, 1977). Both forms of  
capital are a form of  economic capital since they are good for economic status 
and income. 
But the notion of  capital obstructs the perspective that I want to offer 
here. It is the identification with economic returns but also with the notion of  
legal property that prevents us from seeing all the things that we own, includ-
ing the stocks that really matter. I also find that outside the conversation of  
economists, the notion of  capital evokes the wrong responses. When I speak 
of  cultural capital, artists, for example, find reason to dismiss my argument as 
a typical economistic one. 
So I have been looking for another term. Power is a possible term to use, 
as having a stock of  some kind empowers the owner. Stock represents a power. 
But “power” also generates associations that need to be sidelined before going 
ahead. I settle for the notion of  sources. A source is stock of  something, nuts, 
knowledge or skills that enables someone to realize certain values directly or 
indirectly by way of  certain goods. In the company of  economists the notion 
of  source needs some clarification but in other circles it does not create as 
much confusion as does the notion of  capital. So, source it is. 
Sources enable people, communities or organizations to realize their val-
ues. When Amartya Sen speaks of  the capabilities of  people, he presumes 
that people have sources that make them capable, such as the source of  an 
education, or a supportive oikos and a stable society (Sen, 1985).
How to acquire the sources we need in order to do the right thing? 
Before considering the wide variety of  sources that people like you and I have, 
I need to point out that the mode of  acquisition matters. When we think along 
with economists we are inclined to restrict ourselves to the sources that are 
acquired by way of  purchases, of  (financial) investments. These are sources 
like housing, buildings, machines and maybe even knowledge.
Yet there are other modes of  acquisition. Some sources we have received. 
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They are a gift. Think for example of  individual talents. We will say that the 
great violinist is gifted. But being born into a good oikos is a gift, too, as is being 
part of  a strong society. Some of  us may go much further to consider all we 
have as gift of  God, Allah or nature. 
Most important are the sources that we acquire by contributing to them. 
Think of  shared goods such as friendship, art (or an artistic sub discipline), 
science, faith. 
Accordingly, we need to distinguish 
1. sources that have been bought and have legal ownership
2. sources that have been gifts
3. sources that are acquired by means of  contributions and have a 
shared ownership 
The first category usually receives most attention for the simple reason 
that its items can be measured reasonably well in monetary terms. I know the 
price of  my house, but I have no idea how to pinpoint the value of  my home 
that I have acquired by contributing to it. The CEO of  a company knows the 
total price of  its assets but when it comes to the culture of  his company, he, or 
she, gropes in the dark. 
How does culture come about? How can we do the right thing when we 
do not have a good idea of  our sources? We need to know our sources in order 
to sense what we are capable of. 
The Tree of  Life: the sources for a good life
Later I will consider organizations, communities and societies. First I want us 
to think about the sources that enable us to live a good life. I have found the 
exercise useful for myself  and when I do it with students, they often appear to 
be surprised. It gets them thinking for sure. 
We cannot expect to come to a complete account and definite conclu-
sions, but we can explore the sources that enable the realization of  a good life. 
The image that I work with is that of  a tree. I happen to be fond of  trees 
and have a special relationship with the giant beech tree in my garden. It must 
be standing there for more than 200 years. Just imagine. Its roots are deep and 
it reaches high in the sky. It carries huge branches that require a large space, 
crowding out the spurs that surround it. The other day, one of  the branches 
broke off during a big storm. The branch was so heavy that I could not lift it 
on my own. In the fall it takes me a couple of  days to rake its leaves. For me 
that tree is a source of  magic that leaves me in awe. That gets me thinking of  
the tree of  life. 
Thinking through the tree of  life is an organic process.  We cannot gather 
the components and fit them nicely together as we would do with a machine. 
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The tree, so we will quickly discover, consists of  a wide array of  parts or 
sources, some more concrete than others. Measuring the parts, as we are used 
to doing in balance sheets, is pointless. Even so, we want to weigh the various 
parts somehow. How important is your cultural upbringing for the life you are 
living? Speaking for myself  I would say that it is quite important as it intro-
duced me to the world of  literature (my family read together in the evenings), 
with the visual arts (we went to art galleries on Saturday afternoons) and the 
world of  religion (my father was a Protestant minister). Is that upbringing 
more important than the gifts of  the civilization that you can enjoy, including 
the institutions (schools and the like) that disclosed those gifts for you? Gosh, 
that is a difficult question to answer. Yet when confronted with the question, 
you and I are made more aware of  the sources that enable us to enjoy a good 
life, or we are becoming increasingly aware of  the impediments for a good 
life. Might it be, for example, that we are neglecting the gifts of  our civiliza-
tion, or the fruits of  our upbringing? 
The trunk of  the tree of  life as I imagine it stands for our sources. The 
branches and leaves that sprout from the tree are the qualities that make up 
our daily life. They consist of  our realized values, but also our earnings, repu-
tation, power, influence, experiences, sensations, emotions, pleasures and such 
that we owe to our sources.  
Let us explore this tree of  life. 
a) At the base are the most essential sources: oikos, health, talents, 
basic skills
What would constitute the base of  the tree? (I will get to the roots at the end.) 
I would say that the base consists of  the sources that are most precious, most 
fundamental for a good life. Remember the question about your most import-
ant possessions? The answers constitute the base of  your tree of  life, at least 
so I suggest. The majority of  people would fill in “family” and “friends,” and 
some “freedom” and “health” (really? Are you sure?) and others “faith” or 
“love.” 
These sources are at the base because they are a) most important and b) 
feed other sources. Having a strong home usually enables people to partici-
pate effectively in networks, communities and societies. Home also stands for 
the environment in which we grew up, for our upbringing, for the knowledge, 
norms, experiences and social skills that we take away from our upbringing 
and that are so important for the rest of  our lives. The home in which we 
grew up and our current home are sources of  memories and remembrances, 
of  shared experiences. 
A home is partly a gift; that is especially the case for the home in which 
we are born. But for a large part, a home is the result of  a great variety of  
contributions and investments. Just think of  all the time, emotion and effort 
that are required to maintain a home. (If  you are living by yourself, imagine 
what your parents have invested and ask people like me to tell you about what 
it takes. Who came up with the idiotic idea that time spent at home is leisure 
time?) 
Not all homes are the same, of  course. There are good homes, great 
homes and “poor” or “terrible” homes. A home with abuse or desolation, and 
a broken home can set people back; these may turn into a negative source. 
The better the home, the stronger it is as a source for a good life, at least so we 
may presume. (How would you assess your own home? Might it be a reason 
to put more effort into it, to give it more attention?)
Homes are good for all kinds of  values and experiences, including 
the most important values like love, care and support, but also reputation, 
self-confidence, social skills and social networks, cultural knowledge and a 
religion maybe (showing up as offshoots and leaves). 
Friendships are akin to home. This area of  the tree of  life contains the 
most intimate and important friendships. These are friendships that we have 
for the sake of  the friendship. All the offshoots, all the outcomes are an extra. 
Even so, good friendships are good for all kinds of  values, experiences and the 
like and are therefore important sources, as homes are.  When a good home is 
lacking, good friendships constitute a good alternative source. 
Every now and then I run into people who tell me that they have col-
leagues who are like family to them, only better. They share the deepest emo-
tions, and have a cause in common and work together towards that cause, 
something that families are lacking. I have a few intellectual friends who are 
close to what I would consider family, so I recognize the sensation. Kinship 
is maybe not always most important; a shared cause or a shared experience 
(like having fought a war together) can form a bond that is stronger and more 
fruitful than kinship or intimate love. 
All these sources will stand no chance if  you and I do not have the basic 
skills and health for survival. Basic skills include basic social skills and skills like 
cooking and taking care of  one’s health, basic cognitive skills and skills that 
can earn the owner a basic income. 
b) Social sources come next
At a slightly higher level I am inclined to locate a variety of  social sources, 
such as the social groups I am part of, my friendships, the academic 
network that I can call mine, and the society I am a member of. From these 
sources I derive for example a social status, a social identity, recognition of  my 
contributions, a sense of  honor, and financial gains at times. 
Social sources constitute what is also called social capital. It includes 
“ethos,” the oh-so-important character factor that gives credence to what we 
say to an audience. I benefit every now and then from being a professor: in 
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social settings it gets people’s attention (but less so in political settings and not 
at all in my oikos). Reputation, “having a name,” or “being a brand,” is an 
important source, too. In the competition for attention it is crucial. (A bad 
reputation is counterproductive, of  course. My experience is that a good rep-
utation among some brings about a bad reputation among others: the trick is 
to get a good reputation with the right people). 
An important element of  one’s social sources, or social capital, is the 
social network. Boy, how critical the social network can be. The other day 
a Japanese colleague told me that she was looking for assistance in a research 
project that involved Brazilian artwork. As it happened, I had an enthusias-
tic and capable Brazilian student who was just right for the job.  That made 
the Brazilian student happy, my Japanese colleague happy, and me content 
because I had been able to put my social network to work. It is also great to 
land in Sydney and call up the friend with whom I studied some thirty years 
ago and spend a day with him, as if  we had seen each other the day before. 
Social networks are good for all kinds of  things. Some are better than others. 
How is yours? Does it contain the right people? Does it also contain bad con-
tacts, contacts that can hurt you? 
A couple may think it shares a social network. But that is not necessarily 
so as the remaining partner may discover after the death of  the other: a big 
portion of  the social network may have been mainly connected with the other 
partner and loses interest in the contact. I learn from such experiences that 
I should not leave the social networking to my wife and have to take care of  
my own. I will be in need of  (intellectual) friends later in life—when the next 
generation has lost interest in what I have to contribute—so I should make 
an effort now. 
Other social sources are communities, neighborhoods, clubs, societies, 
reading groups, political parties or any social entity that has a sense of  “us,” 
I now have neighbors who help me out from time to time, and whom I will 
help if  necessary. But that has not always been the case. Thanks to a local 
soccer club I still can play soccer, and with a group of  friends I can share hikes 
through mountainous areas. 
c) Intellectual, artistic, scientific and spiritual sources
It is about right there that I place the cultural sources, including culture 
in its anthropological sense, civilization and the arts. Cultural sources 
constitute what is also called cultural capital.  
We are part of  a culture and we benefit from it, and sometimes we suffer 
from it. In the US I benefited from some, and suffered from other aspects of  
American culture. I benefited from its rich music scene, its fantastic sports, 
the rich and stimulating intellectual climate at its universities, and its entre-
preneurial spirit and suffered from its lack of  patience for long conversation, 
its materialistic culture and the death penalty. (That is my take on that source; 
yours will undoubtedly differ). Currently I am enjoying the fruits of  Dutch 
culture and coping with its problematic aspects. I enjoy the qualities of  Dutch 
personal and family life (with the emphasis on “gezelligheid” or coziness) and 
cope with a lack of  an intellectual climate at its universities, a widespread 
disdain for reading serious books and its inhospitality (as experienced by so 
many foreigners). 
An important cultural source is the language that we share with others. 
A shared language enables us to share experiences, ideas, values and feelings 
with others. When we have to speak to others in a foreign language a great 
deal tends to get lost in the translation. For a Dutchman it is difficult to be 
humorous in English, and Americans will have a difficult time with the gut-
tural sounds of  Dutch and to capture its subtleties. Having been raised in the 
West it is near impossible to be fluent in Japanese or Chinese; one can forget 
about ever passing as a native because of  it, and also because of  appearance. 
Language is a powerful cultural device and a rich source within the language 
community and a serious constraint for operating in the world at large. 
Civilization is another source that is easily overlooked because it may 
seem to be self-evident. However, its richness is far from self-evident. Only 
will we benefit from its rich array of  arts, texts, languages, histories and tradi-
tions when we are willing to put in the work. The bible, Rafael, Giotto, Plato, 
Darwin, Aristotle, Augustus, Zhuangzi, Confucius, Rembrandt and Rumi: 
they are all sources of  great insight and inspiration. They require effort, time 
for study, discussion and time for contemplation to appropriate them. 
As with culture, you will know how important your civilization is when 
you are outside of  it, in a place where its richness does not resonate, where 
people around you have no interest whatsoever and are even hostile. We do 
not even have to travel very far to have that experience. I experience a lack 
of  interest almost daily. Even at the university I run into indifference and 
neglect of  all this richness. Too many scholars are not only ignorant to all the 
sources I have just listed, but also they are uninterested. The consequence is 
a deflation of  their value. I, along with others who care about these sources, 
will experience their relevance less intensely. If  this sense is shared widely, we 
are justified to speak of  a decline of  civilization and a loss of  the source it 
represents. 
The arts are an important source, of  course. It is a source good for the 
valorization of  all kinds of  values. Do I need to elaborate? Each person will 
fill in this source differently. Bach’s St. Matthew Passion moves my wife and 
me to tears, but leaves my children indifferent. Pink Floyd played loud gets 
me and at least two of  my children going while my wife will shout in order to 
demand that the volume be turned down. A cello played well stops me in my 
tracks. I can’t get enough of  experiencing objects of  visual art even if  I do not 
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understand them. But one of  my daughters is even more into that art than I 
am. I often fall back on books that I have read and movies that I have seen. I 
did not even finish reading Musil’s The Man without Qualities, but still the book 
inspires me while writing this book. The other day I found myself  crying after 
finishing reading Potok’s The Chosen. It must have been the father-son theme 
that got to me. Only recently, I discovered that the books of  Karl May that I 
read as a 10-year-old boy had a profound influence on me. The intense bond 
between Old Shatterhand and Winnetou has made me long for a friendship 
that does not require words. In a way that is inconsistent with my fondness for 
conversation. Winnetou remains a hero. The fact that he is a fictitious figure 
does not really matter. I could continue but this is just to show how this source 
works for me in the hope that it evokes associations with you. How about 
your movies? How about dance? How about opera? Architecture? Fashion? 
Design? 
Religion is a source, too. Churches, temples, mosques are among the 
places where people can experience the sacred, where they receive hope and 
inspiration for living the good life. Of  course, many people have a negative 
experience with the church but the weekly services, the religious texts; the 
rituals continue to be a solace and an inspiration for multitudes. The bible is a 
crucial source for Western civilization. All kinds of  common expressions and 
sayings are biblical and social values of  solidarity and compassion are origi-
nally Christian values. It has been argued that the loss of  religion would be 
the end of  civilization as we know it. Buddhism is a source of  a rich array of  
practices, such as meditation, throughout Asia and the Western world. And so 
are Zen and Taoism. Islamic religion has been galvanizing the Middle East. 
Civilization includes cultural heritage. Cultural heritage comes in tan-
gible form (monuments, manuscripts, art objects and such) and intangible 
form (music, traditions, rituals, craftsmanship, languages and such). 
The sciences and the humanities are an immense source for knowl-
edge, insight, meaning, research, teaching and technological and social inno-
vation. Their products fill huge libraries. At Duke University, where I got my 
Ph.D., I liked to wander along the open stacks to be amazed and overwhelmed 
by the sheer amount, variety and richness of  what people have produced thus 
far. There is so much to read, so much to study. 
I like to think of  civilization as a collection of  all kinds of  conversa-
tions. All these conversations are sources that invite us to enter and to which 
we can contribute. For me it is important that there are ongoing conversations 
on cultural economics, pragmatic and Aristotelian philosophy, sociology, the 
arts, classical music, theatre, the euro and quite a few more. I draw inspiration 
and insights from them. Just inspect my bookcase and you will know what I 
mean.
Memories are a source in and of  themselves, although they are fed 
by other sources. Just imagine losing your memory. In that case, you do not 
remember those great moments of  your youth, the love and support you 
received from your parents and others, your friendships, the books you read, 
the movies you have watched, your vacations, everything you saw and experi-
enced, your study, your fights and the conflict situations you were part of, your 
achievements and your embarrassing moments. 
Our memories enable us to be who we are. They constitute us. So much 
of  what we do is for the sake of  our memories. Vacations serve that purpose, 
for example. S         o do our visits to the theatre, social meetings and all kinds 
of  efforts like giving lectures, organizing festivals, and meeting famous people. 
What remains of  everything we do is a memory, at least so you may hope. For 
most things we do, if  we are honest, is not worth remembering. The nice St. 
Nicholas party that I had with my family (a Dutch tradition that takes place 
on December 5) I will undoubtedly forget soon; it will become part of  my 
memory of  such parties in general. I will also quickly forget the meal I had 
yesterday or that great class. But those memories that I have, are precious for 
me.  
Human capital is the knowledge and the skills with which the owner is 
able to earn an income. It is composed of  a selection of  the previously men-
tioned sources. 
d) Societal or common sources
The society that you and I are part of, is good for all kinds of  things. It 
includes educational institutions, public infrastructure, health care provisions, 
care of  the elderly (for when we grow old), democratic or other political insti-
tutions, newspapers, media and good Internet. This source also stands for the 
Just imagine how rich you are compared to Emperor Nero in ancient 
Rome or King Louis XIV in France in the 18th century. You can listen 
to a concert or any other music in a few clicks whereas they had to 
command large groups of  experienced musicians to perform live for 
them. No pop, country or jazz for them. You can buy a mango around 
the corner that they had had to import—if  they knew about its exist-
ence. And when you want to take a drive, you start the engine and 
speed away, whereas they had to get the horses ready for their chariot 
in order to get going at not even 20 km an hour. And then we are not 
even speaking of  the health care you can have, the information you 
can access. Even if  you do not have much money, you are in all these 
respects much richer than the emperors and kings of  the past.
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degree of  solidarity in a country, the sense of  patriotism, a national identity 
and a national history. 
I am reminded of  the importance of  the societal sources that I draw 
from when I visit other societies. Sometimes I notice how much better other 
societies function, but I confess that I often praise myself  fortunate to have 
lived in the US and for living now in the Netherlands. I praise myself  lucky for 
being able to benefit from the great universities that the US has to offer, and 
now recognize the benefits of  a well-organized and well-functioning Dutch 
society. For an intellectual like myself, the fondness of  the Dutch for discus-
sion, meetings and lectures is a great good, good for plenty of  invitations to 
speak and participate in debates. 
But a society provides so much more. I enjoy the market in my local 
town, a few special shops, and the possibility to choose from a great vari-
ety of  restaurants and cafes. (What shall we eat tonight? Italian, Spanish, 
Japanese, Thai, Indian, American, Russian, Greek, Indonesian, Argentinian, 
Vietnamese? African? Sorry, we do not have an African restaurant.  We do 
not have a real Dutch restaurant either but that is because the identity of  the 
Dutch cuisine is dubious.) The proximity of  Amsterdam is a wonderful asset 
that I take too little advantage of. 
Nature as part of  societal sources is dubious but it sure is a crucial source. 
It generates the fruits, minerals and food of  all sorts that we humans need to 
survive. But nature also provides landscapes, views and so much more.  
e) Material and financial sources
The house, the car and computers are among my material sources. They 
are good for shelter, comfort, transport, information and a few more values, 
including status, I guess. 
And then there is the bank account, and especially the number that 
it specifies, other accounts and their numbers, the value of  shares and the 
accumulated pension. These are financial sources. We can exchange them 
for goods we need and appreciate. Financial sources, therefore, suspend the 
realization of  values and are valuable for that reason. 
Some of  the material and financial resources we have purchased with the 
means that work, entrepreneurship and invention has generated. Others we 
receive as a gift, by way of  an inheritance. Speculation may play a role, too. 
f) The roots are faith, hope and love
What then are the roots of  the tree of  life?  What sources secure every-
thing else we own and make sure that we do not drift and get lost? Deirdre 
McCloskey (the friend with whom I began this chapter) suggested the answer 
to me: according to her, faith, hope and love are the most important of  all 
sources. They are fundamental for a good life. 
“Faith” stands for “trust.” Having self-confidence, having a source of  
inspiration and having a firm faith: they all contribute to a good life, at least 
so we may surmise. The question is “what feeds a source like faith?” A strong 
oikos could be a contributing factor, but quite a few people will mention a reli-
gion, a spiritual practice or a passion of  some kind. 
When people have lost hope, all sources lose their meaning and their 
power. Without hope everything we do becomes pointless. There is no pur-
pose, no direction. It is the condition at risk when cynicism takes over or when 
people fall into a mental depression. 
Love is most important of  all, as the Buddha and Paulus (in the letter to 
the Corinthians) declared. It is the source that enables us to connect with all 
living beings, to experience empathy, this most human sentiment of  all, and 
thus to do the right thing. 
Diagram 8-1 The Tree of  Life
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So what?
Have you formed a picture of  your tree of  life? Can you distinguish the most 
important sources? Are there sources that I have not mentioned (or thought 
of)? Do you recognize the roots as I imagine them? Or would you do them 
differently? What do you make of  your tree of  life? Allow me to make some 
suggestions, speaking for myself  of  course. 
- The wealth of  nations?  The book by Adam Smith carrying that title 
got people to think about the economy, physical wealth and markets. That 
was not the common perspective at the time— at the end of  the 18th century. 
Religious values still prevailed and richness had to do with faith and God’s 
blessings. If  one dared to think of  material wealth, one thought of  gold and 
silver. Nations who were able to accumulate large stocks of  gold and silver 
were considered wealthy. Adam Smith upset this conventional wisdom by 
claiming that the wealth of  nations has more to do with how much the people 
of  that nation produce, and how much they are able to trade with people of  
other nations. It is by labor and industry that nations become wealthy. Such 
has become the conventional wisdom up till now. 
The tree of  life is to upset this conventional wisdom. It generates another 
concept of  wealth by including sources that cannot be traded in markets, and 
are not produced by labor and industry. We generate our most important 
sources, so we have figured out, by way of  social and cultural activities, by 
sharing goods with others. It makes for a picture that is quite different from 
the one that Smith adumbrated in The Wealth of  Nations. 
- The richness and variety of  sources: once I got started I began to real-
ize how many sources I draw from almost daily. I was not aware, for example, 
of  the importance of  my memories. Were you aware of  how much you owe to 
the civilization you are part of ? Or of  your society and its institutions?
A British artist, Michael Landy, methodically destroyed all his material 
possessions in 2001. He did so in an art gallery using a big machine. 
Among Landy’s possessions destroyed was a Hirst painting, which at 
the time had no insignificant economic value, a Saab, his passport, his 
pictures and his clothes. At the end he was left naked. He owned noth-
ing anymore. Did that mean he did not possess anything anymore? 
Certainly not. For one thing, this performance earned him quite a rep-
utation and led to a well-sold book. He also could not crush his skills, 
his knowledge, his social network, his memories, his society, his culture 
or his civilization. Even with nothing to his name, he remained well 
endowed with sources that enabled him to continue a good life. 
- The limited role of  the sources we have paid for directly: the rel-
evance of  our financial sources and economic sources pale in the presence 
of  all the other sources we draw from. How curious it is then that we pay so 
much attention to those sources. Might that be because we can measure them, 
or does this bias have a cultural cause? 
- Tell me again why you deserve that income? When people justify a 
high salary on the basis of  their productivity, or contribution to a financial or 
other result, their tree of  life will compel them to reconsider. How much do 
they owe to everything that they received, like talents, their social and cultural 
upbringing, and their society and its institutions? And how about the luck fac-
tor? Desert or merit becomes dubious when we become aware of  the richness 
of  sources that back us up. It makes me, at least, modest and grateful. 
- The importance of  neglected or overlooked sources. The exercise 
of  imagining and composing one’s tree of  life compels us to realize sources of  
life that we might not think of  otherwise. The result might be a heightened 
awareness of  all the sources that enable you to live a good and full life. 
- Who is rich, who is poor?  When we survey all that we own and pos-
sess, we gain quite a different perspective on richness and poverty. In general, 
richness stands for owning a lot of  money, as in material and financial assets. 
Poverty stands for owning all but nothing of  those things. That is different 
now. When we take into account all our possessions, distinguishing richness 
from poverty becomes harder. Who is richer: the lawyer with all his money or 
the artist with his art of  living? You tell me. And who is richer: the one with 
little money but with dear friends and a strong family or the one with lots of  
money and no friends to speak of  and an alienated family? 
How rich are we with our civilization, health care and welfare? Or are 
The star player on a soccer team earns an extravagant salary these 
days. The argument is that he is worth it because of  the contri-bution 
he makes to the team’s success and, with that, to the revenues from tick-
ets and television broadcasts. But what would this player have achieved 
without a) his teammates, b) the organization of  his club, c) the soccer 
infrastructure and the soccer culture that is good for popular interest, 
d) his upbringing and e) the talents he has received? Might it be that if  
he were aware of  all the sources that enable him to do so well in this 
game, he would be grateful and more modest? Could it be that he has 
a sense of  being indebted to at least some of  those sources—and hap-
pily pay his taxes?
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the Ugandans better off with their strong and extended families and their 
deeply-rooted local cultures? 
The problem with the conventional statistics of  wealth and poverty is that 
they measure what can be measured and leave out the most important pos-
sessions. Maybe the distribution will remain more or less the same if  we were 
to weigh in those possessions, but I doubt that it will. At any rate, comparing 
qualities makes even less sense than comparing the quantities. 
Different types of  inequality
When I was working on this book, a French economist, Thomas Piketty, 
made a big impact with his book (Piketty, 2014). He showed, on the basis 
of  extensive calculations, that the distribution of  wealth was rapidly grow-
ing more unequal. I quickly checked out what he meant and my suspicions 
were confirmed: he limits his calculations to those assets that are measured in 
monetary terms. He showed, therefore, the increasing inequality of  financial 
wealth, that is, merely instrumental wealth as defined in this book. Other 
forms of  inequality he does not even mention. Let me do so here. I base 
myself  on the tree of  life. 
• Cultural inequality is the inequality in the distribution of  cultural 
sources, such as civilization, art, spirituality or what some people would 
call a meaningful life. In this case it is not financial capital that is unevenly 
distributed but cultural capital, or the ability to inspire or to be inspired. 
This is the most substantive form of  inequality. We have no clue what it 
is. As far as I know, no attempt has been made to develop a measurement 
or indicators to get a sense of  the magnitude of  cultural capital and its 
distribution. Perhaps it is even senseless to try. Even so, we could say that 
those who are deprived of  cultural sources are poor in a substantive way. 
A monk without any financial wealth whatsoever would end up dirt poor 
in Piketty’s account, but may be richer than most of  us in terms of  cul-
tural accounting. 
• Societal inequality is the inequality in the distribution of  societal 
goods. The kinds of  societies people value will depend on their values. 
People who value freedom will appreciate some societies more than oth-
ers. The same applies to people who value stability and security. So it will 
be difficult to develop a monitor for societal inequality, unless we focus on 
specific characteristics. That societies are unequal is apparent in the flows 
of  refugees, immigrants and fortune seekers. 
• Social inequalities refer to the distribution of  social capital, that is, 
the ability to function socially. Social capital depends on factors such as 
the social network, status, recognition, memberships and the strength of  
communities. People who suffer a lack of  financial sources often have 
a low social capital. Yet that is not always the case. Rich people can be 
lonely and financially-poor people may have a strong social network. The 
question is, when we want to fight poverty, whether we can ignore the 
social inequality by focusing solely on the financial aspects. Raising the 
question already hints at the answer. 
• Personal inequalities refer to the uneven distribution of  personal tal-
ents, skills, health, roles and functions that individuals have. No matter 
how equal people are, they are not the same. Some people simply are 
better equipped to deal with certain situations. In modern societies peo-
ple with strong cognitive skills tend to do better than people who have 
physical skills; in wartimes practically-minded people are better situated 
than the intellectuals. The inequalities show up at schools, in the world of  
arts, at universities, in the world of  chefs, in sports and in any world where 
selection on the basis of  skills and aptitude takes place. 
How about the negatives? 
The recognition of  additional sources, of  the most critical sources, serves as 
an antidote to the fixation on financial wealth. It encourages us to reconsider 
the nature of  poverty and richness, and to focus on substantive qualities that 
we own. The value based approach breaks the discussion about these issues 
wide open. 
I anticipate that those who fight poverty are troubled. Their fear is that 
poverty will be relativized and as a consequence disappear on the agenda of  
urgent issues. I doubt that the argument here will have such a big impact. 
Furthermore, as a politician I actually benefit from the observation that pov-
erty is as much a consequence of  social inequality as of  financial inequality. 
It motivates me to focus my policy on strengthening communities, on social 
work that aims to get “poor” people engaged in local activities, to get people 
out of  their isolation. 
A more serious problem is the lack of  measurements of  all inequalities 
except for the financial inequalities. That makes them difficult to work with, 
especially for politicians. That may be so. I would like to point out that mea-
surements of  financial inequality remain problematic and even if  they are 
produced, for example by Piketty, this does not mean that politicians are quick 
to respond. At this point it is more important, I would argue, to widen the 
discussion and to raise awareness of  inequalities on different grounds. 
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What follows? Taking stock
Firms do so at the end of  the year, individuals do it occasionally: they take 
stock. They then count what they own and what they owe. The result is the 
net wealth. However, taking stock only concerns the financial and other stocks 
that can be valued in monetary terms. We still need to work on the total pic-
ture of  organizations but the tree of  life shows how narrow a picture given by 
the usual stock-taking is. There are so many more possessions, some so much 
more important than the ones usually accounted for. 
What if  we were to take stock of  all our possessions, and basically com-
pose our tree of  life. One result would be greater awareness of  all the sources 
that we need and that enable us to live a good life. What is needed next is 
the evaluation of  those sources in order to be able to determine lacks and 
shortcomings. What would be the cause of  a life not going too well? What is 
missing? Or what is the reason for feeling good about life? 
How to do so? Usually we do so using phronesis, our practical wisdom, 
weighing qualities of  the various sources. We figure out that we have neglected 
friendships, need to invest in our spiritual sources, or may take another job to 
increase the financial capital. Measurements play a limited role in this process 
of  phronesis. It really is a matter of  practice and experience. 
New, mostly qualitative, methods are needed to assist people in organi-
zations in this process of  phronesis. I will introduce later the quality impact 
monitor. However, I will dare to postulate here that such methods will never 
replace the daily practice of  weighing and assessing values, of  deliberation, 
of  evaluation, of  correcting mistakes and of  generally muddling through. It is 
the process that makes us human. 
Exercises
In order to determine how important a source is, imagine what it would mean 
for your life, organization or society if  you or it would be without? What 
would you be without memories? What would an organization be without 
those? 
What would your life be if  you were to lose your family? What if  your 
organization would lose its network (for example, by moving, or by merging 
with another organization.)  
In order to determine the relative importance of  a source, ask yourself  ques-
tions like: what is worse, losing all your money or losing all your friends?  
Would you consider accepting 20 million euros or dollars when that 
would mean you are going to lose your family and friends? 
CHAPTER 9
REALIZING VALUES IN FIVE DIFFERENT 
SPHERES: 
INVOLVING OTHERS
We need to acquire or produce goods in order to make values real. Scientists 
need to write papers to realize their knowledge or research, artists need to 
generate a piece of  art to realize their art, and shoemakers make shoes to dis-
play their craftsmanship. We form friendships, start a marriage, develop colle-
giality with colleagues and work on welfare programs in order to realize values 
that are important to us. Goods are the way to something of  importance. 
In order to be able to acquire or produce such goods, we are in need of  
sources, as made clear in the previous chapter, and a great variety of  sources, 
at that. We make use of  our talents, benefit from a stimulating culture, apply 
our skills and are glad with a loving family and caring friends because they 
support and encourage us. 
The question that we need to address now is how we can acquire all 
those goods and sources. Put differently, the question could be why we find it 
often so difficult to realize the important goods? Why do we so often end up 
with the wrong things? Why do we so often experience a lack of  one thing or 
another, like money or love?
Here we have reached a critical juncture. Up till now, we could reason 
from the perspective of  the individual or a group of  people seeking the right 
thing to do. We could more or less ignore other people. Only when we came 
across the notion of  shared goods, we saw the need to involve others. But when 
it comes to the valorization of  our values and goods the “other” becomes crit-
ical. Valorization is inevitably and necessarily a social process; it requires that 
others recognize a value in what we do or offer. 
Our inquiry into what it takes to do the right thing takes us now out in the 
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open, to involve the “other.” We need to get others interested in the goods we 
generate. That is obvious in the case of  a good like friendship because what 
is a friendship worth if  no other person is interested in it? We have to make 
friends to have a friendship. The same applies to an idea: for what is an idea 
worth if  only one person has it? An idea gains value when it is shared with 
others. An artist may be full of  his own work, but what does that work mean 
if  there is no one to appreciate the work? 
The necessity to get others interested in a good is obvious if  the owner, 
or creator, wants to realize other goods with that good. The shoemaker is in 
no need of  the shoes he makes but needs bread, clothes and such. So he has 
to figure out how to swap his shoes for those other goods. In that case a good 
is a means to generate other goods. His challenge will be to get the owners of  
those goods willing to give them up in exchange for a certain number of  his 
shoes. 
Getting others interested in your goods is what valorization is all about. 
Valorization of  a good requires that others recognize that the good is good 
for them. A pair of  shoes could be of  use, for example. It possibly could be 
good for more things, like social or esthetic values (I am thinking of  the Uggs 
in chapter 5). Valorization of  an idea may require a certain kind of  conversa-
tion, usually as part of  an existing conversation. Others have to get interested 
in the idea, in what it means, what it implies, what its applications could be, 
for such a conversation to come about. They must recognize the value of  the 
idea. 
Valorization is a matter of  design, or strategy. You and I have to fig-
ure out how we are going to go about making our values real, whom to get 
involved and what we can expect from them. Will they be willing to pay? Or is 
it more important that they participate in a conversation? Where to go? With 
whom to speak? In what way? What to do? What are the options? What is the 
right thing to do?
The standard picture
When people are under the influence of  standard economics, they will auto-
matically think of  the market as the main option for the valorization of  their 
goods. The idea here is that you and I go to a “market” to offer our good for 
a price in the expectation that other people are willing to pay the price in 
exchange of  that good. Valorization in that case implies the realization of  an 
amount of  money (the price) in transactions with others. At universities the 
managers currently speak of  valorization when they want us, the scientists, 
to sell our ideas or to get sponsors for our research. Valorization would then 
be equivalent to “selling.” An alternative option is to get a government grant. 
This gives the standard picture of  the market and the government as 
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the two options for valorization. In the market prices rule, the government is 
all about rules and standards. Standard economics is fixated on exchange in 
markets, on the forces of  demand and supply, on the role of  prices, on prod-
ucts. Governments have a role where markets fail or turn out to be unstable 
or unjust. 
Markets or governments: that is the question that motivates most dis-
cussions in economics and policy. Should there be more market, or should 
the government step in? Should the government control more, or should the 
government let go? Laissez faire, laissez passer.   
We can depict the standard perspective as follows:
M stands for the market and G stands here for the government (later we extend 
the meaning of  G to stand for governance, or governmentality). Economists 
know a great deal about how the market works. In order to understand how 
governments work, you better consult those who study public administration 
and legal scholars. The market is where private goods are traded. G provides 
public goods. 
The conversation that motivates the standard picture makes us think 
about issues like the efficiency of  markets, the possibility of  a general equi-
librium in a system of  markets and about the effectiveness of  government 
interventions. We are made to wonder about the workings of  the market and 
get sucked into discussions on the pros and cons of  economic policies, of  the 
need of  intellectual property rights, or not, of  government subsidies of  the 
arts, or not. In the discourse of  standard economics all this makes perfect 
sense, of  course. But step away and consider your own experience. How much 
sense does the talk about markets and governments make? Does that tell us 
how we realize friendships? How about a home (versus a house)? And can it 
tell managers how they realize trust in their organization? Can it account for 
Diagram 9-1 The two standard logics: Market and Governance
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valorization of  political ideas in the society? Does it tell us how people realize 
art, scientific knowledge or religion? I would say it does not. 
The following anecdote should make clear why the picture of  M and G 
is incomplete and is in need of  other dimensions. 
How an artist involves others to realize the value of  his art 
A befriended artist who teaches at the art academy in town had asked me to 
talk about art and money with a group of  his students. They all were involved 
in a project about the highway as a special kind of  space. Apparently they had 
weekly discussion evenings to which they invited guests. I was surprised by 
the number of  students present, and then detected a few people who more or 
less looked like me: older and dressed up, that is. Later I found out that they 
were representatives of  the Transportation Department that was financing 
the project. I sat down next to them. 
A 35 year old guy—the age I was guessing, but he looked older than the 
others—was doing the talking. At first I had difficulties figuring out what it 
was about. Slowly I put the fragments together and determined that it was 
about an art project of  his. Apparently he had designed an algorithm for the 
exploration of  a city. By applying the algorithm, as seemed to be the idea, you 
would discover a city in a totally different way from how you would see it with 
a tour guide in hand or as a local inhabitant following the habitual routes. 
The presentation triggered an animated discussion about the technique of  the 
algorithm, the personal and the political ramifications, the artistic qualities 
and about what it is to experience a place—or should we say space? It was a 
discussion that is quite typical for a gathering of  artists. 
At one point during the discussion the befriended artist invited me to 
comment. I asked the question that might be expected from an economist: 
“How much have you made with your project?” Artists can be direct; these 
certainly were. “What a stupid question,” one student with a braided hairdo 
yelled. Another joined in: “Why is that important?” “Yeah,” added another, 
“I really don’t care.”  Having the advantage of  age and function, I insisted: 
“No really, what did you make so far with this project? I am interested to know 
what others have been willing to contribute to it or pay for it.” 
The guy muttered “300 euros.” He sounded like he was exaggerating. 
“How long have you worked on it,” I asked him then. “On and off for half  a 
year, a couple of  months work so far, I guess. “How then do you support your 
family?” (I had picked up that he has a kid.) “Well, I have a small administra-
tive job and my wife works.” 
I could think of  all kinds of  other options for him. He could sell his 
algorithm, to a tourist agency maybe, to Lonely Planet or another alternative 
tourist guide. He could have an app for the smartphone made. It might be a 
hit and make him a rich man! He could also approach the government people 
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next to me, so I thought at the time, to find out whether his project could 
qualify for a subsidy. All these seemed to be obvious ways for him to realize 
the values of  his project. Yet, they were not his options. So what is he doing to 
involve others and to get others interested in his work? 
My task at the meeting was to point these students towards various 
options that M, the market, has to offer them to valorize their art. Much of  
what I said, seemed new to them. The resistance remained strong, though. 
A tough crowd they were. Yet with all their resistance they showed me that I 
was not doing justice to their practice. They were actually telling me that they 
had other ways to valorize their art, even if  they were not explicit about those. 
Those other ways were obvious to them. It was the spheres of  the market and 
the government that were elusive to them. 
The ways that are so obvious to the artists are lost in the standard per-
spective simply because they are not included in the framework. So to do 
justice to the ways of  artists we are in need of  more dimensions. On the basis 
of  this experience and many others in the course of  time, I have concluded 
that the framework needs at least three more dimensions that artists, and ulti-
mately we all, use to valorize our goods. 
First is what I call the social sphere. 
Note that the artist was sharing his work with a group of  enthusiastic and 
ambitious future artists. He got them to take his work seriously and even got 
them to talk about it. Why is this noteworthy?  
Millions of  artists are making art and only a small fraction of  all that 
work is being considered and even a smaller fraction is talked about. All these 
artists aspire to be in the conversation, to get other artists to pay attention to 
their work, but only very few make it big. This artist got his project at least in 
this conversation. The teacher had invited him, so apparently he was inter-
ested in the work. The students were willing to engage in a discussion. The 
work might even influence them in their own work. (It actually had an impact 
on me as it got me thinking how I approach foreign cities and made me realize 
how habitual I am in my ways in my own city.) For this artist, being able to 
present his work that evening is important. It is an achievement. It valorizes 
his work in some way. 
Getting in the conversation and getting recognition for work is something 
he accomplishes in the social sphere, that is, in the sphere where people 
socialize and are in conversation with each other. In this sphere they get oth-
ers interested and involved, they persuade or seduce others to contribute with 
their time, emotion and intellect, and maybe even money (in the form of  
gifts). For that purpose they develop networks and have various relationships 
with others, some of  which are professional, others more intimate. For this 
artist, this sphere is crucial.
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The cultural, or artistic, sphere 
In having the discussion about his work, the students and he are practicing 
their art. They use the terms that are meaningful in the conversation that is 
called art, they appeal to shared values (“innovative,” “political,” “interdisci-
plinary,” “cliché,” “interesting,” “authentic,” “critical”) and use the codes for 
that conversation (like the mentioning of  certain names—Marcel Duchamp, 
Joseph Beuys, Vincent van Gogh—while avoiding others and using exem-
plars from the field—in this case other action-oriented art). If  we had been in 
an academic seminar, the discussion would have been entirely different since 
academics engage in another kind of  conversation with other terms, values 
and codes. 
For the artist, the conversation that constitutes action-oriented art—a 
sort performance art—is a source. Within the context of  that kind of  con-
versation, his work stands a chance to become valuable. So he needs that 
conversation to valorize his art. 
Then there is the sphere of  the oikos, or home.  
Often overlooked, especially when the standard economic perspective pre-
vails, is the oikos, the home. (It is included in economics, oikos nomos, meaning 
the law of  the household.) I didn’t see it at first either. For the artist, the home 
plays a critical role in the valorization of  his life as an artist (less so for a piece 
of  work). His home is his life with a family, with himself. He first has to con-
vince himself  to do his art and to make sacrifices doing so, like taking a mean-
ingless job and forsaking a larger income. That is part of  the valorization of  
his art, convincing himself. Then he needs to involve his significant other: he 
has to convince his wife to support him in doing what he is doing. Imagine 
the discussions at the kitchen table. “When are you earning some money with 
your art.”  “Give it some time. Van Gogh also needed some time before his 
work became successful.” “Yes, but I am not his brother, and we have a kid to 
take care of.” “I know, I know. I also am not happy with how it is going. But 
you know how important this work is for me. Next week I am going to talk 
about it at the academy. Who knows what is going to come out of  that.”  She 
sighs, and lets the issue rest.  And off she goes, to earn the income that they 
need to pay the rent, the basic livelihood and a family vacation from time to 
time. 
Home stands for oikos. And as I already pointed out, the oikos is a cru-
cial sphere for the valorization of  all sorts of  goods. It is not that the family 
needs to appreciate the works and ideas of  its members but it sure helps if  it 
supports them in doing what they are doing. Most people start the process of  
valorization at home, among family. Kids seek approval for their artwork from 
the parents, or make sure that they get fed and sheltered while doing their 
thing. When they grow up they may make sure that they have their oikos as a 
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last resort to turn to when everything else fails. At the end of  our lives, when 
we lie in our grave, we may find out that the most appreciation for all we did 
comes from those with whom we shared our oikos. 
In the experience of  this artist each sphere is significantly different. The 
sphere of  the oikos and the cultural and social spheres are obvious to him. He 
knows all too well that he needs support from his wife, that he needs to work 
in order to get other artists to pay attention to his work and that he needs to 
participate in the artistic conversation appropriate for him. It is the spheres 
of  the market and the government that are difficult for him to grasp. He had 
no idea how he could market his concept and earn money with it. Whom to 
approach? Which organization might be interested? He had no clue. And he 
had not even considered the options that the market offers. It took some seri-
ous persuasion from me to get the students interested in the market. It was not 
the sphere where they fancied themselves. If  they could choose, most of  them 
would opt for the oikos and the social sphere to valorize their art. Interestingly, 
the two options depicted in the standard perspective—coming to all of  them 
as an afterthought—are the options that they need to have pointed out to 
them. 
Getting the artist to see the option of the sphere of  the market:
The artist could consider getting other people, or organizations, to pay for his 
algorithm. In that case he would seek an exchange: the use of  the algorithm 
or even its ownership in exchange for something that has value for him, like 
food or clothes or gas or an amount of  money that allows him to buy all that. 
When he seeks an exchange, he enters the sphere of  the market. 
Practically, that means that he has to approach individual people or peo-
ple in an office, in a gallery maybe, and tell those people about his idea, con-
vince them that the idea is of  value to them and then agree on a price.  
An exchange occurs when the other is willing to pay or, to put it differ-
ently, is willing to give up some other goods in order to acquire this one. The 
question here is: why should someone else be willing to pay for his art? The 
artist in this anecdote appears to have no clue of  the answer and that is why 
he ignores this option. That shows that participation in the market calls for 
imagination and some creativity: the artist, or some intermediary, needs to 
imagine someone else, a stranger maybe, and then imagine his or her values 
in order to propose a deal. He might imagine, for example, that an organi-
zation like Lonely Planet, could be interested offering the algorithm to its 
customers and would therefore be willing to pay for it. 
The exchange is instrumental, at least in principle. The exchange serves 
the goal of  acquiring other goods; the price that another will pay is good for 
money with which he can pay the price of  goods that he is in need of. The 
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exchange is not so much about the relationship with the other—it could be, 
but it is not necessary—but about the possibility that the good offered has 
value for the other.
And then there is the option of  the government or governance. 
The artist can also apply for a subsidy or a grant. He can download the appro-
priate forms from a government website, or talk with government officials 
to discuss the possibility of  support. He then enters the sphere of  the gov-
ernment. When he approaches foundations for a grant, he more or less gets 
into a similar process. In both cases he involves others, not for what they may 
value themselves, but for the function they have and the system they repre-
sent. When he deals with governments and foundations he needs to take into 
account the procedures, the criteria, the rules and regulations. He may need 
an accountant to help him to account for his expenses. And he will be depen-
dent on the judgment of  committees. 
He could also subject himself  to the governance of  an organization. That 
may happen when he offers his creative skills to a firm or gets to teach at an 
academy or another school. In that case he valorizes his skills by persuading 
people of  the firm or school that he is worth a salary. The firm or school will 
have application procedures, functions, salary scales, conditions of  sickness 
leave and the like. The firm may claim the rights to whatever he creates as an 
employee. The academy will have requirements about his art production. A 
high school wants him to show up in time or may have requirements as to his 
teaching skills to boot. In all such cases he subjects himself  to the logic of  G, 
that is, of  governance. He will get a secure and stable income in return. 
So now we have expanded the standard economics frame consisting of  just 
the market and the government—or better, governance—with the social 
sphere, the cultural sphere, and the sphere of  the oikos. I draw it as follows, 
with the oikos as the base and the social sphere in the center holding all spheres 
together. The cultural sphere could be a third dimension; I draw it to encom-
pass all others to suggest that everything that is done in either of  the five 
spheres, is embedded in a culture (as I suggested in chapters 1 and 2). 
Someone saw in this picture a bicyclist riding a unicycle while keeping 
the market and the government in the air. She noted that the S is the back of  
the person; that back has to be very strong in order to maintain the balance 
between all spheres. So right she was, as will become clear. 
M stands for the sphere of  the market, G for the sphere f  government, 
or more general, the sphere of  governance (as I will clarify below), S for the 
social sphere, O for the sphere of  the oikos and C for culture. Each sphere has 
its own characteristic logic, that is, a collection of  rules, norms, institutions, 
relationships and values that makes certain actions meaningful and renders 
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others strange, unheard of  or objectionable, that is, illogical. 
The M is the sphere for exchange. It is where the logic of  the quid pro quo 
rules, where goods become products, or commodities, with a price attached, 
where people or organizations buy and sell, where money functions as a unit 
of  account and a means of  exchange. It is the sphere of  commercialization, 
of  profit seeking, of  interest, of  competition, of  efficiency, of  entrepreneur-
ship and of  free choice. It is the sphere in which people become sellers, buy-
ers, customers, consumers, traders and merchants. It is sphere in which goods 
get valorized as private goods, that is, as goods that are privately owned. 
G is the sphere of  governance. It is where governmental logic operates, 
which is a formal logic based on rules and regulations, standards, accounting 
procedures and laws. It is the logic of  bureaucracy. Governments work with 
this logic, but so do all organizations, some more than others. Foundations 
work with this logic and so do commercial organizations of  some size. In this 
logic, people become functionaries, managers, employees, subordinates, civil 
servants, clients, patients, subjects and citizens. It is good for the valorization 
of  collective goods, that is, goods that are collectively owned. 
S is the social sphere. Its logic is social and therefore informal. Prices do 
not figure, neither do rules and regulations. Social logic is the logic of  reci-
procity, of  contributions, of  gifts, of  participation, cooperation and collabo-
ration. It is the logic of  relationships and of  networking. In the social sphere 
people are partners, friends, acquaintances, colleagues, members, comrades, 
contributors, donors, supporters and participants. In the social sphere people 
generate shared goods such as social and cultural goods. In the social sphere 
(creative) commons come about and conversations take place. 
Diagram  9-2 The Five Spheres: Market, Governance, 
Oikos, Social and Cultural
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The logic of  the oikos is akin to the social logic but it is different because 
it presumes kinship or a shared fate. It is the logic of  interdependence, of  
loyalty, of  family ties, of  intimacy and of  love. In the oikos people are parents, 
children, uncles, aunts, nephews, cousins, family members, soul mates, close 
partners, friends of  the family and intimate friends. The oikos is good for social 
and intimate goods. 
The logic of  the cultural sphere is cultural. In the cultural sphere we 
transcend all other spheres, relate to the Good, the Beautiful, the Truth, to 
God or to Karma, harmony, the Sacred, or whatever suggests transcendence. 
It consists, among others, of  religious, artistic, and scientific conversations, or 
practices. In this sphere people relate to their cultural values, celebrate rituals 
together, honor sacred objects and share a common history. This is also the 
sphere where people tap into the sources of  the civilization in which they 
partake.  
The following two chapters will probe the spheres further and deeper and 
will provide a more complete picture. They will discuss the overlaps, the 
encroachment of  one sphere upon the other, the phenomenon of  crowding 
in and out, and a few more of  those matters that are relevant when people or 
organizations are determining their strategies in order to do the right thing. 
In the remainder of  this chapter I will show how the model came about, how 
it makes sense of  historical developments and how it can affect our worldview. 
 
Becoming aware of  a need for this model of  five spheres
The idea to distinguish spheres came many years ago when I worked with 
P.W. Zuidhof, then a Ph.D. student, on a paper about cultural heritage. We 
needed a sphere for gift giving and called that the third sector because that 
was the common nomenclature at the time for the philanthropic sector. When 
I presented the paper at a conference of  cultural economists, Michael Hutter 
referred me to the work of  Luhmann, a German sociologist (with the warning 
that he might be too much for what I needed) and suggested I add a sphere 
for the family (Luhmann, 1997). At first I drew that sphere on top, with the 
social sphere in the middle, but after reading Gudeman, a befriended anthro-
pologist, I decided that the oikos, as I then called it, should be at the base of  all 
spheres, that is, below them (Gudeman, 2008). That came as an insight and 
caused a revolution in my thinking. From then on I taught myself  to use the 
oikos as the point of  departure of  whatever train of  thought. You must have 
noticed the effects in the preceding chapters and will continue doing so in the 
remaining chapters. So much of  what people do is for the sake of  the oikos. 
Life starts at the oikos, involves significant others—spouses, parents, children, 
close friends—revolves for a great deal around them, has often a good oikos as 
a major goal and usually ends there as well.  
Later I began to recognize the need to express the cultural dimension. 
When I teach the culture of  economics, a course that I taught already for 
fifteen years or so to students of  philosophy, I discuss the social and rhetoric 
aspects of  economics. My argument is that scientists need to operate in a 
social setting using a social logic and that that setting may affect the way they 
practice their science. That is the sociology of  science and clearly connects 
with the social sphere in the model here. But it is not just that logic that 
applies since scientists use special scientific terms, follow scientific codes and 
respect scientific values, that is, they practice a particular rhetoric. All that 
does not show in a model with just four spheres. I was in the need of  another 
sphere. Because I imagine that sphere as transcending the social, I could draw 
it above the other four spheres, in a third dimension. When I connect the 
anthropological meaning of  culture (C1) with the meanings of  culture as civi-
lization (C2) and art (C3) I see the sphere of  C as encompassing the other four. 
The model of  the five spheres serves various purposes, as I began to realize 
when using it. It will gradually become clear in this and especially the next 
chapter that it not only helps to account for a great variety of  phenomena, 
but it also encourages an analysis of  the characteristic practices in each sphere 
and of  their differences. Gradually it has shaped my worldview. I present the 
model in almost all lectures that I give and make use of  it in my political func-
tion to motivate my policies. 
The differences between the spheres are crucial for the model to make sense 
of  and to signify what we do when we realize our values. I have found that 
they can help make people aware of  alternative options, of  different strate-
gies, when they recognize the differences between the five spheres. Our artist 
could benefit if  he were to step out of  his comfort zone in spheres C, S and 
O, and recognize the opportunities that G and M have to offer him. The 
differences are also helpful to account for the hostility that the art students 
demonstrated towards M, or me, when I brought up M. Apparently they 
were focused on S, the social sphere; the practices of  M and the values that 
they associate with M, clashed with the social practices that they value. That 
made them feel hostile. Hostility is incidentally also the response of  M lovers 
towards G. Listen to free market economists speaking about governmental 
practices such as taxation, regulation and laborious decision making, and you 
can notice the disgust vibrating in their voices. There is more hostility around. 
Quite a few artists I have run into seem to have a thorough dislike of  the oikos 
and it’s, in their experience, suffocating and suppressing practices. They are 
more comfortable in S.
Hostile feelings are a clear indication of  important differences. The model 
should make sense of  all such sentiments, and I think it does, as chapters 10a 
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and b will show. We will see more need for the model when we try to figure 
out how we generate shared and common goods. We will not be able to make 
sense of  those if  we stick to a model with an M and a G only. We are in need 
of  an S, a C and an O to understand how we realize the goods that are most 
important to us. We also need S to understand how creative commons such 
as those of  the arts, religions and the sciences come about and how they func-
tion. The “M and G only model” blinds us to the realization of  social and 
cultural goods. 
All this is not to say that it is easy to get people to see the merits of  think-
ing in terms of  five spheres. The pull of  the framing in terms of  M practices 
is powerful. Especially economists are inclined to apply the instrumentation 
that they have developed to comprehend the practices of  M to any other 
practices. Accordingly, they propose that politicians are striving to maximize 
votes and that partners in the oikos are entering a kind of  exchange when 
dividing chores (Becker, 1976).  Such an economistic perspective annihilates 
the differences between the spheres and makes everything look basically the 
same, as if  everything is subject to the logic of  M. 
A similar tendency I detect among sociologists. In their case social pro-
cesses are all that count. They see, for example, the socializing of  traders in 
the market and the role of  social factors in markets, such as status and the 
need to belong. Politics is for them a social process and so is family life. For 
them the S covers all.
I will not deny that overlaps among spheres occur, that the logic of  M 
may operate in S and O, and that S works in M and G. They actually can be 
most significant and I will deal with them in the next chapter. However, first 
we need to be clear about what makes the spheres different, and why those 
differences matter when we are realizing our values. 
The spheres through times
The differences may become more clear when we take a quick run along the 
course of  history. For all we know, human life started out in the oikos. The 
first people moved in small and tightly connected groups. They were entirely 
dependent upon each other (Sahlins, 1972). They shared what they gathered 
and hunted, and respected clear lines of  authority based on age and skill. 
Their realization of  survival, of  a sense of  belonging and spiritual life all 
occurred in these small groups. The ties were close. The others were all well 
known. Dealings with other groups were rare or non-existent. These groups 
operated first of  all in O. 
Yet, humans are cultural beings. Equipped with the faculties of  language 
and imagination, they have to articulate expressions and design symbols that 
give meaning to their common experiences. Cavemen began drawing on the 
walls of  their caves, developed rituals to cope with the vagaries of  fate, and 
developed the method of  the narrative to render their actions meaningful, to 
give them continuity through time. Accordingly, the activities in the oikos were 
embedded in a cultural sphere. 
The groups evolved into tribes in which we notice the beginnings of  
social practices next to those of  the oikos. In S, members of  an oikos relate 
to members of  other oikoi and do so socially, on the basis of  reciprocity. The 
S constitutes the public sphere, a sphere in which all people have access but 
where they do not relate on basis of  kinship of  family values. Tribal members 
created rituals together, collaborated and swapped goods and services. Yet, 
there was no need for money as a means for interacting; no need to keep 
count of  the what for whom. The elder usually ruled on the basis of  phrone-
sis. There was no need yet for governmental practices with rules, regulations, 
enforceable contracts and the like. A tribe operated in O, in C and in S. It 
even did so when it interacted with other tribes. As the French anthropologist 
Marcel Mauss describes in his famous book The Gift, the Trobriand tribe 
entertained an intricate gift exchange to maintain stable relationships with 
other tribes (Mauss, 1967). 
For all we know, market practices emerged quite early on. Strangers might 
come by offering wares of  interest to the people in the tribe, or local commu-
nity. And here something remarkable happened, something that children still 
experience when they go out of  the home with a few coins in their little fists. 
Instead of  asking someone of  your oikos for something you wish, you now go 
up to a total stranger to ask for something of  value to you to discover that the 
stranger, an unknown other, is willing to accept something from you in return, 
something like a few of  those coins in that fist. How can that possibly work? 
Why not attack that stranger and take the goodies away from him by brute 
force?  Why not take the goodies when he is not looking? How can you tell 
what is needed for getting a deal done? Why does that amount of  coins suffice 
and not another amount? What is the worth of  those coins anyway? 
For many people these questions might seem silly, as the answers seem 
so obvious. But they are not necessarily so obvious. The artist in the opening 
anecdote had no idea what he had to offer and what to ask in return. The pos-
sibilities of  M continue to elude so many, especially those working in cultural 
organizations. 
The social sphere was getting more diverse and more elaborate in Athens 
at the time that Aristotle wrote down his reflection on the polis. Where people 
gathered in cities they came in need of  the goods and services of  so many 
other people, so many that they could not get to know them all very well. And 
they needed other people to make a living for themselves, to bring about a full 
and meaningful life. 
According to Aristotle the oikos was still the pivot around which practical 
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life revolved. The oikos was to provide for shelter and as much of  its food and 
other necessities as possible. Autarky was the objective. And the position in 
one’s oikos and the wealth of  that oikos determined the position someone had 
in the public or social sphere. Heads of  well to do households clearly did 
much better than, say, slaves and women, who had no public position.  
The men were supposed to partake in political life that took place at the 
agora, the central square of  the city. Political life is social as it involves discus-
sions and arguments with fellow citizens. The polis (city), therefore, had quite 
a rich C and a developed S with plenty of  social interactions. The G showed 
up in the form of  governmental structures and institutions that the Athenians 
had put in place. Athens had a sphere of  governance. Some citizens had gov-
ernmental functions and there were laws to regulate daily life and the inter-
actions among citizens. The S was needed for the philosophizing that made 
these Greeks famous, for the realization of  theatre and artwork, that is, of  the 
C. Athens must have had a highly developed civil society, that is, a strong S 
outside the oikos, with a great variety of  intense and intensive conversations 
going on in order to produce such everlasting beauty and insight. 
Problematic for Aristotle was the trading that took place in his Athens. 
He named it chrematistike and considered it unnatural since the exchange of  
goods with complete strangers for a price conflicts with what he considered 
the natural way of  doing things. To him the oikos was meant to provide all 
necessities. That had to be the natural state of  affairs. Exchange did not seem 
natural to him. He had problems with the idea that people use other people 
as instruments for the realization of  their own values and that they reduce 
the nature of  goods to a quality that they are not, that is, a price expressed in 
monetary units. Even so, he grudgingly admitted that oikoi were in need of  the 
goods to be acquired by means of  chrematistike. 
The G becomes more important when we move closer to current times. 
Governance was central for the mercantilists in their picture of  the world. 
Strong governments with powerful armies and warships could amass great 
wealth, so was the idea (and still is albeit with different attributes of  power 
such as size, large domestic markets, innovative power, ownership of  vital 
sources and yes, also military power). Governments stood for central author-
ity, rules and regulation, taxation, control and the law. 
We credit Adam Smith for the distinction of  M as a distinct sphere with 
its own practices and its particular importance for the realization of  values. 
He articulated practices that were anathema for Aristotle and so many think-
ers and religious scholars after him. How could the pursuit of  self-interest 
be justified? Does the prioritization of  profit not corrupt social interactions? 
What good could come if  the interactions between people were left to an 
invisible hand, without the intervention of  governmental authority? 
Historians such as E.P Thomson and Karl Polanyi narrate the impact 
that the emergence of  M as a common practice had on traditional commu-
nities (Thompson, 1991 and Polanyi, 1944). Just imagine what it means for 
people growing up in a farm, expecting and being expected to farm in their 
own oikos, to face the breaking away of  some members in order to work for an 
outsider for a monetary payment. It must have meant a dramatic change in 
the lives of  oikoi at the time. E.P Thompson narrates the revolts that occurred 
in the 18th century when locals would attack the miller on his way to the 
market with the flour that he had grounded from local wheat. The locals per-
ceived this action of  their miller as a “selling out to strangers”. Their social 
logic clashed with the logic of  the market (where selling to strangers for a 
good price is perfectly normal).  
In his narration Polanyi is in need of  a distinction of  spheres, too. He 
distinguishes four spheres, one of  exchange (the M here), one of  redistribu-
tion (the G here) and one of  reciprocity (the S here). In addition he addresses 
house holding, the O in the model here. He needs especially the S to indicate 
that market type interactions are not “normal” as a run of  the mill economic 
analysis would suggest and that other, social, interactions once overwhelmed 
market exchanges. The latter started to grow more dominant only in the 16th 
century. (My good friend Deirdre McCloskey tends to fume when the name 
of  Polanyi comes up as he, according to her, grossly distorts the history of  
markets and underestimates their role; she is probably right--she usually is on 
such matters--but the more important point here is not the timing, but rather 
the very phenomenon of  frictions that occur when the emphasis shifts from 
one sphere to another.) 
In the last two hundred years or so, the market has acquired a strong 
presence in the collective mindset. People in the modern world grow up in 
awareness of  the importance of  markets for earning an income and acquir-
ing goods. We all learn how powerful M is when it comes to the exchange of  
private goods and the size of  economic capital. The widespread resistance 
against the dominance of  M corroborates the point. 
An important factor is the increasing capacity of  modern societies to mea-
sure market outcomes. Turnovers, profits, the value of  assets like machines, 
buildings, shares, bonds and bank accounts; they all come in numbers. The 
financialization of  our world means that we can count an increasing num-
ber of  transactions and possession in financial or monetary terms. And that 
conveys a sense of  hardness and concreteness to M. For it is a strong belief  in 
instrumentalist thinking that numbers are factual and therefore concrete and 
hard. It makes one belief  that all that cannot be counted in monetary terms 
is “abstract” instead of  “concrete,” “soft” and thus not “hard.” That makes 
anything that comes about in O, S, and C “abstract” and “soft,” at least in an 
instrumentalist way of  thinking. The value based approach turns that world-
view upside down or inside out. 
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Even so, the impressive accumulation of  economic and financial wealth 
that the modern world has witnessed in the last two hundred years attests to 
the great impact of  M and the innovative and entrepreneurial practices that 
brought about all of  that. The M is a crucial sphere for us to valorize our 
value as workers (in the labor market), to buy computers, houses, clothes, 
therapy, vacations and all kinds of  other goods that we need so much, and in 
order to acquire the means to buy. People in most parts of  the world do not 
know any better than that they have to engage in practices of  M in order to 
get what they want.  
However, we also learned that the practices of  M can be destabilizing, 
can even bring about crises and can have unintended consequences such as 
inequalities and injustices. The Great Depression of  the thirties continues to 
linger in the collective memory (in Western countries at least) as an episode of  
grand market failure. I doubt that the recent recession (2008-2014) —or shall 
we continue speaking of  the financial crisis?—will have the same impact. At 
the time the answer to the crisis was sought in boosting G. Communists in the 
Soviet Union had already embraced the practices of  G as a way to outwit M 
and bring about more welfare for everyone. They sought a scientific solution 
to the problem of  allocation and perceived governmental practices as essen-
tial in the implementation of  such a solution. Socialists and social democrats 
looked for a solution in a combination of  M and G. John Maynard Keynes 
propagated government expenditures to compensate for a fall in domestic 
demand. Jan Tinbergen took a more systematic approach with models to 
show that governmental policies can influence economic outcomes. But for 
the government to be effective it had to grow bigger.  
Accordingly, governmental practices increased dramatically in the decades 
that followed, with increasing budgets for welfare programs, and, in the sixties 
and seventies, in waves of  rules and regulations. In most developed countries, 
governments grew in size to claim up to half  of  Gross Domestic Product. 
They ran utility companies, took care of  education, healthcare, telecommu-
nication, the post office and cultural activities such as museums, theatres, and 
libraries; they subsidized cultural and social activities as well as entrepreneur-
ial activities. They protected companies against foreign competition and pros-
ecuted violators of  the anti-trust laws. In the eighties governments began to 
embrace M as a governing logic and the process of  privatization and liber-
alization began. Even so, governments continue to contribute between 40% 
and 55% to the total of  national income. 
Governments signify bureaucracies and bureaucracies make up G. Every 
private party seeking gain, profit or pleasure in M will have to deal with gov-
ernmental bureaucracies. Just try to get into India or the US as a tourist or 
businessperson and you will notice.  
The sphere of  G becomes even more dominant when we take business 
organizations into account. Although the inclination is to relegate them to 
the sphere of  M—since they buy and sell—they actually operate internally 
in accordance with governmental logic. They also, after all, have bureaucra-
cies assign functions to their employees, maintain a system of  accounting and 
operate by way of  all kinds of  rules, procedures and contracts. They all stand 
for what could be called a managerial culture. Such a culture came about in 
the second half  of  the 19th century when feudal and paternalistic practices no 
longer sufficed for complex organizations like the railways, and it took flight 
in the thirties of  the 20th** century, when MBA schools shot up (Chandler, 
1977). Management is about organizing, guarding and implementing a gov-
ernmental logic and for that, advanced education was deemed necessary. The 
emphasis on management in the business world also gave plenty of  opportu-
nities to consultants to assist managers in being systematic, structured, and 
evidence-based in their strategies. When consultants got hold of  institutions 
like universities and hospitals, those, too, became subject to the managerial 
culture. 
When we imagine G as the sphere of  all organizations, public and pri-
vate, it may be possible to realize that G involves us more than M. Most of  
our interactions take place within organizations or with organizations. A great 
majority of  workers receive their paycheck from organizations; transactions 
within large multinationals constitute the greater part of  international trade. 
The influence of  governments is pervasive. We are ruled and regulated by 
them, receive income or benefits, pay taxes and fines. So although in the col-
lective mindset M is dominant, in their daily lives most people depend more 
on forces in G than on those in M. The bias probably occurs because transac-
tions in M are measured and most interactions within G are not. 
Throughout the 20th century, the logics of  the market and governance 
have received most attention in public and scientific discourses. Economists 
made everybody else believe that the market logic is all that matters, whereas 
business economists discussed the shaping of  governmental (or managerial) 
logic to profit optimally from the market logic. Lawyers and public adminis-
trators were focusing on governmental logic as it functions in governments. 
The social sphere and the sphere of  the oikos all but disappeared from sight. 
Sociologists did a valiant attempt to keep their logics in the public picture, but 
in the eighties their discourse became increasingly marginalized.   
Spheres of  regulation, coordination and discipline
The historical perspective makes clear that the five spheres have distinctive 
principles of  regulating, coordinating and disciplining human actions and 
activities. No matter how much freedom we have or desire, we are in need 
of  (outside) correctors, of  signals that tell us whether we are doing the right 
FIVE DIFFERENT SPHERES 161
162 DOING THE RIGHT THING: A VALUE BASED ECONOMY
thing, or not. As children we are in need of  some serious disciplining from 
time to time, and even as adults we need to hear from our spouse, the police, 
a judge or a manager that we have to do something about our conduct. For 
politicians and governors one of  the key questions concerns what mecha-
nisms are best to get people to do the (politically or commercially) right thing. 
How to prevent them from abusing welfare provisions? How to get people to 
be entrepreneurial? How to get them to be efficient and productive? How to 
motivate people to do right? 
The inclination, once again, is to focus on the disciplinary and regula-
tory mechanisms that M and G provide. The picture of  the five spheres calls 
attention to the regulatory and disciplinary forces of  the three other spheres. 
The cultural sphere is good for intrinsic motivation. A cultural setting 
stimulates and gives meaning to certain actions and makes other actions 
senseless or even bad. In C you find out whether your beliefs make sense, or 
not; whether your idea is meaningful; whether a contribution or action reso-
nates with the prevalent culture (as in C1 and C2). 
The sphere of  the oikos appeals to loyalty and the norms of  kinship; 
when you violate them other members may get mad at you and in the worst 
case you risk exclusion. The Amish oikos will ban members who choose to 
join regular society. In the oikos parents have a stern talk with their children, 
will ground them if  necessary, and otherwise may correct them all the time. 
(“Close your mouth when eating.” “You are not going out before you have 
done your homework.”) Children may do the same with their parents, at least 
in some cultural settings. 
The social sphere provides mechanisms of  social control, of  approval 
and disapproval, of  shaming, of  teasing and revering, of  attribution of  guilt, 
of  reputation and recognition, of  exclusion, and of  authority, power and hier-
archy. Social mechanisms are probably most pervasive in daily life. When I 
injure the feelings of  someone, that person or someone else, may let me know 
in such a way that I feel badly about it. When I am aggressive in traffic, my 
wife usually yells at me. When I am too full of  myself, a child lets me know. 
When I give a bad talk, I will not be invited again. When I treat a colleague 
badly, I will pay for it later, for example by her support of  a measure that is 
bad for me. 
The market regulates by means of  prices and financial rewards: a high 
reward is a sign of  doing well. In the market some profit and others lose. The 
market punishes bad ideas and bad products, and rewards good ones. Markets 
make good entrepreneurs rich and throw others in poverty. As economists 
like to say, the market provides incentives to do the right thing. And it does so 
without the involvement of  any authority. Accordingly, it does not restrict the 
freedom of  those who participate in it. 
That is different in G. The governmental sphere regulates by means of  
rules, programs, accounting procedures and monitoring, that is by restricting 
actions and activities of  people. Bureaucracies punish and reward by way of  
rules, judgments of  committees, or decrees of  authorities. Governments apply 
the law and make use of  the judiciary if  necessary. In G we get speeding tick-
ets, may be thrown in jail, disallowed to build as we please, cut trees at will, or 
merge with another company. 
The mechanisms of  M and G are widely acknowledged. This model of  
five spheres expands these two with three other mechanisms of  regulatory, 
coordinating and disciplinary mechanisms. 
Worldviews
Others have pointed out the need to differentiate between spheres beyond 
those of  the market and the government. Mostly they do so to call attention 
Figure 9-3  Five systems of  control and regulation
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to the existence of  a society, of  social processes, that is, and sometimes to 
remind us that we operate in an oikos, too (although that is not the term they 
use).  I refer to the philosophers Hegel and Habermas , the sociologists Paul 
DiMaggio and Viviana Zelizer, the anthropologist Stephen Gudeman and the 
historian Karl Polanyi. Most of  them do so in order to explain things better, 
to give a more accurate picture of  the real world than the one-sided pictures 
in which M, or G, dominates. 
My objective is a moral one as it is my purpose is to figure out what is 
the right thing to do. What is the right strategy for the realization of  values? I 
offer the model of  the five spheres to inform worldviews of  people and orga-
nizations seeking the right thing to do. Yet if  we can use the model for indi-
viduals, groups of  people and organizations, then we can use it for politicians 
as well; the only difference being that politicians are in need of  a strategy to 
realize societal values. Main political movements turn out to stress one sphere 
or another, as I will show. 
The model may be used to counter the idea that M is all that matters and 
to argue that there is such a thing as a society (as the former British prime 
minister Margaret Thatcher, a fervent advocate of  M, once famously denied) 
(Thatcher, 1987). The issue that got us going in the case of  the artist was the 
outright rejection by the art students of  my appeal to M logic. To them selling 
an artwork is not what art is about. They object, therefore, to the dominance 
of  M logic. They are not alone. Suspicion towards and resistance against the 
market logic is strong. I notice it all around me. A book that is critical of  the 
market tends to sell well. What money can’t buy: the moral limits of  markets, by the 
Harvard ethics professor Sandel was a bestseller (Sandel, 2012). 
Usually the discussion stops with the criticism. A good question to ask, 
I would suggest, is why the criticism is so loud and so persistent. Markets are 
clearly operating all over and we all are benefiting from them as they enable us 
to valorize the goods we produce and the services we provide, and we acquire 
goods and services that are useful for us. So why all the criticism? One reason 
for this is that markets do not always work very well and generate unwelcome 
outcomes, like pollution and inequality. Another reason is that people do not 
recognize all what they do in the sphere of  the market. Whether it is their 
intimate interactions, their friendships, their social activities or their conver-
sations about art, they cannot make sense of  those in terms of  the market. 
When people see the spheres of  the social sphere and the oikos, at least some 
of  their criticism is resolved when they perceive that they are justified in sur-
mising that there is life beyond the market. In the case of  the artist the social 
and the cultural sphere as well as the sphere of  the oikos help to make sense of  
his behavior and show that he was valorizing his work even if  that was not in 
the spheres of  the market and the government. 
Additionally, having a picture of  the S, we can more easily recognize 
movements that occur in the social sphere. Especially the digital environment 
thrives on social initiatives to which people contribute without monetary com-
pensation and which operate with a minimum of  G. Think of  open sources, 
of  Wikipedia and the like. S is also the domain of  the share economy in which 
people share cars, machines, homes, rooms and so on. S is the domain where 
communities are active, where people start cooperatives and use social money. 
It is also the sphere where colleagues support each other, where scientists 
share ideas and research findings, where musicians make music together and 
where people pool resources to help each other out. The more you explore S, 
the more you will see. 
The purpose of  the picture with the five spheres, therefore, is to make 
sense of  all possible strategies that people follow when they valorize their val-
ues. When you make it your own, you may find out that it will affect the way 
you perceive the world around you. You will still discern markets working 
and governments operating but you will probably pay more attention to what 
people and organizations do in the social sphere and, as far as people are 
concerned, in the oikos in order to do the right things. It will get you interested 
in the possibilities as well as the limitations of  each sphere, of  the frictions 
that occur when people switch spheres, and the misunderstandings that result 
when it is unclear in which sphere someone is operating. And you may won-
der, as I do, whether the spheres as they function now in current societies are 
sufficiently in balance or whether some kind of  correction is called for. 
You will also notice that the model of  five spheres enables us to address 
all kinds of  other questions. For example, when the question comes up why 
the level of  trust is going down, we might consider processes in S besides 
what happens in M and in G. The S factor, incidentally, was generally rec-
ognized as problematic when the former Soviet countries embraced the M; 
it was surmised that they lacked the strong civil society that is needed for a 
good functioning market and an effective government. The inclusion of  S 
and O furthermore indicates that other coordinating mechanisms are at work 
besides the pricing mechanism of  M and the regulatory mechanism of  G. I 
refer to the socializing and moralizing forces in S and O. And when the dis-
cussion turns to the qualities of  life, to issues of  meaning, to the question of  
civilization (“are we experiencing a loss of  civilization, or not?”), we need to 
distinguish a distinctive cultural sphere. 
Those forces are not always recognized. A while ago I addressed a large 
audience together with a well-known and eloquent Dutch economist. I pre-
sented the model. He thought it was all “nonsense”—he likes to be provoc-
ative. His example was the traffic. “Listen,” he said to the audience with a 
dramatic tone in his voice, “when we regulate traffic, all we need are rules 
and prices. Because of  the rules people drive on the right side of  the road, or 
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the left in some countries, and stop for traffic lights. The price of  cars and gas 
prevents overcrowding of  the roads.”  And then he turned defiantly to me. 
That was an easy one. “Arnold,” so I responded (I was prepared this time!), 
“ever driven in Iowa City, Naples, Mumbai and, say, Amsterdam? Did you 
notice how different the traffic is in those cities? In Iowa City people drive 
slowly, they are considerate of  other drivers, stop for stop-signs and traffic 
lights and they yield to others. In Naples you have to ignore those behind you 
and forget about looking in the rear-view mirror—and take whatever space 
you can, to notice that the Italians are gracious in defeat. Mumbai is just one 
big chaos where it is not clear on which side of  the road you need to drive, 
where no one seems to care about what the others are doing, where you better 
ignore traffic lights if  you want to keep going and where it is perfectly normal 
to get stuck in a massive traffic jam. In Amsterdam there is a continuous war 
between cars and bicycles, with the latter violating all possible traffic rules to 
beat the cars. In all cases, the official rules are more or less the same, and in all 
cases, prices operate. Yet the traffic is dramatically different. This shows that 
the most important regulating forces are social, or cultural, in kind. People are 
socialized in the way they manage the traffic.” Arnold decided to ignore the 
point and barged ahead with another point. This confirmed my impression 
that economists have a hard time seeing the spheres of  S, C and O, even if  
you point it out to them. 
  Not only economists have a problem perceiving the workings of  S, C 
and O. My guess is that most people do. When it comes to their worldview, 
most people will mainly see a world with M and G. After decades of  belief  
in G, M appeared to become more popular. Whereas in my student years the 
discussions were about what the government should do, nowadays the discus-
sions are about what the government should not do. At least that was the case 
until the recession that started in 2008. It was believed that governments had 
grown too big and too bulky, that taxes were too high and welfare programs 
too generous. Ever since the late seventies free market ideologies are back 
in vogue and free market ideologies such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich 
Hayek were once again widely read and discussed. The trend was to withdraw 
governments from all kinds of  activities. This resulted in the privatization of  
all kinds of  government organizations (such as in telecommunication, utilities, 
maintenance, health care, transport and education) and the liberalization of  
various markets from government control, the financial sector being a prime 
example. 
In the model, this shows up as a shift from G to M. As noted earlier, the 
Great Depression had motivated a move towards G. Keynes advocated more 
and bigger governments, a larger G, that is (Keynes, 1963). They saw in a 
large G a counterbalance to an unstable and too powerful M. However, they 
did not go as far as communists who advocated the abolition of  the M logic 
altogether. Accordingly, developed, non-communist countries moved first 
from M to G, then moved back to M, to return to more G during the financial 
crisis of  2008-2014. 
You would expect liberals (the European label for free market advocates) 
to celebrate the embrace of  M by politicians from the eighties onwards. But 
that is not necessarily the case. The reason why I could figure out with the help 
of  my model and the dissertation about neo-liberalism by Zuidhof  (whom I 
mentioned earlier in the chapter). Neo-liberalism is a commonly used term 
to characterize current policies. It is said that current social democrats have 
turned into neoliberals and that the policies of  the EU are neoliberal as well. 
The definition of  neoliberalism, however, remains usually unclear. Most peo-
ple I ask can’t tell its difference from liberalism. They come as far as iden-
tifying neo-liberalism with Chicago economics and its emphasis on selfish 
behavior and free markets. The model creates clarity. Zuidhof  helped me by 
making a connection with Foucault’s notion of  governmentality that I subse-
quently adopted (Foucault, 1975). 
Governmentality is what characterizes neo-liberals. They are people who 
operate in G, or think in terms of  G, and adopt the logic of  M as a strategy 
in their politics. Neo-liberals, therefore, are governors, or people who identify 
themselves with governors, who advocate free markets and entrepreneurship, 
as managerial solutions for societal problems (such as high unemployment, 
inefficiencies and high prices). They are the politicians who want to liber-
alize markets and privatize government organizations. Yet because they are 
governors, they also seek ways to somehow stay in control. That is why we 
have witnessed a surge in supervisory institutions, regulations and accounting 
procedures. All those are anathemas for true liberals who prefer to minimize 
as much government as possible and safeguard the autonomy of  individuals, 
especially of  entrepreneurial individuals. 
Typical was the response to the financial crisis starting in 2008. Instead 
of  propagating laissez faire, as a true liberal would do, politicians as well as 
people on the street called for massive government intervention. The logic of  
G had to come to the rescue of  what was perceived to be a failure in M logic. 
As a consequence, governments rescued banks, even nationalized them, and 
formulated a massive set of  new rules and strengthened the supervision of  
the sector. 
In the academic world I see a similar trend. Even where academic gov-
ernors speak about the importance of  valorization of  research in markets, 
and where students have become our customers, the number and influence 
of  rules and formal procedures are only expanding. In recent years European 
universities have suffered greatly under time- and money-consuming accred-
itation procedures. It is all about control and accountability, that is, values of  
G. In that area of  my life, I experience G indeed as a capital G. A colleague 
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of  mine speaks of  a Soviet system. I am reminded of  Kafka, since nobody 
can give me the rationale of  the procedures and everybody tells me that we 
have to do it whether we like it or not. (I can’t help revealing my bias here. I 
would argue that universities should focus on S, on the fostering of  academic 
communities and experience G practices as undermining the S in the aca-
demic world.) 
Whereas conventional wisdom would probably state that the M logic is 
dominant nowadays, I would argue that G logic rules in everyday and public 
life. When something goes wrong, like an airplane crash, a large fire, high 
unemployment, a failing bank or personal misfortune), most people look to 
the government for a solution. When journalists ask for the solution when 
someone has discussed a problem of  any kind, they usually imply asking what 
the government should do about it. Bring a politician on stage together with 
any other citizen, and everybody wants to know what the politician has to say. 
Only pop stars may succeed in drawing the attention away. When people or 
organizations are in trouble, they expect the government to help them out. 
This is certainly the case in northern European countries, but such a mental-
ity is also strong in countries like England and the US. In southern European 
countries people customarily whine and complain about ineffective and cor-
ruptive governments, but that practice betrays rather a longing for strong and 
effective governments than for no government at all. Advocates of  mere lais-
sez faire, laissez passer may have a large audience but find few followers when 
it is time for action.  
  Of  course, it is a matter of  political belief  to stress one sphere over 
another. People recognize their values more in one sphere than in the oth-
ers and will be inclined to advocate strategies pertaining to that sphere. The 
model is not going to determine who is more right than others, although I 
surmise that the final conclusion will be that there is a need for some balance. 
That still leaves room for discussion as to what the perceived imbalances are 
and how to correct for those. Politics is the working of  phronesis at the level 
of  societies and beyond. People apply it in cafes, in classrooms and in public 
squares. It is in the corridors of  power that phronesis is really at work, with 
consequences for all citizens. 
The model allows for rough characterizations of  political movements, 
based on their faith in or valuation of  one sphere above the others. The table 
on the following page provides a summary.
In conclusion
The model of  the five spheres provides a picture of  the world in which we all 
operate in order to realize our values. It directs our attention to the others we 
need to involve in order to do so. Also, it points out to us that we have vari-
ous options, various strategies that we can follow. It is not that one strategy 
excludes the other, but we need to be aware of  the consequences of  choosing 
one strategy rather than another. The choice may matter for the values that 
we ultimately succeed in realizing. 
The model provides a set up for a view of  the world. It inspires us to look 
beyond market and governmental practices and to recognize the role that 
social relations have in daily life. The social and the cultural sphere and the 
sphere of  the oikos are essential for the generation of  social and cultural goods, 
for all the goods that we need to share with others. Without a clear view on 
those spheres we cannot make sense of  social and cultural goods, and will fail 
to get a clear understanding of  how artistic, scientific and religious practices, 
among many others, work.
Having the overall picture, we can now turn to the intricacies of  each 
sphere and to the interactions among and between them. 
Simple characterizations:
Liberals (in the classical sense) celebrate the forces of  M and are criti-
cal of  the actions of  G for the sake of  freedom. 
Keynesians or the liberals in the American sense argue that a 
strong G is needed to compensate for failures of  M for the sake of  
stability and justice.
Socialists argue that G should dominate M for the sake of  justice and 
the power of  the people.
Neo-liberals are governors (that is, they are positioned in G) who see 
practices of  M as solutions for their problem. 
Communists seek to displace M with G; in communism all goods are 
state owned. 
Communitarians stress the importance of  S, of  social arrangements, 
and downplay the role of  M and G.
Corporatism stresses cooperation between organized labor and 
organizations of  enterprises with secondary roles for the market and 
the government.  
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CHAPTER 10 A
AN ExPLORATION OF THE FIVE 
SPHERES: LOGIC, RHETORIC, VALUES 
AND RELATIONSHIPS. THE OIKOS 
AND THE SOCIAL AND THE CULTURAL 
SPHERES FIRST
The main message of  the value based approach is hopefully clear by now. In 
order to do the right thing we need to reach beyond the practices of  exchange 
(M) and governance (G), beyond private and collective goods. To valorize 
our social, cultural and whatever other goods we have to operate in all five 
spheres. To realize an idea, we do best in the cultural sphere. Is it a family 
we need to realize, or something like care or love? Then we do better in the 
sphere of  the oikos. Reputation, recognition and trust are best realized in the 
social sphere. For selling tickets and advice, the sphere of  the market is prob-
ably ideal, and when an organization needs to be in order, we have to be in 
the sphere of  governance. 
And what if  you are just trying to survive? In that case any sphere will do. 
Get welfare benefits if  you can in G, sell whatever possible in M, find support 
in S, or plead for help from family members in O. C may not be a very useful 
source, though. 
The picture of  five spheres will broaden the perspective of  people who are 
in the process of  planning their life. Quite a few of  my students express a 
preference for work in the commercial sector. They think of  M and the logic 
of  exchange and the values of  ambition and financial security. The picture 
warns them that if  they seek employment in a commercial organization they 
will have to deal with the governance in that organization, that is, with G. 
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Would they fit in a bureaucratic structure? They furthermore have to answer 
to how they are going to operate in S and O, that is, in the social sphere and 
their oikos. What kind of  oikos are they striving for? Is a family life important 
to them? How about close friends? And then there is the cultural sphere. How 
will they bring about meaning in their life? What kind of  relationship do 
they seek with the transcendental? Will they seek contact with the Muse, with 
Nature, with the Divine? What kind of  practices, or praxes, do they seek to 
appropriate? All these questions together are too much to answer when you 
are, say, twenty-one But they will cross your path sooner or later. 
Awareness of  the five spheres is a practical matter. A director of  a museum 
better knows the differences when she is planning her financial strategy. Might 
she respond to the values that people seek to realize in S and C? How would 
she do that? When she is seeking donations, she is likely to engage with the 
logic, rhetoric and values of  S, and possibly O as well. Likewise, leaders of  a 
business firm are well advised to take notice of  the cultural setting in which 
they operate (C), and the way social goods like trust, collegiality and a creative 
environment come about (and get lost) in S. They, too, may ponder how their 
goods can appeal to the need to realize social and cultural values or to feed an 
oikos. Political leaders who fail to recognize the workings of  S, O and C are at 
least partially blind. 
People like yourself  as well as politicians and governors have another 
reason to consider all five spheres with their logic. Their reason is that of  
guidance, control or regulation. As an individual you are in need of  (outside) 
correctors, of  signals that tell you whether or not you are doing the right thing. 
Diagram  10A-1  The Five Spheres
For politicians and governors one of  the key questions is what mechanisms are 
best to get people to do the (politically or commercially) right thing. How to 
prevent them from abusing welfare provisions? How to encourage people to 
be entrepreneurial? How to get them to be efficient and productive? How to 
motivate people to do right? As we saw in chapter 9 each sphere generates 
a distinctly different system of  regulation, stimulus and discipline. The five 
sphere model brings out the importance of  social and cultural systems next to 
the regulatory systems of  M and G. 
The previous chapter introduced the five-sphere model and also showed how 
the model can inform one’s worldview. This chapter will explore the charac-
teristics of  each of  the five spheres of  the oikos (O), the social sphere (S), the 
cultural sphere (C), and in chapter 10B the market (M) and the sphere of  gov-
ernance (G). It addresses questions of  how, what and why. The how-question 
contemplates how best to valorize certain values and how to strive for certain 
purposes. The what-question reveals in which sphere what goods are to be 
generated, acquired, given, or shared. And the why-question examines why 
certain strategies are failing and others succeeding. 
For starters 
The five spheres represent ideal types. Each of  the five spheres stands for a 
stereotypical interaction with others. 
Real interactions usually involve aspects of  more than one sphere. Take 
the visit to the local grocery store whose owner you happen to know. You walk 
in and chat some with the owner; you exchange some niceties and you make 
a few jokes. That interaction takes place in the social sphere as you do things 
to affirm the relationship that you have with the other, the owner of  the shop 
in this case. Then you get the carton of  milk, the cookies and the coffee that 
you need, go to the cash register and pay for the goodies. That interaction is a 
market transaction and pertains to the sphere of  the market. The value added 
tax that you also pay is an interaction within the sphere of  governance. Then 
you go home and make yourself  and your housemates some coffee. That you 
do in the sphere of  the oikos, or the social sphere (in case you are not that close 
with your housemates). The cultural sphere is responsible for the cultural set-
ting in which you, the people in the store and the people in your oikos operate. 
For example, in an Asian setting the carton of  milk would be an unlikely item, 
and the jokes made in Central Africa will be quite different from the jokes 
made in a Dutch provincial town. 
Similarly, people working in an organization are switching between the 
different spheres all the time. When they talk with each other, share experi-
ences, make plans, talk about what is going on in their lives and in the world 
in which they are interacting socially, in S, that is. When they appeal to, work 
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with and enforce rules, contracts, functions, standards, protocols and the like, 
they are in G, the sphere of  governance. When they discuss the content of  
their work or whatever makes their work meaningful, they operate in the 
cultural sphere, C. When they sell their goods to other people or to other 
organizations they take advantage of  the sphere of  the market, of  M. They 
may wish to be an oikos, being close to each other and all that, but the claim 
of  having a true oikos in an organization will be highly dubious (for example 
because of  the risk of  getting fired). 
Even so, it is important to be aware in which sphere you are operating. 
It probably would not go over very well if  you were to go up to the grocery 
owner with a sad story and then ask him to let you just have the goodies for 
free. It would be also weird if  you were to say something like “Hey, I feel really 
at home here” and walk away with the goodies without paying, as though you 
were grabbing stuff out of  your refrigerator at home and taking them up to 
your room. And your colleagues would look strangely at you if  you suddenly 
ask them for money for the advice you just gave them: it’s alright to charge 
outsiders, but it’s not what you do when helping out colleagues. It would be 
illogical. 
The following exploration, therefore, is about raising the awareness of  
what it takes to valorize values and goods in the right way, how to involve oth-
ers rightly. It is meant to be edifying and tries to influence your worldview—it 
has already done so for me. It adds content to the picture of  the model of  
the five spheres that may affect the way you design the activities in your life, 
organization, community or society. 
Many of  the examples in the following exploration I have taken from the 
cultural sector. The reason for this is that I regularly advise cultural organi-
zations and frequently talk with artists. When the issue of  valorization comes 
up and—what it often boils down to—the financing of  their practice, I use 
the model. But the model applies to any kind of  activity that is meant to be 
the right thing. 
As I keep saying to people in the cultural sector, the sphere in which you 
valorize your art matters. In the heat of  the money game, however, the mes-
sage is easily lost. When people are badly in need of  money—or when they 
think they are—they easily forget to what end it is that they are doing what 
they are doing. Not all money is good. The source of  the money is important. 
Selling more tickets is fine, but if  the sacrifice for doing so is the forsaking 
of  ideals, then it is not so fine anymore. Likewise, acquiring money from a 
sponsor with a dubious reputation (shall we say from a rifle factory, or a Mafia 
organization?) could be disastrous for a cultural organization. 
This is where the process of  valorization must begin: the ideals, that which an 
organization, a person or a community articulates as the goods to strive for, 
the goods that define the purposes, the mission. Is that good something artis-
tic, social, societal or personal? Without articulation of  those goods, the sub-
sequent actions are aimless and without meaning. If  someone wants to create 
art, he better look for a group of  people that are able to appreciate his art. If  
fatherhood is the good to strive for, then the oikos is clearly the sphere to look 
at. If  justice is the good to strive for, then the governmental sphere is probably 
the best choice, although certain parts of  the social sphere might qualify as 
well (e.g. for the bringing together of  people interested in the same goal). 
How about production for profit, or status? It is possible, of  course, to 
articulate an instrument as an intermediate goal, such as profit or social sta-
tus. Although, as we saw in chapter 7, that triggers the question of  what such 
an intermediate goal is good for. What is the profit good for? If  the ultimate 
purpose is having a good family, or a more just world, or a better quality of  
work and products, then a single-minded pursuit of  profit may not be the 
right thing to do.  
With the set-up of  chapter 4 in mind—going from ideals via strategy and 
practice to evaluation—the five-sphere model informs of  the next step: the 
determination of  the best design, or strategy. Is the market the best option, 
or should the sphere of  governance be the main focus of  the valorization 
process? How about the possibilities that the social sphere has to offer? How 
about the oikos? Accordingly, the model gets us thinking about the design of  
activities, an organization maybe, financial strategies and the like.   
The main characteristics to look for in each sphere 
1. The kinds of  relationships. The design of  activities concerns first of  all the 
way in which to involve others. It is a matter of  the kind of  relationship 
that best suits the purposes at hand. A social relationship that is some-
how reciprocal is good for the realization of  social goods. An exchange 
in the market with a merely instrumental relationship is good for the gen-
eration of  financial means that, in turn, are good for other things. The 
government can also be good for financial means but requires a different 
rationale (“Does the proposal meet the criteria?”). If  the idea is to sustain 
certain activities, some kind of  organization is called for and that requires 
the formalization of  at least some aspects of  relationships with others. 
Then there is the option of  fostering intimate relationships in the oikos 
with specific requirements for the design to allow space for such relation-
ships (“work-life balance”). The relationship with the transcendental is 
not a social one. Even so, we can say that we relate to Nature somehow, 
to a (national) Culture, Art, the Truth or the Divine. Such relationships 
constitute the cultural sphere. Accordingly, the types of  relationships are 
one of  the characteristics to look for in each of  the spheres.
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2. The logic. The second characteristic to consider is the logic of  a relationship 
and the sphere in which it functions. The logic refers to the way of  doing 
something, the types of  interactions, and the norms that makes sense for 
that kind of  relationship, in a particular sphere—and what would fail to 
make sense (be illogical) in the other spheres. The logic includes institu-
tional practices, norms and (implicit) rules, and the kind of  currency that 
mediates and regulates the interactions. (The currency in M is money; in 
S it comes in social forms like favors, reputation, credits, and blame.) 
3. The rhetoric. The particular way of  speaking that characterizes a sphere 
is its rhetoric. It represents persuasive strategies that are particular to that 
sphere and would not make sense in the other spheres. By calling it rhet-
oric, I want to alert you to the types of  metaphors at work and the narra-
tive (the kind of  story) that makes sense.
 
4. The values. Then there are the positive and negative values for which each 
sphere stands and that the practices in that sphere valorize. The positive 
values are what people generally appreciate in a particular sphere, what 
makes them propagate that sphere. Negative values are usually the values 
that are attributed to a sphere from the point of  view of  other spheres 
and will motivate moves away from that particular sphere. For example, 
the positive value that people attach to M is freedom to choose; a negative 
value is greed, a value that emanates from the vantage point of  the social 
sphere. 
Let us now explore each sphere in turn for each of  these characteristics. We 
start in the sphere where life begins, and usually where it ends as well: the 
oikos. 
1) Oikos  
It all starts at home. It does so for all of  us. At home we realize important 
values of  all kinds by way of  goods that are particular to O. These goods are 
all shared goods, such as a good family, intimate relationships, cozy evenings, 
vacations, conviviality, trust, love, and memories. All of  these are answers to 
the what-question: what goods do we realize in the sphere of  the oikos? 
Another set of  answers to the what-question is the virtues that we hone 
by partaking in an oikos, virtues like being honest, loyal and loving. At home 
we seek to be all of  that in some way or another (and that is not to say that we 
actually behave accordingly).  
The oikos can be a purpose in and of  itself. In that case it is a praxis (as 
defined in the chapter 7.)  Many people value their oikos as their most precious 
possession for which they are willing to do anything to protect, from hard 
labor to even sacrificing their own life. The oikos can also be good for the 
realization of  other ideals, such as the ideal of  being a good father or mother, 
and of  love. 
The oikos is instrumental in satisfying a variety of  wants and needs. A 
home can be good for shelter, children, grandchildren (I would love to have 
some myself), home cooked meals, companionship, cozy evenings, interest-
ing experiences (vacations and the like), education in art and music, religion, 
craftsmanship, attention, support, and care. In addition the oikos can be a 
production unit as in a farm, a shop or a (family) business. 
Products and services that economists call “consumption” are instru-
ments for the oikoi, to realize themselves and for their relevant values and 
goods. The apples that I buy are an input into my oikos.  
Dysfunctional families fail to realize some or more of  these goods and 
values. Some families do not succeed in providing support, love, affection, 
cozy evenings and fond memories and instead generate bad experiences of  
suppression, loneliness, and exploitation. They demonstrate that the realiza-
tion of  a good family is tough and requires skill, lots of  effort, and a bit of  
luck.  
Realizing a good oikos is about getting relationships right, respecting the 
proper logic and adhering to its values. Let us take a look at what these charac-
teristics involve. 
The kinds of  relationships that the O encourages us to generate and sustain 
are family relationships, as well as intimate and sexual relationships. The lat-
ter are the basis of  a new oikos that members of  two different oikoi will form. 
(Note that oikoi are changing all the time, by death, divorce, marriage, birth, 
tragedy, and romance.)  
The relationship with the other that we need in order to valorize our goods 
is in the oikos a family, kinship, or an intimate, close and loving relationship. 
We get the other involved because of  that kind of  relationship. The other will 
support us out of  love, loyalty or duty (“it is the family duty to back each other 
up, and to do so unconditionally”). 
Through the O we sustain relationships with parents, siblings, part-
ners, children, grandparents, nephews or whoever is inalienable for us. The 
Germans express the idea well: your home consists of  people with whom 
you share a “Schicksalgemeinschaft”—a community that is based on a shared 
fate. One characteristic of  such a relationship is that it is very hard, and in 
some cases impossible, to sever. Even when children break with their parents, 
or vice versa, the parent-child relationship does not cease to exist. (Think 
of  the biblical story of  the prodigal son who is welcomed back by his father, 
even though he made an elaborate effort to make such a welcome unlikely.) 
Divorce or separation, however, is a good method to break up an oikos and 
sever the relationship of  a couple (though it will usually not sever the ties with 
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children). 
One’s oikos is usually based on kinship, but it is not necessarily so. A part-
ner, for instance, does not have a blood-relationship to you. Marriage is about 
connecting different oikoi. An intimate friend could be part of  your oikos, too. 
An oikos can be extended, as in tribal communities, or consist of  extended 
families as in the Chinese societies. In Western societies the oikos is usually 
small and consists of  only a few people. Even so, it is possible to experience 
an oikos in a particular place, or in one’s own country. People, who have been 
away from the country where they were born for a long time, may experi-
ence that country as their oikos and anyone they meet from that country as a 
member of  that oikos. (Imagine yourself  in a dire and desperate situation far 
from home. You feel helpless and hopeless. Imagine now how you feel when 
someone comes up to you, introduces himself  as someone from the embassy 
of  your country, and offers to help since you are a fellow citizen. I imagine 
that it feels like coming home.)  
My students do not always recognize the relevance of  the oikos and nei-
ther do quite a few artists I talk with (“I can be at home anywhere, with 
anyone.”). This is understandable as the students have often just left their 
original oikos behind and still have to make up their mind about whether or 
not they are in need of  their own. And the artists resist the oikos for all kinds 
of, for them good, reasons. Yet, even they, at least most of  them, have a place 
that they can call home; it is the place where a parent or friend prepares the 
food, where they have a bed, and where they can take refuge when in trouble. 
Home is what people fall back on when they have experienced a disaster, 
where they seek solace in troubled times, and where they can “let their hair 
down.”  Home can also be a feeling or a sensation.
When you are so clear on what your home means to you that you hardly 
have to think about it, just imagine what it would be like to ‘lose’ your home, 
because of  violence, a divorce, or death. It happened once to me. The feeling 
of  loss is tremendous. 
Within an oikos a special kind of  logic is at work. One distinctive char-
acteristic of  this logic is the sharing: families share the evening meal, some 
members share their bed, and they share vacations and memories. Another 
characteristic of  this logic is the contributing. Members chip in somehow, by 
doing chores, bringing in goodies, providing financial sources, taking care of  
others, telling stories, cooking meals, cleaning, and so on. Small children tend 
to get a great deal just by being small, cute and naïve. When children grow 
older they learn that they have to contribute something somehow (“You do 
the dishes tonight”). The oikos logic is also one of  interdependence. Because 
the members share goods and need to contribute to the family, they depend 
upon each other. 
How families are organized, how their hierarchies are established, how 
they work, and how they deal with the frictions, quarrels and conflicts that are 
typical for families, is partly a cultural matter. In some families the father is 
the head, in others the mother leads. Members of  traditional Chinese families 
defer to the will and decisions of  the elder of  the family. In such families aunts 
and uncles have also a much more important role than in most Western fami-
lies. The typical Dutch family tends to negotiate when differences occur, with 
children having a voice (and at times even seem to dictate what the parents 
do); an Italian family will shout and gesticulate a great deal when something 
needs to be done (at least that is my impression). 
The currency that families use is usually hard to pinpoint. Members 
build up credit when they have contributed a great deal; the father who is 
never home and neglects his chores may lack the credit that he needs when 
he gets into trouble. Charm may attract credit and a bad mood may deter it.
Families develop their own values and norms, and therefore have their 
own specific culture (C1 as defined in chapter 2), as usually becomes painfully 
clear during wedding ceremonies. 
Diagram 10A-2  The sphere of  the oikos
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Families represent and reproduce overarching values as well. Families 
foster the values of  loyalty and trust. (Emblematic is the way Francis Ford 
Coppola’s movie The Godfather portrays the working of  such values in a mafia 
family.) Families stand for the values of  care and love: members care for each 
other and may love each other.  
An oikos needs boundaries. Families close the doors of  their homes to 
keep outsiders out, and have special hospitality rituals when outsiders enter. 
(But what to do when you run into a young stranger in the kitchen one morn-
ing, waiting for your 18-year-old daughter to serve him breakfast?) That is 
why an oikos is a shared good or, even better, a shared practice.
All these characteristics have consequences for the realization of  values 
and goods in the oikos. They work well to realize values such as care, intimacy, 
and love for the nurturing of  healthy and well-behaved children and for get-
ting attention, recognition, support, and a sense of  belonging. Yet they work 
less well, and often not at all, when you want to become a good artist, con-
tribute to science, practice a religion, start a revolution or set up a business. 
An oikos is unlikely to satisfy the desire for fun, excitement, adventure, justice, 
and great wealth. In order to realize all that, people must venture outside their 
oikos into the other spheres. People usually figure out in their adolescent years 
that they have to leave their original oikos in order to “make it in the outside 
world.” 
It may be possible to create great art or a sanctimonious life within and 
through an oikos, but that may require the development of  a very particular 
oikos, such as an artistic community or a monastery. The idea is to create 
an intimate community of  people who share the same ideals. The Jewish 
Kibbutzim are a good example. 
The sphere of  oikos in brief
The oikos is good for:
The realization of  an oikos as an ideal—a good oikos can serve as a 
purpose in life, as does love, motherhood and fatherhood, intimate and 
sexual relationships, companionship, shelter, meals, shared experiences 
and memories, attention, support, and care. 
Oikos can also be a source of  income, a possibility for work (farms, fam-
ily businesses, child care).
The oikos is less good for: 
The realization of  great art, science and religion (unless an oikos is 
specifically designed for such purposes), worldly success in working and 
political life, all kinds of  goods (the oikos rarely produces computers, 
cars, meat and vegetables, clothes, entertainment, music, and coun-
seling)—those have to be acquired in other spheres. 
 
Logic
The logic is one of  interdependence, sharing, and contributing. The 
logic involves respecting the culture of  the family, the established hier-
archies, positions, and roles. The currency is social; families work for 
example with credit and blame. 
Values
Positive values fostered by the oikos are loyalty, trust, love, and care. 
Negative values associated with the oikos (at least in Western cultures) 
are dependency, paternalism, suppression, and discrimination. 
Relationships 
Involving the other in a process of  valorization requires persuasion 
with an appeal to the values of  loyalty, care, dependency, kinship, con-
nectedness, love, and intimacy. The others will share or give what they 
have (like attention, care, food, and money), or contribute somehow 
(chipping in, cooking a meal, cleaning, listening, or giving advice).   
Rhetoric
The rhetoric of  the oikos gives expression of  its logic and values. It uses 
the family narrative and series of  topoi (Greek for commonplaces) with 
expressions such as: 
I love you. 
What’s mine is yours.
We share equally what we have.
You are a great dad. Can I have a raise in my allowance?
I’m hungry.
I take care of  you. You don’t have to worry about anything.
Why? Because I am your father and I say so.
I am happy when the kids are happy.
I hate you.
Because you are my wife, I will support you no matter what.
These characteristics are particular for the sphere of  the oikos; they 
generally will not make sense in other spheres (there are exceptions, 
though). 
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There are good reasons why people resist the oikos and even abstain from 
any involvement. Developing and sustaining an oikos requires a great deal of  
effort, time, and resources. Disappointment and failure are almost inevitable. 
There are plenty of  stories in circulation in the form of  novels, movies, and 
gossip to highlight the dark side of  the oikos. Moreover, we know that an oikos 
can in some cases be stifling and suffocating, inhibiting personal freedom, and 
suppressing desires and ambitions. The oikos can furthermore fail to deliver 
a wide range of  goods that we need and want. All of  these are reasons for us 
to venture outside the oikos and operate in the other spheres. Yet, people who 
have turned their back to any kind of  oikos, will often find out sooner or later 
that they are in need of  some form of  oikos.
2) The social sphere
When we venture outside our oikos, away from the kitchen table, we will first 
enter the social sphere, by walking into the street, going to the public square, 
playing with other children, going to school or by joining a club, a church, 
a synagogue, a mosque, or maybe even a political party. When we do so, we 
engage with people to whom we do not feel connected in the way that we do 
with those belonging to our oikos. The social sphere is the sphere of  informal 
social relationships. It is the sphere where we find commons of  all kinds.
While S does not appear in economic texts, the social sphere, S, is a dom-
inant presence in real life. In S we realize relationships of  all sorts, we join 
clubs, become members of  communities, we are in conversations with others 
about sports, the weather, religion, art, science, and relationships of  course. It 
is the sphere of  co-production and co-creation, in the sense that it is where we 
co-create social, cultural, and symbolic goods. It is in S that the sciences and 
the arts come about; in S religion and politics happen; in S open sources are 
generated and maintained; and in S creative commons come about. A great 
deal of  market transactions are intended as inputs for the realization of  social 
goods, like when we pay for meals, drinks, rooms, concerts, performances, 
and other such goods. Suppliers of  those goods do better when they are aware 
of  the social purposes of  their goods. 
S is varied and comprises social settings, the society at large, all kinds of  
social organizations like clubs, societies, political parties, ensembles, orches-
tras, and groups, as well as a great variety of  commons, or shared practices. 
In a further development I can imagine that a differentiation of  the S is 
desirable. After all, participating in a crowd is quite different from being in a 
friendship. The political S is quite different from the S of  sport clubs or aca-
demic departments (although... academic departments can be quite political). 
For this exposition, S is considered to be one entity.
Once you see S clearly, it becomes hard to comprehend why standard 
economics overlooks it altogether. When you overlook this sphere, you do not 
see all the work that S requires; you will not notice all the goods that S gen-
erates. Once you picture S, so much of  what keeps people occupied every 
day suddenly makes sense. It will make, for example, cooperative and even 
altruistic behavior seem normal. 
To answer the what question, the social sphere is good for social goods—that 
is for goods that we need to share with others for them to have social value. 
Friendship is such a good, and so is a sense of  belonging, collegiality, commu-
nity, political relevance, reputation, identity, recognition, collegiality, trust, sol-
idarity, membership of  a club, authority, power, and so on. The social sphere 
is good for relations and conversations of  all kinds. 
As we noticed in chapter 6 conversations are commons or shared prac-
tices. In the US you can join an ongoing conversation about topics such as 
baseball and American football, but such a conversation is all but absent in 
Dutch society. That society, in turn, has unique conversations about ice-skat-
ing, the battle with water, and the Dutch monarchy (tulips and windmills do 
not make for much of  a conversation in the Netherlands).  
The social sphere is crucial for the realization of  values. When you want lots 
of  people to wear your hats, watch your movie, savor your art, enjoy your 
music, know what you know, or share your faith, you have to make sure that 
your good is part of  a conversation, that it is talked about. (In business this is 
called word-of-mouth advertising.) All that takes place in S.  
The social sphere is also the sphere in which power has to be realized, 
since power is the force to influence or determine the activities of  others. 
Power is a relational thing. So is trust. It is in the social sphere that trust comes 
about, or is lost. 
The how-question concerns how we involve the other in assigning value to our 
goods. The answer in the social sphere begins with the social relationships that 
we form. The objective in this sphere is to befriend people from other oikoi, to 
develop close and weak ties with a variety of  people, to develop networks. We 
need these relationships in order to generate goods like friendships, networks, 
and conversations of  all kinds. Some of  these goods are goods to strive for, 
like friendship, others are instrumental for the generation of  other goods (you 
need to have team members in order to play soccer or baseball, but you can 
also play baseball for the sake of  friendship, to share the game with friends). 
The next part of  the answer to the how-question is the logic of  the social 
sphere. That logic is social. It is the logic of  informal relationships, of  partici-
pation, collaboration, donation, and contribution. In order to play soccer, the 
social logic dictates that you befriend some people to play with you and that 
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you then convince another group of  likeminded people to play a game. To 
be part of  a team you must be willing to contribute to the team effort. When 
you play all by yourself, never passing the ball, you are likely to lose the team 
(unless you are exceptionally talented). 
The social logic is informal. Unlike the formal logic of  the market, it 
does not use money as a unit of  account. And unlike governance logic it does 
not rely on rules, standards, protocols, contracts, or laws. Social logic is qual-
itative, not quantitative. (And that makes it hard to capture in mathematical 
models and empirical statistics.) 
The logic of  social relationships relies on the logic of  gift giving. The gift is 
an important instrument for the initiation and sustenance of  social relation-
ships. Gifts have been the subject of  a great deal of  scholarly research. Often 
referred to, is the book The Gift of  the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss 
(Mauss, 1967). From this research we learn that gift giving is about reciproc-
ity: when I give you something, I expect something in return. It is tempting 
to identify a form of  exchange as it takes place in the market, but the logic 
of  exchange is fundamentally different from the logic of  gift giving. The big 
difference is that the terms of  trade are made explicit in case of  exchange, but 
are left ambiguous in the case of  gift giving. When you give a friend a present, 
support, or your undivided attention you will expect a gesture in return but 
when, how, and even to whom remain undefined, undetermined, and usually 
undiscussed at the time that you give your gift. A thank you from your friend 
may suffice, but for good friends that would be even too much (you do not 
thank a good friend, since giving each other is what good friends do). It is even 
not determined that you are the beneficiary of  the gesture in return. If  your 
friend is doing a favor for your child, or for another friend, then that may be 
good enough for you.2
The logic of  contributing is another major component of  the logic of  S. It is 
related to the logic of  gift giving. (See also the discussion in chapter 6.) When 
you want to be part of  a conversation or to share a good such as friendship or 
community, you need to contribute somehow. Friendship and a conversation 
are shared goods that require contributions to be part of  them, to share in 
their ownership. You contribute by making a gesture, giving attention or a 
piece of  your mind, showing interest, doing some work, and so on. A contri-
bution needs to be recognized by the others to count towards the establish-
ment of  co-ownership of  the shared good. 
The logic of  contribution is also what brings about so-called creative 
commons, or conversations. It underlies the co-creation and co-production 
2  If  you want to know more about the logic of  gift you can consult apart from 
Mauss, an extensive literature including Klamer, Gift Economy (2003) and Komter, 
The Gift. An Interdisciplinary Perspective (1996)
of  the commons. Co-creation or co-production is what is needed to generate 
a shared good and a claim to shared ownership. A creative commons comes 
about in the digital environment when people add content, respond to that 
content, and share the content with people in their network. All such activities 
are contributions. Without them the creative commons would not exist. As a 
rule, contributions do not have any reward other than the satisfaction of  being 
part of  that conversation, of  sharing in its ownership. 
In chapter 6 we already discussed how art is being realized in S as a 
common or shared practice. We concluded that while you cannot buy art, you 
could contribute to the common practice somehow in order to appropriate 
art, to make sense of  it. The same social process applies to the practice that is 
Diagram 10A-3  The social sphere
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The social sphere in brief
What is it good for? 
The social sphere is good for the realization of  shared goods like friend-
ships, conversations, communities, clubs, teams, colleagues, move-
ments, parties, an atmosphere, culture (C1), and civilization (C3).
Relationships
The relationships in S are informal, usually do not involve money or 
governance, and serve the purpose of  generating a shared good or 
serving a common interest. The other is a partner, member, friend, 
donor, contributor, associate, colleague, helpful stranger, comrade, or 
neighbor (but not a customer or client). 
Logic
The logic of  S is the logic of  reciprocity, as in the circulation of  gifts, and 
the logic of  contributing.
The logic of  reciprocity stipulates that a gift, a gesture, an offering 
of  whatever kind gets reciprocated, that is, it calls for a counter-gift, 
gesture or offering. However, and this makes for a fundamental dif-
ference with the exchange in the market, the terms are left informal 
knowledge or science. You have to do it in order to “have” it. And the doing 
implies participating in some social setting or another, such as a lab, university 
environment, or discussion group on the Internet. In all cases contributing is 
a critical part of  the logic concerned. 
Knowing what to contribute, what to give, or how to give or solicit a gift 
is a matter of  phronesis. You have to be able to assess what is called for, what is 
appropriate, whom to approach and how. You also have to take into account 
the cultural context. Americans are more used to being asked for contribu-
tions than the Dutch (except for members of  a church) and the Japanese are 
most sophisticated in their gift exchange (foreigners are well-advised to con-
sult natives before they engage in a Japanese gift exchange). You may contrib-
ute too much or too little. 
The social sphere is filled with clubs, neighborhoods, communities, 
societies, schools, churches, mosques, and social organizations (also called 
non-profits to indicate that they do not follow the logic of  the market). We 
have to be careful, though, since the organization of  clubs, schools and social 
organizations, often requires introducing the logic of  G, of  governance. The 
social context with informal relationships and the logic of  reciprocity and 
(no contracts and monetary measurements) and inexplicit; the what, 
how and for whom of  the counter-gift are ambiguous. Phronesis in the 
social sphere applies moral and social forms of  accounting, taking into 
account environmental, historical, and cultural conditions. 
In the logic of  contributing, we provide attention, knowledge, interest, 
labor, time, and money for the sake of  a shared good, of  gaining a 
share in shared ownership. A contribution counts when others some-
how involved in the shared or common good recognize it. 
Values
Positive values: community, friendship, solidarity, social cohesion, social 
inclusion, status, a sense of  belonging, and membership.
Negative values: discrimination, exclusion, exploitation, power, nepo-
tism, favoritism, provincialism, unprofessionalism, and chaos.
In S we involve others by persuading them to acknowledge a com-
mon interest, to form some kind of  informal relationship, to realize 
a shared good like a conversation, and to contribute somehow to the 
valorization of  our good. 
The rhetoric of  S dictates that we use the language of  part-
nership, of  social exchange, of  reciprocity, of  social exchange, 
of  reciprocity. When we address the relationship with oth-
ers we speak of  partners, friends, contributors, donors,  
participants, members, associates, colleagues, soul mates, and com-
rades. We are part of  a team, a club, a community, or movement. 
When we articulate our actions, we contribute, participate, cooperate, 
collaborate, donate, co-create, and co-produce.  
Rhetoric
Expressions that make sense in S, the social sphere:
I would like you have this. No, I do not ask for anything in return.
I do this because I care for this community.
Let us do this together.
I really like your ideas. I want to do this and that to get it realized.
I am hungry. Can you help me?
This is my idea. What do you think?
Great idea of  yours. It could be even better if  you use this idea of  mine. 
I am willing to sacrifice my life for freedom and democracy. 
We would like to invite you to give a keynote speech at our conference… No, there is no fee.   
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contribution will remain, but certainly in the case of  larger organizations, 
governmental logic will crowd out at least some of  the social logic. (When 
people call for professionalization, they usually have concluded that S logic 
has to be limited and checked by an expansion of  G logic.) 
The social sphere is good for the generation of  shared goods of  all kinds, 
but it may fail to generate legal order, and to procure sufficient (financial) 
resources or the variety of  goods that we need. In poor areas people have 
access only to the social sphere beyond the oikos; in developed areas they have 
access also to a developed M and G. 
The social sphere is good for the propagation and reproduction of  social 
values such as the values of  community, friendship, solidarity, social cohesion, 
social inclusion, status, a sense of  belonging, and membership. 
In a negative sense the social sphere can be the sphere of  discrimination, 
exclusion, exploitation, power, nepotism, favoritism, provincialism, unprofes-
sionalism, and chaos. Accordingly, people can have plenty of  good reasons to 
take recourse to the spheres of  the market and governance. 
3) The cultural sphere
This is the all-encompassing sphere, in which all other spheres are embedded. 
I imagine it to hover above the other four spheres to suggest the vertical or 
transcendental relationships that constitute the cultural sphere. It is the sphere 
that gives meaning to the actions in the other spheres. In this sphere we all 
realize ourselves as cultural beings. 
When we go through daily life, living our oikos, interacting socially, trading 
and respecting governing structures, we may not be aware of  the cultural 
sphere. Yet when we engage with art, religion, or science, then we have to. 
Also when we change environment, by moving to another country for exam-
ple, we may discover the cultural values (as in C1, see chapter 1) that have 
influenced so much of  what we did and thought. 
It is in the cultural sphere that ideals are realized. It is there where we 
distinguish the ideals of  Goodness, Beauty, and Truth. It is where people find 
and experience faith, grace, the sacred, compassion, the Holy Grail, and 
other such transcendental goods. It is the realm of  artistic, spiritual, religious, 
and scientific practices. It is in such practices from which people derive—or 
hope to derive—meaning for their life, with which they try to make sense of  
their world. 
So when we want art, religion, or science in our life, we need to reach out 
to the practices that constitute the cultural sphere. This will involve a social 
component as we seek the company of  kindred spirits, as we do in the S, the 
social sphere. However here, the content of  such practices comes about at the 
cultural level. In a Platonic interpretation we will try to see transcendental 
ideas, ideas that are beyond what we can see directly. They are metaphysical 
Diagram 10A-4  The cultural sphere
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in the sense that we cannot grasp them or hold onto them. They are transcen-
dental because they transcend the social and the physical. 
In the cultural sphere we relate to abstract entities. Religious people will 
say that they seek contact with the divine, naturalists may try to feel one with 
nature, and artists are passionately involved with their art. We all relate some-
how to the (anthropological) culture that we are part of, or to the civilization 
that has formed us. 
The logic of  the cultural sphere may differ for each practice. What is logical 
in the arts may not be logical in science, or in religion. Each sphere’s logic 
includes rituals, norms, and rules. In a religious practice bowing one’s head 
may make sense, but in scientific and artistic practices it does not. Reading 
sacred texts—the thing to do in religious practices—is a taboo in most scien-
tific practices. 
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The cultural sphere in brief
What is it good for? 
The cultural sphere is good for the realization of  cultural values (C1), 
civilization and transcendental practices such as art, science, and reli-
gion, as well as transcendental goods such as faith, truth, beauty, and 
moral rightness. 
Relationships
In the cultural sphere we relate to ideas, to abstract entities. The rela-
tionships vary from being intense to being superficial and incidental.
Logic
Logic is that which makes sense. The sense-making process follows 
rituals, respects an idiom, and heeds norms. 
Currency
The currency comes in the form of  meanings. Meaningfulness is the 
reward and may be experienced as feeling inspired, passionate, blessed, 
humble, enlightened, uplifted, in awe, knowledgeable, or connected. 
The other side of  the coin shows a lack of  meaning, a sense of  loss, 
emptiness, shame, stupidity, or superficiality. 
Values
Positive values are curiosity, dedication, authenticity, inner freedom, 
and humility. 
Negative values are blind faith, one-sidedness, fundamentalism, obses-
sion, impracticality, and abstraction. 
Rhetoric
Each practice in the cultural sphere has its own idiom, metaphors, and 
narratives that are usually manifest in exemplary texts or works (like 
the sacred books, canonic works, the classics). The language of  econo-
mists, to take one obvious case, is dramatically different from, say, the 
language of  musicians. It takes a long period of  education and training 
to fully master the one or the other. 
Most people grow up in a cultural idiom (as in “Dutch” or “Chinese”). 
After the age of  sixteen, or thereabout, it is nearly impossible to fully 
master another cultural idiom. 
The cultural logic in the sense of  C1 follows cultural values and becomes 
noticeable in contrast with other cultural logics. While being direct is consid-
ered “logical” in a Dutch setting, doing so in Asian contexts would be seen as 
insulting, rude and uncivil. 
The currency in the cultural sphere comes in the form of  meanings. The 
reward is the experience of  meaningfulness, of  a sense of  connection with 
the ideal, of  feeling blessed, enlightened, inspired, fulfilled, uplifted, knowl-
edgeable, or spiritual; punishment comes with a lack of  meaning, confusion, 
feeling stupid, feeling lost, empty, superficial, sinful, and the like. 
The cultural sphere provides content, or least the resources that enable us to 
realize content in whatever we do. That is why the notion of  civilization (C2) 
is important for us. Civilization stands for the great variety of  resources that 
enable us culturally, or to realize cultural values. It provides us with a sense of  
history, a narrative that makes the present meaningful. It constitutes civility as 
the outcome of  a long evolutionary process.
As soon as these three spheres are spelled out, it should become obvious 
how pervasive they are, how much they are a part of  our daily lives. Not only 
our oikos that we know best, but also the social sphere is so present that we 
are left wondering why it is left out of  legal and “economic” practices. I hope 
it has also become clear why it helps to distinguish the cultural sphere sepa-
rately, certainly when trying to make sense of  artistic, religious, and scientific 
practices. 
We now turn to the spheres that figure so pervasively in the instrumentalist 
approach, that is, the spheres of  the market and governance. 
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CHAPTER 10 B
THE MARKET AND GOVERNMENTAL 
SPHERES, AND THE SPILLOVERS, 
OVERLAPS AMONG THE FIVE SPHERES 
For the valorization of  the important values and goods, the oikos and the social 
and cultural spheres are most relevant. Social as people are, they will forever 
seek out social situations in order to partake in shared goods. It is in our 
nature, Adam Smith would suggest, that we emphasize with others and seek 
their attention when we are in need of  their good will. At least that is what 
he stresses in The Theory of  Moral Sentiments, his first major work (Smith, 1759).
Adam Smith is, of  course, also the moral philosopher who got us to imag-
ine the market. Achieving this at the end of  the 18th century, he earned the 
title “father of  modern economics.” In The Wealth of  Nations he led us to imag-
ine the market as follows. First he observes that 
“[man] has not time, however, to [get the attention and the good will of  
others] upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times 
in need of  the cooperation and assistance of  great multitudes, while his 
whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of  a few persons.” 
Notice the reference to the social sphere and the suggestion that the social 
dimension comes first and has our preference. However, the social dimension 
does not suffice. Therefore, he continues, 
“he will be more likely to prevail if  he can interest their self-love in his 
favor, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what 
he requires of  them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of  any kind, 
proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have what 
you want, is the meaning of  every such offer; and it is in this manner that 
we obtain from one another the far greater part of  those good offices 
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which we stand in need of.”
He follows with the most often cited sentence in the economic literature: 
“It is not from the benevolence of  the butcher, the brewer, or the baker 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” 
All these citations are from Adam Smith, The Wealth of  Nations, Book I, 
chapter II (Smith, 1776). The Wealth of  Nations came out in the year that the 
US declared its independence.
 I refer to Adam Smith because he puts the sphere of  the market in its place, 
that is, not as some sort of  ideal arrangement, and not as the dominant logic 
but as necessary when the social sphere falls short for the realization of  goods. 
Where Aristotle still idealized the oikos as sole provider of  food, shelter and all 
kinds of  other goods, and Smith concurs by acknowledging the importance 
of  social relations, Smith acknowledges that modern life calls for a sphere of  
the market. Accordingly, the claim that Smith puts the market on the central 
stage is unwarranted. 
Accordingly, following Smith we should now put the market first, and pri-
oritize it over any other sphere. It is what economists like Ludwig von Mises, 
Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman instruct people to do. It is what con-
ventional wisdom dictates. It is what politicians and journalists usually do. 
But is it right to continue now with market? I do not think so. I, however, will 
continue our exploration of  the various options for the valorization of  value 
with the sphere of  the government. 
4) The sphere of  governance  
The reason to begin with the governmental sphere is simply the realization 
that in our daily activities we have more dealings with the sphere of  gover-
nance than with the market. We work for organizations, we run organizations, 
we deal with organizations, we are member of  social organizations like clubs 
and political parties, and we are subjects of  governmental organizations that 
make us pay taxes, pay out benefits and subsidies and that employ quite a few 
of  us, including myself. Sure, we enter a few exchanges every now and then, 
but most of  our interactions are with organizations of  all kinds. Apparently 
we are in great need of  using the sphere of  organizations, of  governance, that 
is, for the valorization of  our values. So we better be aware of  what organiza-
tions are good for, of  their logic, their values and of  the way they make us talk 
and think. Dealing well with organizations is an inevitable aspect of  doing the 
right thing. 
Note that the sphere of  governance comprises all types of  organizations, 
not just the government. The following elaboration should make clear why 
that is. 
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What for?
First the what-question: what are organizations good for? Alternatively put, 
why would you deal with an organization? The reason is that organizations 
serve a purpose of  some kind. The local grocery store aims to sell the grocer-
ies you and I need, which is a sufficient reason to frequent it. The organization 
of  Facebook makes it possible to share our news with “friends.” The multina-
tional law firm provides very expensive legal advice that we may need when 
we happen to work in a large firm with serious legal issues. In short, private 
organizations deliver the private goods that we need or want (mind you, as 
instruments or inputs to realize the really important goods).  
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Types of  organizations
Governmental organizations serve a public or societal purpose; 
their actions aim to improve the qualities of  life  in S and O and for 
that purpose regulate transactions in M and organizations in G. They 
procure collective goods.
Commercial organizations focus on M; they supply (private) com-
modities to anyone who is willing to pay the price. Their purpose is 
instrumental in the sense that they seek maximal financial gain for 
work, great products, and social returns).
Social organizations aim to realize social or societal goods for their 
stakeholders. They include the so-called non-profits and NGOs (non-
governmental organizations). Sport clubs, societies, foundations, aid 
organizations, universities are all social organizations. They rely on the 
willingness to contribute by the stakeholders.
Cultural organizations aim to realize cultural or artistic goods for 
their stakeholders. Think of  theatres, museums, pop bands, dance 
groups, orchestras, design firms, and architectural bureaus. Stakeholders 
need to be willing to contribute to realize their goal values. 
 
Social and cultural organizations are good for social and cultural goods. A 
school wants to provide education, which is good to realize when you are a kid 
in need of  an education. The theatre performs art or delivers entertainment. 
An architectural bureau produces architectural designs for the building you 
may need. Amnesty International enables you to support human rights and 
Greenpeace, a sustainable environment. 
Governments are good for the provision of  collective goods. A national 
government provides, hopefully, safety, social security, laws, schools, and a 
great deal more. Local governments provide welfare to people with little to 
no income, maintain the sewage system, and collect garbage. The United 
Nations stand for world peace and collaboration of  national governments on 
international issues. 
Most organizations are also good for jobs. People seeking challenging 
jobs greatly benefit from organizations such as universities that can give them 
the necessary credentials and other organizations that provide a challenging 
work environment. Organizations are employers or, as the Dutch word accu-
rately describes them, “werkgevers” (work-providers). Whether it is the local 
grocery store, the school, the theatre, the multinational law firm, the national 
government, Greenpeace, or the United Nations, they all provide work and, 
with that, income. Consequently, organizations are instrumental for the 
generation of  financial means, and hopefully for meaningful work as well. 
When you want to realize a particular good, such as a performance, or a 
consulting advice, or a new type of  car, you will most likely need an organiza-
tion and will have to deal with other organizations. When you want to make a 
career, you probably do so by way of  an organization. When you want to fight 
for human rights, animal rights, or a crime-free neighborhood, you can either 
make use of  an existing organization or set up your own. 
Is it possible to valorize goods without the mediation of  organizations 
altogether? I doubt it. 
How and why?
Organizations are an answer to the how-question. When I am seeking rad-
ical reform in academic education, as I actually do, I can work within existing 
academic institutions or, when I decide that those institutions do not really 
work for that purpose, I can found an entirely new institution, as I actually 
tried. When setting up an organization or working within organizations, we 
operate in G. 
Therefore, the sphere of  governance can provide the means—a strat-
egy—for people to realize what is important to them. When someone wants 
to become a ballet dancer, she will first go to one organization—a school—
and then try to join another organization—a ballet company. When you value 
the environment and nature, and want to valorize those values, you can set 
up your own organization, join the World Wide Fund for Nature, or become 
a politician to attempt to steer governmental organizations in the right direc-
tion. You face similar choices when you want to make true on your personal 
ambitions concerning your career, or on your societal or transcendental val-
ues. Whether you join a society for artists, a church, or a temple, you become 
part of  an organization. Most of  us will be in need of  one organization or 
another. Working with or working for an organization or setting up your own 
organization is part of  your design, or your strategy. 
Why do people organize? Members of  tribes organized all kinds of  things but 
they did not work with or for organizations in the formal sense or for the type 
of  organizations that fit in G. They worked in S, using S logic. Governmental 
organizations were needed when taxes had to be collected and armies had 
to be formed. Bureaucracies came about, with clearly defined hierarchies; 
within them rules dictated actions, and actions were accounted for. In the 
Middle Ages workers organized themselves in guilds in order to limit competi-
tion among each other and with outsiders. The church is a deliberate attempt 
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to organize religious practices. The Roman Catholic Church is called the first 
multinational dealing in real estate, setting up franchises first in Europe and 
then all over the world, developing a bank and running all kinds of  “busi-
nesses” providing not only services such as religious performances, festivals, 
concerts, confessions, and absolutions, but also goods like beer. 
Business organizations as we know them now only came about in the 
19th century (Chandler, 1977).  The first modern organizations were railway 
companies. They were necessary to coordinate complex logistics and coordi-
nate itineraries that covered long distances and different time zones. For the 
sake of  efficiency, specialization was in order and a clear hierarchy became 
necessary. Later it became clear that a similar organization also worked well 
for the production of  cars, steel, electricity, and more of  such commodities. 
Nowadays, the need for such large organizations is called into question 
as new technology makes small-scale production efficient again and more and 
more people prefer to be autonomous in their work. So maybe organizations 
will become smaller. In the Netherlands, an increasing number of  people are 
self-employed. They mostly work for organizations on a freelance basis. In the 
Netherlands, 9,500 care workers have organized themselves into small teams; 
the central office has only 34 staff members. Organizations do change.  
The size of  governmental organizations continues to be a subject of  dis-
pute, too. Free market economists advocate minimization of  such organiza-
tions, whereas socialists consider big governmental organizations to be the 
only way to secure all kinds of  societal goods. However, even in times when 
cuts in government spending rule the political agenda, governmental organi-
zations maintain their dominant presence in most countries. 
Relationships in G
The shapes, sizes, and appearances of  organizations vary enormously. They 
are usually housed in buildings, small or large, and often have a logo. Other 
than that, they are mainly abstract. They are formal entities with a legal sta-
tus, represented in legal documents. We relate to organizations in a formal 
way. Of  course, people associated with organizations will address us and 
interact with us when we seek employment or work in a governmental orga-
nization, but they do so in their formal capacity, as part of  the organization. 
(When they use small talk and address us in a personal manner, they apply 
social logic, not governmental logic; there is a great deal of  that in everyday 
life in organizations.) My relationship to the university comes in the form of  
a contract, the description of  my function, and a series of  rules and regula-
tions that articulate the constraints for my actions and interactions within the 
organization. (When a colleague once remarked that the university does not 
appreciate him, I asked him what he expects: does he really think that the 
university buildings will bow when he passes by?)
I combine governmental and private organizations in the same category. 
Their legal status is different, of  course, and they differ in many other ways, 
as we will see. Nevertheless, all organizations have in common that they are 
instrumental and formal, implying that our relationships with them are also 
formal. The government, too, is abstract to its subjects. It presents itself  most 
directly in the form of  envelopes that contain information about the amount 
of  taxes owed, and through offices, windows, forms, and websites where we 
learn about our rights, programs, procedures, and so forth. People working 
for a governmental organization are civil servants with well-defined functions 
and explicit contracts. 
The formal character of  internal relationships is expressed in the hierar-
chal structures of  most organizations with formalized lines of  authority and 
concomitant titles (CEO, CFO, director, president, vice president, depart-
ment head, supervisor, team leader, account manager, secretary general, proj-
ect manager, and so on). 
Although most social and cultural organizations have formalized posi-
tions and functions (with artistic leaders, directors, supervisors, board mem-
bers, chair people, and team leaders), their formal character will often be less 
pronounced because a) they tend to be small and b) their social or cultural 
objectives require plenty of  social interaction. Recall art is a collaborative 
activity and therefore does not suffer a formal embeddedness in formal struc-
tures easily.
An interesting issue is the ownership of  organizations. I already estab-
lished that universities do not approve or disapprove of  the work of  its peo-
ple. But to whom does the university belong? Who are the owners? In the 
Netherlands, the government could be named the owner. Yet what does that 
mean? Who is the government? The same question arises for cultural orga-
nizations. When a group of  people starts a theatre company, the company 
is clearly theirs. They would feel so and others will recognize them as such, 
regardless of  the formal status of  the company. But to whom does the com-
pany belong after they have left? It is hard to say, especially when the company 
is set up as a foundation with a board of  trustees. When a single individual 
sets up and runs a company it is clearly his, or hers. The same can be said for 
the family that takes it over. When the company issues shares, the owners of  
the shares are called the owners. But what does that mean? Most of  those will 
never have set foot in the company, don’t know anything of  its daily affairs 
and don’t really care as long as the company pays sufficient dividend. In a 
formal sense ownership can be merely legal; it is determined by the rules and 
the contracts. 
In a value based approach, the emphasis is on contributions: people 
who contribute to an organization will experience a sense of  ownership. The 
company becomes theirs and will continue to be so as long as they continue 
contributing. Such a kind of  ownership could be called social or moral, in 
contrast to formal ownership. 
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Governmental organizations are collectively owned. In princi-
ple, governments belong to all citizens. Everyone contributes by paying 
taxes and everyone stands to benefit from the goods and services that 
the government provides, although some may do so more than others. 
When dealing with the government, you are dealing with the collective. 
When you receive subsidy from the government, you receive it from 
the collective, and when you are working for the government, you do 
so for the collective. 
Social and cultural organizations belong to the people par-
ticipating in them. Ownership here is usually not legal, but social 
or cultural instead (see chapter 8). You need to contribute somehow 
in order to benefit from their goods. You need to be a member of  the 
church, or take part in its services in order to realize its religious and 
social values. The same applies to a dance company or a soccer club. 
Commercial organizations belong to its shareholders. These 
can be families in case of  family businesses, partners in case of  a part-
nership, or anyone willing to pay the price for a share in case of  joint 
stock companies. When dealing with such an organization, you are an 
instrument for the aim of  the organization, which is in principle maxi-
mal financial gain for the shareholders. (I continue to stress that this is 
not an end in itself; for the shareholders the gain is an instrument to 
realize goods that are really important to them.)  Even so, employees, 
and especially the managers among them, may say that the organiza-
tion is theirs. Such a feeling is understandable since they contribute a 
great deal to the furthering of  the organization. Formally, they are not 
the owners. That is why democratic procedures in business or govern-
mental organizations may make sense. 
The issue of  ownership may be important to people. Some people pre-
fer to work for the common good; they will do better working for or 
with governmental or political organizations. Others seek firstly finan-
cial gain (in order to realize with such the goods that are important 
to them); they will opt to work for commercial organizations. Then 
there are those people who consider social or cultural goods to be most 
important. They will do better working for and with social or cultural 
organizations.
The subsequent listing clarifies the different types of  ownership. 
Types of  ownership
Logic
When considering the logic of  organizations, we should be aware of  the 
bounded nature of  organizations. In this sense they clearly differ from social 
communities that usually have diffused boundaries with potential for disputes 
about who belongs and who does not. It is a critical characteristic of  organi-
zations that they clearly mark their boundaries so that you know when you are 
inside or outside of  them. 
Commercial organizations, for example, let you apply if  you want to be 
inside.  Some have security guards who will check your company pass before 
you enter and escort you out when you get fired. With money, you can buy 
yourself  in by purchasing its shares. Buy lots of  shares and you may even have 
a voice inside the company. 
National governments guard the national boundaries. They decide which 
people are “legal” and which are not. Legal people are the citizens who have 
to pay taxes, can vote and benefit from its programs. The Dutch government 
will do all kinds of  things for me that the Belgian government will not even 
consider. I am a Dutch citizen; in Belgium I would be an outsider, a non-cit-
izen. If  a Dutch citizen were to marry an African or Asian citizen—a social 
arrangement—he or she cannot be sure that the partner will become legal, 
that is, recognized by the Dutch government as its citizen. Furthermore, gov-
ernments select their civil servants and also may have guards at their entrance. 
Social organizations may require membership to determine who is in 
and who is out and cultural organizations are usually highly selective before 
they allow someone to dance, play, or perform with them. 
All organizations share these formal practices; you could also say that 
these formal practices define the organizations. They have meetings, keep 
records of  those (in the form of  minutes), follow procedures for decision 
making, have protocols, standards, and account for activities and financial 
flows. These practices determine the logic of  organizations. The logic is that 
of  bureaucracies, as sociologist Max Weber was one of  the first to observe. 
Anyone working in an organization has a better knowledge and understand-
ing of  that logic, lest it make their functioning impossible (Weber, 1968). 
Administrative or bureaucratic logic is the logic of  control, of  structure, 
or predictability. Organizations impose structure and provide means of  con-
trol by working with reports, for example, and accounting systems. It makes 
tasks and functions explicit and usually employs a system of  hierarchy. 
It is G logic that tightens rules and changes procedures in case of  trouble. 
It is G logic that appeals to the judgment of  superiors in case of  doubt. 
It is also logical within G to seek the expansion of  its influence and scope, 
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and to increase control of  the organization. That is why organizations seek 
to merge with other, competing, organizations, or—as in the case of  govern-
mental organizations—aspire to centralize or cooperate, or form suprana-
tional institutions (the European Union!).
Administrative or managerial logic is objectifying since it follows clearly 
formulated criteria, or well-specified rules with clear terms and well-defined 
measures in the event of  trespassing or violation. For such logic the quantifica-
tion of  activities works best. It helps to know what criteria an employee has to 
meet in order to qualify for a raise in salary. In principle, such logic rules out 
arbitrariness, personal preferences, prejudices, discrimination, and other such 
social factors. Ideally, organizational logic renders judgment unnecessary. 
 You learn the logic of  governance at business schools and schools of  
public administration. They teach you the planning, strategic management, 
human resources, financing, accounting, procedures, protocols, mergers, and 
so forth. 
The logic of  governmental organizations is similar in principle to the 
logic of  commercial or social organizations. They share the penchant for 
quantification, for objectification, and for clarity in responsibilities and hier-
archies. They all need to have specified who has the position to decide what, 
who supervises whom. 
Values
Organizations enable the valorization of  values by means of  the goods that 
they generate. These goods include jobs, work, career, status, and influence. 
In addition, they are vehicles for the realization of  behavioral values by virtue 
of  their logic. When people want a fast-paced life, with ample challenges, big 
projects, lots of  travel, power, and status, they would do best to work with and 
for large international organizations. 
But when you value working with only a few people, with lots of  personal 
attention, relaxing lunches, and the feeling of  a home, then small social or 
cultural organizations are the better option. As a scholar I have found the 
greatest satisfaction in relatively small academic institutions with lots of  social 
interaction and little to no interference from the formal organization. 
 In order to be a good civil servant, you need to be able to appreciate the 
bureaucratic process, procedures, and due diligence and work on behalf  of  
the politician you serve.  
All organizations stand for some kind of  order or structure, have proce-
dures for the decisions to be taken, and for the valuation of  the performances 
of  its employees. (Many organizations adopt behavioral values like loyalty, 
team spirit, quality-driven, courageous, and creative. They come about in 
a social sphere and require a social logic, and are hence in principle not 
valorized by the logic of  G. As I will elaborate below, logic spills over into 
other spheres. In this exercise, it is important to clearly separate the spheres 
and see them for what they are in their own context.) 
Commercial organizations are result oriented, but so are governmental 
organizations, at least in some cultural contexts. They are about efficiency—
an important value—and about economies of  scale, influence, and power in 
the market place. Governmental, social, and cultural organizations may be 
rather about effectiveness in the sense of  their power to realize their collective, 
social, and cultural goals. 
Organizations may want to be valued as innovative, entrepreneurial, reli-
able, and as good employers.   
Negative values of  organizations become especially clear from the per-
spective of  other spheres. From the perspective of  the sphere of  the market, 
governmental organizations seem inefficient and bureaucratic, excelling in 
red tape and being risk averse and overly controlling. From the viewpoint of  
the social sphere, governmental organizations evoke Kafkian nightmares of  
people caught in complex procedures, powerless in the face of  inadequate 
rules, and unwilling civil servants. 
Commercial organizations may be valued as unfair, inhuman, anti-social, 
ruthless, power mongering, money-driven, bureaucratic, dictatorial, exploit-
ative, authoritarian, selfish, and so on. 
Social and cultural organizations may seem naïve, inefficient, ineffective, 
unprofessional, and addicted to subsidies. 
Virtually all organizations have the inclination to value their own con-
tinuations. That is why sustainability of  their business is often an important 
shared value, sometimes valued even over and above profit. 
The rhetoric of  G
Organizations make people talk and think in certain ways. In the social sphere 
and at home, people will not ask to fill in forms and reject applications because 
of  missing or wrong information. In organizations a superior can admonish, 
order, instruct, praise, and penalize subordinates in ways that would be illog-
ical in any other sphere. 
When people tell of  a cultural organization needing to become more pro-
fessional, they mean to say that it needs to strengthen its organizational logic 
and adopt the values that come with it. Professional logic is about “stream-
lining” the organization, “delegating tasks,” “outsourcing tasks,” “restruc-
turing,” “coordinating activities,” “improving communication,” “reviewing 
standards,” “results,” “efficiency,” “specialization,” and so on. 
It is G rhetoric that evokes rules and regulations when you want to 
get your way, to justify your actions on the basis of  the same, to call for a 
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committee when disagreement stands in the way of  a decision, or to call in 
the handsomely-paid consultants for their advice. 
In commercial organizations an appeal to the profit motive will be per-
suasive in internal meetings; people working for governmental organizations 
may appeal to results that had been stipulated or find positive response by 
mentioning the common good. 
Each organization tends to have its own rhetoric that you have to make 
your own when you want to work with or for it. It is part of  their culture, the S 
logic at work in an organization. People cannot work with the G alone. They 
will be inclined to embed the formal G logic in a social logic, personalizing 
formal relationships, generating social talk, like gossip, to maintain their san-
ity. Accordingly, social logic spills over into the G sphere. 
The Governmental sphere in brief
What are organizations good for?
Organizations are good for all kinds of  things. We participate in and 
deal with organizations to earn an income, to produce goods of  all 
kinds, varying from commodities to ideals. 
Governments are good for the realization of  public or societal values 
such as justice, security, education, health care, public infrastructure, 
public transport, and so on.
Relationships
The relationships in G are formal and abstract. People relate to organi-
zations by way of  contracts, rules and procedures. Within organizations 
social relationships rule and social logic do not apply—in principle, that 
is. In reality the social logic operates in organizations as well in the form 
of, for example, collegiality, the abuse of  power, personal preferences 
and trust.
Logic 
The logic of  G is formal. It is the logic of  bureaucracy, management, and 
law. It is the logic of  procedures, protocols, meetings, hierarchies, budg-
ets, (business) plans, strategies, accounting, results, and departments. 
The logic of  commercial G is that of  profit generation; governmental 
organizations will stress the logic of  the right procedure and respect for 
the rules. 
5) The Sphere of  the Market
It seems weird to end an economics book with the sphere of  the markets. 
However, as I pointed out above, the market is less omnipresent, less pervasive 
in our lives than standard economic accounts lead us to believe. 
The sphere of  the market is the sphere of  transactions, of  exchanges 
between suppliers and buyers of  commodities. In the phrase of  Adam Smith: 
“Whoever offers to another a bargain of  any kind, proposes to do this. 
Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the 
meaning of  every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from 
one another the far greater part of  those good offices which we stand in 
need of.” (Smith, 1759)
In the market we offer our wares to others, and we look for wares that others 
have to offer. If  what we offer the other is to his or her liking we enter into an 
exchange: the ware in exchange for something of  equal value. The trick is to 
determine the equivalent, which is usually an amount of  money, or its price. 
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Values
Positive values or qualities of  G can be control, structure, objectiv-
ity, formality, legality, rationality, hierarchy, power, efficiency, or 
predictability. 
Negative values or qualities of  G can be bureaucracy, inhuman pres-
ence, anonymity, formality, abstraction, hierarchy, power, abuse, exploi-
tation, or in conflict with personal values.
Rhetoric
The rhetoric of  G is organizational, administrative, bureaucratic, and 
procedural. 
“Please fill in this form, and we will get back to you.” 
“Why? Because I am your superior and I have made my decision.” 
“Since you met the additional criteria, we will place you in scale 10. 
Your salary from September onwards will be $8,765. If  you wish to 
object to this decision, please do so with form …” 
“So, let the minutes say that we have decided to start a new program 
for innovations. I’ll have the human resource department draw up a 
text for the advertisement to recruit an innovation manager.” 
Note that these sentences would be illogical in the spheres of  the mar-
ket, society, and culture. They would not make sense in the sphere of  
the market either. 
206 DOING THE RIGHT THING: A VALUE BASED ECONOMY
What is the market good for—and what not?
The market sphere has proven to be instrumental for the generation of  the 
welfare that people have experienced in the developed world. Because of  it 
people can specialize in one thing and become highly-productive in doing 
so—say in the production of  computer chips. Through a series of  exchanges, 
they procure a wide variety of  other goods made by other specialized people 
spread all over the world.  
It is also in markets that we offer our skills and efforts, that is, our labor in 
exchange for a wage, salary, a share in the profits, or gratitude (in case of  some 
social and cultural organizations). That wage in turn enables us to purchase 
commodities, sooner or later. 
As we have discussed earlier, markets cannot realize the social, societal, 
personal, and cultural or transcendental goods that are ultimately important 
to us. We do not buy friendships, trust, solidarity, faith, beauty, knowledge, 
skill, or wisdom on a market. But we can buy food, beer, access to education 
and museums, books, clothes, therapy sessions, and so many more goods and 
services that are instrumental to the really important goods. The market is 
good for instrumental acquisitions. 
The market, therefore, is not only good for the procurement of  a wide 
variety of  goods, tangible and intangible, it also enables us to generate the 
means for buying those goods by selling our labor time, by applying our skills 
to serve others in exchange for a monetary amount. Yet the market is impo-
tent in the valorization of  shared goods. 
Market as an answer to the how-question
When you want to valorize, say a theatre play, or an idea, an artwork, a pair 
of  shoes you made, or a house you built, the market is an option next to the 
other spheres. To do it well, you may need to know certain things or certain 
people, such as what price to charge and how to get others willing to pay your 
asking price, but it is certainly worth a shot. The nice part of  the valorization 
in the market is that you get an amount of  money that directly enables you to 
buy the commodities you need. 
Markets are intricate and complex things. Unlike organizations, you usu-
ally do not see them right away, unless you go to the local farmer’s market or 
an old-fashioned stock market. In the latter cases you can watch a bunch of  
people buying and selling.  It is more difficult to imagine a market when you 
stand by yourself  at a cash register to pay the price, or when you place your 
order at a web shop and transfer an amount of  money. No wheeling and deal-
ing there. In most cases, the presence of  a market calls for some imagination. 
When you are putting your house up for sale, you can imagine other people 
doing the same and, again, other people sitting at home wondering whether 
they are going to view your house and, who knows, place a bid. 
As advocates of  markets will tell you, markets are world wonders, miracles 
if  you wish. It is indeed a miracle how something like a pencil—the favorite 
example of  the late Milton Friedman—costs only a small amount of  money, 
yet is made of  materials that come from all over the world. It is a miracle, if  
you think about it, that if  you crave a mango or a Porsche, you can get them 
right away, at least if  you are able and willing to pay their price. It is amazing 
that such huge numbers of  commodities, produced by so many organiza-
tions and individuals, find their way to so many customers in a more or less 
smooth manner. Yes, markets do crash; yes, commodities remain unsold; and 
yes, too many people do not have the means to buy even minimal amounts of  
commodities. Overall markets work, though. We travel around the world and 
there they are, the Starbucks, the clean water, a pretty clean bed, and food and 
all for a reasonable, if  not dirt-cheap, price. 
Since the magic of  markets has done its work, say, during the last few 
hundred years, the number of  commodities exchanged has increased dra-
matically and the material welfare of  most people has increased tenfold, if  
not twentyfold. Sure, markets have a dark side, too, as I will illuminate below. 
Relationships
In the formal market sphere there are no relationships. In the textbook ver-
sion (just look at any economics textbook) all that is required are products, 
prices, individual parties offering the products, and individual parties willing 
to pay the price. There is no need for relationships. The price is the only 
information that counts, at least in principle. Once the price is paid and the 
product handed over, the account between both parties is settled. And that is 
that. There is nothing hanging in the air, no obligation, no counter gift to be 
considered, no unfinished business. There is simply no relationship with the 
other. (The standard economic approach, therefore,abstracts from relation-
ships; in economic models there are no relationships among people.)  You 
experience the formal market clearly when you make a purchase in a web 
shop. You click to put your desired item in the basket, go to the payment page, 
transfer the price with a few more clicks, and then wait for the delivery of  the 
item. In all this, the other party, the supplier, remains perfectly anonymous. 
In reality, market parties often develop and maintain a relationship. 
Financial traders exchange jokes as well as large sums of  money, and go out 
for beer together. People about to make a deal may have lunch together and 
exchange niceties. I have friendly chats with the owner of  the shop where 
I buy my groceries. Like in the governmental sphere, market logic is easily 
mixed with social logic.
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Market logic
The logic of  the market sphere is the logic of  exchange. This logic consists of  
the following four characteristics: 
1. There has to be a product. There has to be a good that can be offered 
for a sale. That is clear for a loaf  of  bread, but you have to realize 
that your creativity could be a product, too, that you can offer to 
someone else. (Question: What is the product that a museum can 
sell? Answer: It sells access for the price of  its entrance ticket and it 
offers usage of  its name for the price of  a sponsorship.)
2. There has to be property right for the product. The selling party has 
to be able to claim property right for the product that is for sale. The 
exchange transfers the property right, as in the case of  the loaf  of  
bread, or gives the other right of  usage for a certain time, as in the 
case of  your creativity. Intellectual property rights transform intangi-
ble goods such as music, ideas, and designs into products that can be 
sold and bought, bestowing rights on intangible products
3. There has to be a price. In the logic of  the market, the (exchange) 
value of  the commodity is its price. Price is the value in exchange. 
The price indicates what the seller is asking in order to transfer the 
property right of  a good to someone else without causing upset or dis-
appointment. When the buyer is willing to pay the price, we can infer 
that he or she is valuing the good for at least that amount. (Should 
she have been willing to pay a higher price, then she is lucky; econ-
omists refer to this as her surplus, the consumer surplus.) The price 
that buyers would be willing to pay is also called their reservation 
price. When a visitor to the studio of  an artist gets all excited about 
a painting and asks for the price, he or she may already have a price 
in mind that they are willing to pay. This is their reservation price. So 
when the artist names a price lower than the reservation price, they 
will be pleasantly surprised. Or they will be disappointed when the 
price is higher than the reservation price. 
4. There must be a transaction. In the end the market is all about trans-
actions, about goods changing hands, about paying and receiving the 
price, about turnover, and about profits and losses. Displaying your 
art in a gallery may give you pleasure, but the point of  doing so is to 
sell them, to record transactions, to make a turnover. The transaction 
is the result of  the market logic, its outcome. 
Let me reiterate a point about prices that I made earlier in chapter 5. There I 
argued that--contrary to what most economic textbooks suggest--price is not 
a value. Neither is the amount of  money that a price refers to. When we pay 
a sum of  money, the price for a commodity, we forego other commodities that 
we could have purchased for that amount. It is not the money that counts but 
the commodities for which that amount stands. Likewise, when we are selling 
something for an amount of  money, we receive the means to acquire other 
commodities that we want or need to realize what is important to us. It is not 
the monetary amount or the price that we should focus on, but the commodi-
ties that the amount represents to us. The price of  a transaction is thus, strictly 
speaking, either an opportunity cost (that what we give up), or a suspended 
purchase. Accordingly, the market is good for the acquisition and appropria-
tion of  commodities, goods and services that we need as instruments 
It is logical, therefore, to name something of  value a product or commod-
ity, to call its price, and to be willing to hand it over with its property right to 
anyone willing to pay the price. In many circumstances such a logic would 
fail to make sense, like when a man would walk up to me and tell me that he 
is willing to pay a large amount for my kid or wife. A student may consider 
going to the professor to offer a price for a good grade, but that usually would 
not be logical, at least not in a standard university. It is in the illogical propo-
sitions that you will understand best what the logic of  the market amounts to. 
Market rhetoric
In the market sphere people speak of  “deals”, of  “prices”, and of  “sellers and 
buyers”.  In the market people become “customers”, workers for a company 
may tell each other “the customer is king” (as long as he pays the right price, 
of  course). In the market it makes sense to say to someone else: “Hey, you got 
something I want; here is something you want. Deal?” In the market you can 
use the rhetoric of  haggling (“Oh no, that’s too much. For half  the price I will 
buy it.”) In the market you can say things like “I don’t care what you need or 
what you think, this is my price: take it or leave it.” When you badly want a 
work of  art and someone else bids more for it than you can pay, you can say 
that it is unfair. Well, you can say it, but it’s not in accordance with the market 
logic. 
Market rhetoric allows people to fire other people with the argument 
that the market conditions make this necessary. Markets are “up” or “down”, 
markets are “stable” or “volatile”. When you work in the market sphere you 
will quickly have to learn the appropriate rhetoric. 
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The market in brief
The market is good for commodities, tangible and intangible goods and 
services that we need in order to realize our values. 
The market does not deliver shared good and ultimate goods, like a 
good family, knowledge, art, or enlightenment. They usually are not 
good for the realization of  collective goods.
Relationships
Interactions in the market place are instrumental and do not require 
relationships, at least not in principle. 
Logic
It is the logic of  exchange that counts in the market sphere. It is a logic 
that requires the transformation of  goods into commodities, the pric-
ing of  such a commodity, a willingness to sell, a willingness to pay, and 
an agreement between the seller and the buyer to implement the deal. 
Market logic stipulates that in the deal the seller transforms the owner-
ship of  the commodity to the buyer, or gives the right of  usage. 
Using guns or any other form of  violence would be illogical, and so 
would the refusal of  handing over the commodity after the deal is 
made. Giving away stuff would be illogical, too, at least in the sphere 
of  the market. Asking to sell certain goods, like an organ, a spouse, a 
child, or one’s life would be illogical in most contemporary cultures. 
Values
Positive values or qualities come about when markets are efficient, 
stimulate innovativeness and entrepreneurship, and are instrumental 
for the realization of  material welfare. Markets are a sign of  civiliza-
tion as they enable strangers to interact civilly with mutual benefit as 
the result. 
Negative values or qualities that may be associated with markets are 
unfairness, injustice, commercialism, greed, transaction fixation, 
monopoly power, exploitation, anonymity, the violation of  human val-
ues, being unnatural, alienation and threat to the environment.
An illustration: valorizing theatre 
Say you want to stage a play. To valorize your dream you first need to make 
it real in the social and cultural spheres. In the latter you develop your knowl-
edge about what theatre is and particular plays and learn about their mean-
ings and artistic values. Usually you valorize the idea in the cultural sphere 
along with the social sphere by attending a school for drama and socializing 
with like-minded people. You may decide to realize your dream with some 
others who share your ambition. So let’s imagine you and your comrades are 
ready to go. What to do? 
If  you are in a northern-European country you are likely to automati-
cally seek out the government. You will look up the criteria for a subsidy or 
grant, what forms to fill in. You will find yourself  making an elaborate plan 
with a detailed budget because that is usually one of  the conditions. You will 
consult an accountant to get the accounting right and seek contact with the 
Rhetoric
The rhetoric of  markets includes expressions such as the following:
“Can I have an ounce of  beef  please?” “Sure.” […]  “Thanks.”  “That will be 3 
dollar fifty five, please.”  “Here it is.” “Thanks, have a good day.”
“I offer you 1,000 euro for that boat of  yours.” “But I paid double that amount 
for it. For 1,700 euro you can get it.” “Look at what shape it is. 1,400 is my final 
offer.” “Okay, because you are such a nice guy.” 
“I am selling the firm.”  “But what about us? What’s going to happen to us? All 
that we’ve done for you all those years, doesn’t it mean anything to you?” “I am 
sorry. It is a bad time and I got a good bid. I also have to think about myself  and 
my family.” 
“I am hungry and desperate for some food.” “Can you pay for it?  If  not, I am sorry 
but I can’t afford giving you any. This is not a charity.” 
“What is your price?” 
“Let’s make a deal.” 
Try using any of  these expressions in the other spheres and you will 
notice that they no longer make sense—unless they are meant as a joke. 
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relevant civil servants and politicians. On this path, you are being pulled into 
the sphere of  governance. 
Suppose you are denied the subsidy on the grounds of  inexperience, or 
dubious artistic quality. You and your comrades will probably be upset and 
may even get angry at the procedures and at the committee that issued a neg-
ative advice. What’s next? 
You basically have three options left. You can exploit the sphere of  the 
oikos by agreeing to forsake any income from the play, ask your spouses to 
finance your adventure, or get a job on the side yourself. 
You can also choose to be creative in the sphere of  the market. The prob-
lem here is that you need to find people willing to pay for your play. Will busi-
nesses be willing to sponsor you? It is doubtful, since you do not have much 
of  a name or reputation yet. Another possibility would be a crowd funding 
campaign, but crowd funding is not an exchange really, unless you succeed in 
determining clear terms of  a trade. An interesting option is the issuance of  
shares that pay out when the play is selling well. For that is what you are going 
to do: stage the play, find a venue, and charge a price for the tickets. 
Your best options are in the social sphere. Here you appeal to the willing-
ness to contribute, to money given with a warm hand. You can activate your 
social network and approach family members to get support. You may run 
into people who have a weakness for young talent, who would have liked to 
do what you are doing but did not dare to, and would like for you and your 
comrades to succeed. Offer them a share in your enterprise, a loan maybe, or 
ask them to connect you with others who may want to do such a thing. See, 
now you are working the social logic, building relationships, interacting with 
people, and figuring out what will entice them and what you will have to do in 
return. You are not going to pay back the same amount, mind you, for that is 
not part of  the social logic. No, you will see how you can do the other a favor, 
for example by inviting your benefactor to opening night, to be interested in 
his or her story. Maybe the other will be sufficiently pleased that you guys end 
up performing your play. 
I suspect that in the end the social sphere is best when the valorization con-
cerns shared goods, like a theatre play. It is in that sphere, therefore, that 
churches get realized. Scientists valorize their ideas in the cultural and social 
sphere but depend on governmental logic for their financial income. They do 
pay a price for that, though. 
Spillovers and crossovers
The preceding characterizations are idealizations. They highlight the char-
acteristics that are most pronounced for each sphere. In reality, the logic of  
one sphere shows up in other spheres. People mix them up all the time. In 
many cases the mixing is problematic and impedes the valorization. A more 
fundamental point is that we cannot operate in one sphere alone and need to 
balance them somehow. 
Let us consider a few important and remarkable spillovers and crossovers. 
G logic in M
Actually it is difficult to observe a clean exchange. Most exchanges involve 
organizations—think of  shops, firms, advertisement agencies, firms selling 
advertising space, real estate firms renting spaces for the exchange—and are 
embedded in governmental constructions of  laws, safety and health regula-
tions, specified rights for customers, restrictions on financing arrangements, 
and so on. As I noted, G logic is everywhere and does its work in the market 
sphere, too. 
G logic in S and O
In traffic we better heed the traffic rules that governmental agencies have 
designed and enforce. In public spaces laws apply as well. Non-profits are 
organizations and so are churches and theatres. In O we are most successful 
in keeping G at bay. Only in case of  divorce, child abuse, and the like G will 
make its (intrusive and inexorable) presence felt. 
O logic in M 
“Hey, you are my friend. You can have this stuff for a special price.” The seller 
evokes O logic to make a deal. Good salespeople will try to do the same by 
speaking in familiar terms—“you have such a nice full body; this suit really 
looks good on you.” And there are people who project oikos feelings on ordi-
nary market situations. Like a friend of  mine who had to buy something at a 
gas station in the middle of  nowhere where we had stopped for gas, only to 
discover that the price was higher than he wanted to pay; he felt terrible for 
disappointing the attendant, suddenly hopeful for a rare sale that day. So he 
ended up paying the price anyway. 
S logic in M
In some cultures people wine and dine before closing the deal to suggest some 
kind of  relationship and create a sphere of  familiarity. In Arabic markets hag-
gling serves a social purpose: the seller feels insulted when the buyer simply 
pays the price. Trading parties quite often exchange niceties, social informa-
tion, and the like because they want to do more business together, need to 
establish some credibility, or try to persuade the other to make the deal. 
In art markets a lot of  talking takes place. A gallery owner may not sell 
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a work to the highest bidder because she dislikes him or does not care for his 
background. Traders in financial markets also talk a great deal in order to 
share insights, establish trust, and deal with basic uncertainties. Entrepreneurs 
have to be persuasive and may make use of  their charisma. Operating in mar-
kets requires social skills; it is a reason to consider markets as socially-embed-
ded, as socio-economists tend to do. When you enter a market you will notice 
how much socializing it requires from you. It is a reason for artists to frequent 
openings and for local businessmen to attend New Year receptions and other 
such social occasions. 
Pure market exchange takes place on Internet, where one party places an 
order, pays by credit card, and gets the order delivered at home without any 
social interaction whatsoever, without knowing anything about the people on 
the other side. 
M logic in O and S
Contrary to what economists like Gary Becker purport, the M logic does not 
work well in the O and S. Social goods do not lend themselves easily for an 
exchange and the willingness to pay tends to be inappropriate in both spheres. 
Even so, people may introduce the rhetoric in their social interactions like 
when they demand a “pay back” for social trespassing (like in the case of  adul-
tery or failing to meet a social appointment). People may want a social return 
for a social investment and grandmothers may give money for a birthday gift. 
Usually such remarks or gestures are disguised in apologies and irony. 
Crowding in and crowding out
We speak of  crowding out when the valorization in one sphere is under-
mined by the encroachment of  another sphere. Crowding in occurs when 
the encroachment of  another sphere actually adds value in the valorization 
process. Crowding in and crowding out are consequences of  the interactions 
among spheres and show that spheres do not function in splendid isolation. 
A strong governmental sphere tends to crowd out the other spheres. 
When the government takes care of  the homeless, churches and the Salvation 
Army can undertake other activities. When commercial companies provide 
cheap clothes, housekeepers will stop sewing and mending their own clothes. 
When restaurants offer cheap meals, home cooking becomes too much of  an 
effort. Likewise, strong government programs for the subsidization of  the arts 
and the sciences crowd out the willingness to contribute or to pay. 
A strong social sphere can crowd out the oikos. With lots of  good friends 
the need for familial support becomes less urgent. The market, in turn, can 
crowd out the social sphere and the oikos. People will sacrifice friendships and 
abandon families for high-paying jobs far away. Well-paid jobs require so 
much time and emotional energy that not much of  either is left over for family 
life. In such instances, M and G have crowded out O. 
When artists become commercially successful, they risk their artistic rep-
utation. When large crowds overrun a culturally well-endowed city, its cul-
tural capital gets crowded out. When an art museum proudly announces its 
new commercial sponsor, the artistic world may cringe and think less of  the 
museum as a consequence. In that case we can speak of  a crowding out of  the 
artistic reputation of  the museum by the encroachment of  the market sphere. 
Crowding in occurs when the involvement of  another sphere actually 
strengthens the valorization of  a good. People who got rich by a clever use of  
the market logic may see their social status rise and their social effectiveness 
increase. They may even become more attractive as a partner. In that case 
encroachment of  the M adds value to the valorization of  social goods. 
When an artwork is bought for a remarkably high price, interest in the 
artwork may increase and, with that, its artistic value. That, too, is a kind of  
crowding in.
Likewise, government support may give legitimacy to a project and thus 
enhance its social or cultural value. Companies, too, may benefit by having 
the government as a client. 
Most significant and relevant is the crowding in as the result of  encroach-
ment of  the social sphere. The application of  social logic in the market sphere 
may generate trust and mutual sympathy and those may be good for better 
deals. Governments benefit from strong communities and social support for 
their measures and programs.  
Conclusion
The five-sphere model is a critical element in the value based approach. It is 
for the valorization of  our values and that makes the approach economical, 
at least if  defined as the discipline that studies the realization of  values. Being 
an economist myself, I use it all the time. It is a standard ingredient in my 
lectures. I have it drawn on a flip over in my government office to refer to 
when necessary. I use it, for example, to explain my policy towards the neigh-
borhood. I point then to the S and warn for the crowding out of  S when we 
from the government become too dominantly present in the neighborhood. (I 
usually have to explain what I mean by crowding out.)
I am writing this on the flight back from a conference on the rural econ-
omy in Korea. The question addressed was what is needed to let rural areas 
benefit from the creative economy. The audience consisted mostly of  civil 
servants. I shared with them the picture of  the five spheres and used it to warn 
against overreliance on government programs. Recalling my own experiences, 
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I suggested that the initiative be in the S, that the S logic is crucial for any suc-
cess. They were mostly interested in tourist attractions, I had already learned. 
Tourism exploits the M logic and that means financial income to them. The 
model helped to get the thinking to move beyond M and G and to consider C 
and S. C makes us consider the peculiarities of  Korean culture, especially in 
the countryside. Would the British examples that we heard in an earlier pre-
sentation be of  relevance? Culture can also stand for cultural heritage that can 
be accentuated and exploited. How about the natural capital of  the Korean 
countryside? Such a capital needs to be cultivated, requiring the involvement 
of  S somehow. When local communities do not get involved, when local peo-
ple do not collaborate, when there is no influx of  entrepreneurial people with 
new ideas, governmental programs or commercial operations usually fail. 
Then again, a stimulating and supportive government can give private initia-
tive a decisive push.
I emphasize the S, C, and O because they have gotten such short shrift in 
the instrumental age that we are on the verge of  leaving them behind as far as 
I am concerned. We thought all the time in terms of  M and G with the result 
that especially G, but also M seem to have become stronger than is right. 
When colleagues argue that we need to leave more to the market, I point at 
the possibilities in S. How about social enterprises? How about cooperatives? 
And how about focusing on qualities instead of  quantities?  
In the end it is not one sphere or the other. Whether we are individuals 
eager to valorize our values, our ideas, or our skills, whether we are part of  an 
organization trying to make a buck or a significant contribution to a societal 
or transcendental goal, or whether we are politicians and civil servants serving 
the common good in a governmental organization, we will need to find the 
right balance among the five spheres. 
CHAPTER 11
SO WHAT?
A few skeptical questions
Wimar Jaeger is a governor for another party than mine; he is the leader of  
the city council of  which I am a member.  We govern the city of  Hilversum, 
right in the center of  the Netherlands. When I had reached this point in the 
book, the concluding chapter of  Volume I, he wanted to know what the book 
is about. The vacation had just ended, so we were quite relaxed and had the 
time for a probing conversation. I should add that Wimar was a businessman 
before he turned to politics; that makes him a pragmatic individual, eager for 
results. But he is also interested in ideas—he has the arts among his respon-
sibilities—and so, every now and then, he responds to remarks I make. So I 
took his question seriously. 
I told him that the book is about rethinking economics as a science and 
that it develops another perspective on the economy. I added: “It is a shift 
from thinking in terms of  quantities to thinking in terms of  qualities.” Seeing 
his puzzled look I added: “I develop a value based approach and suggest that 
what you and I do in the economy is the realizing of  values. We actually do 
that right now.” I saw him making an effort to understand all this. And then 
he asked: “What are the practical consequences? In what ways would your 
perspective make a difference to me?” I had to swallow a little, since that can 
be the question when someone can’t quite figure out what you are saying. Skip 
the substance and ask for the consequences. He has a point though. What is 
a theory worth if  it has no consequences, if  there is no good answer for the 
family man that Wimar is, and for the businessman who turned into a politi-
cian? I tried to give him the short answer—“it would motivate us to steer for 
qualities”—and felt dissatisfied doing so. A good answer requires more work, 
a concluding chapter, that is. 
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The what-question also inevitably pops up in interviews with journalists. 
They want to know “what needs to be done?” In their case the question actu-
ally is: “What should politicians do?” For most journalists an economic argu-
ment only makes sense for its policy consequences. Should the government do 
something? Should it intervene in educational programs, spend more money 
on poor neighborhoods, change the policy indicators, alter the measurements 
of  the economy, stimulate cooperatives, withdraw from neighborhoods, or 
what? Only if  I were to have answers to such questions, and if  those answers 
are noteworthy somehow, would the book be worth their attention. Such a 
query is typical for the instrumentalist worldview: if  there are no instruments 
for politicians, then it can’t amount to much. 
These journalists overlook all the other people reading and watching. 
Shouldn’t they want to know what to do? To know what the right thing is to 
do?
The difficulty that an introduction of  the value based approach runs up 
against, is precisely the prevalence of  the instrumentalist way of  looking at the 
world. People tend to think that money is the thing, and that we have to mea-
sure anything and everything with money to pinpoint their value. Accordingly, 
organizations presumably pursue profit, academics go after research grants, 
and governments cut costs and steer for economic growth, that is, for more 
GDP.  So who cares about values? Softies, clearly. People who cannot face the 
harsh reality of  money and whatever is measured with money. The point of  
the value based approach is to look beyond prices, incomes, salaries, financial 
wealth, income, profit, and GDP and to see how we all move around in a 
world of  values, busy realizing the values that are important to us. The book 
is about doing the right thing. 
An economist might want to know how the value based approach addresses 
questions about taxing and spending of  governments, about the right interest 
rate for a central bank to determine, and whether protectionist measures are 
in order. I will grant that the value based approach as developed in this book 
has no answers to such questions, and that standard economics is much better 
equipped to deal with them. Let me reiterate here that it is not my inten-
tion to debunk standard economics. Especially the accounting that standard 
economics includes, with its cost-benefit kind of  analysis, the accounting for 
stocks and flows, is most useful to deal with all kinds of  instrumentalist and 
especially financial questions. Standard economics, therefore, covers a part of  
the world that the value based approach charts. It is the instrumental part, as 
should be clear after reading this book.
Because the value based approach is about values, or qualities, the stan-
dard remark is that it is therefore normative. My response is that stressing 
“efficiency” and focusing on prices, income, and other financial quantities are 
values, too. A standard economic account values as much as does the value 
based approach. We all provide a perspective on the world and make others 
look at it in a special and, therefore, value-laden way. Remember the blind 
men observing the elephant? 
I can imagine that some readers are frustrated because they were looking 
for solutions to the problems of  the world. They may have expected a dev-
astating critique of  capitalism, or of  the way the health care system works. 
Or they may have expected a motivation for working on the sharing or cir-
culating economy; or a substantiation of  the creative economy. It’s all there, 
I would like to respond. The value based approach enables the development 
of  a rich and directive perspective on all kinds of  issues. But that needs more 
work. I intend to do that work in the next volume. 
Affirmative answers
Here is what I have been trying to do. My objective is to take the practice of  
economics beyond instrumentalist issues and to redirect it to consider issues 
of  value. That has consequences for the type of  questions that are relevant. 
Although the value based approach provides a context to address questions 
of  a political nature, it encourages a change of  perspective and makes us 
think about what is the right thing to do as members of  a household, friends, 
members of  a club, as someone working with a governmental, social, or com-
mercial organization. 
This is one ploy that I use to draw my audiences in. I ask you to imagine 
you are a parent who has to advise a child who is seeking a fulfilling and cre-
ative life with a warm and loving home. It is undoubtedly sound advice to tell 
the child to get an education in order to have a good job and it may help to 
give the child some money for the purchase of  a house. That would be more 
or less the advice and type of  support that follows from a standard account 
of  the economy. Then I bring in the value based approach and point out that 
this approach makes clear that so much more is involved, such as the ability 
to initiate, develop, and sustain loving relationships, the ability to realize the 
qualities of  a home, like the need for a creative environment, and a great deal 
of  self-awareness or mindfulness, among other values. It makes for a more 
complex advice but also for a more truthful advice. You might say that such 
advice is obvious but if  you think in instrumental terms, it is far from. 
Notice that quantitative indicators don’t figure into a value based advice. 
It is senseless to tell your child how large the income must be in order to have 
a fulfilling life, how many children to have, or how many contacts to maintain. 
A life is captured in qualities, not quantities.
Then I ask you to imagine yourself  in the boardroom of  a company or as 
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a governor in a city or as the artistic leader of  an artistic organization. What 
if  you were to aim at the satisfaction of  the people for whom you are respon-
sible, for fulfilling lives and a significant contribution to society? Would your 
advice be all that different?
The value based approach is action oriented. If  you recall the preface, it is 
therapeutic by raising questions like “what is important for you?” and “what 
is this good for?” The value based approach is also edifying in the sense that 
it provides a series of  concepts, frames and pictures that enable a value based 
life, organization, politics, and economy. That is what the approach is good 
for. 
The value based approach differs from the standard economic approach 
in the sense that it is less directed at feeding one’s worldview. Standard accounts 
describe the elephant, to evoke the anecdote from the preface, whereas the 
value based approach tries to imagine what moves the elephant. Standard 
accounts may continue to be important to understand how the world or the 
economy works, what causes unemployment to go up or down, what explains 
the increase or decrease of  the power of  large companies, and other such 
issues. The value based approach will only consider such knowledge if  it is 
relevant for knowing the right thing to do. Quite frankly, I suspect that a great 
deal, if  not most of  the insights that the standard accounts generate, fail that 
test. When I plan my family vacation, the sale of  my house or make plans to 
improve the lives of  the poorest in my town or to improve employment oppor-
tunities, scientific research is virtually of  no use. Knowing what is going on in 
the world is not a must either. I do make use of  the value based approach all 
the time, though. Values drive most decisions. Values make people do their 
most important things, whether they are at home, on the street or at work. 
Worldview
I must acknowledge that the value based approach adds virtually no factual 
content to one’s worldview and feeds it with few insights into how the world or 
the economy works. It does represent a particular way of  looking at the world 
though, and with that, a worldview. Let me adumbrate what that worldview 
may look like.  
The value based approach depicts a world in which people are trying to 
do the right thing, and are limited in their knowledge, awareness, and capa-
bility of  doing so. A lot goes wrong; we make mistakes all the time. Even so, 
the only reasonable, mature thing to do is to strive to do the right thing. The 
presumption is, therefore, that people are trying to do the right thing, even if  
they do bad and wrong things all the time. (Ever met someone who is system-
atically trying to do the bad and the wrong thing?)
When we are trying to do the right thing we need to be aware of  what is 
important to us, our values, of  the goods that we are striving for, our ideals. 
In other words, we need to answer questions like “What is important to us?” 
and “What is it that we are doing good for?” That makes for a worldview that 
highlights values and qualities.  
Remember: it is not the “house” that the economy is all about, but the 
“home.” 
We may realize that instrumentalism, or governmental logic, has become 
too prevalent; that market logic is needed to streamline the production and 
distribution of  instrumental goods and values, but that the social logic needs 
special attention. It is by way of  the social logic, by the willingness to con-
tribute, that we generate the most important goods, and with those the good 
life and a good society. It is with the social logic that we realize the important 
qualities in our own lives, in organizations, and in societies.
In order to realize all this, transformations in governance are most likely in 
order. Might smaller organizations, rather than larger ones, be more amena-
ble for the striving for good work and for quality of  the goods generated? 
Might governments need to collaborate better with their citizens, by way of  
the social logic? 
We may also look for changes in the social and market spheres. Think of  
a share economy, the circular economy, and a creative economy. It is first of  
all in the social sphere that initiatives will sprout to vitalize shared, circular, 
and creative practices.  
The value based approach upstages the opposition between the market 
and the government. The discussion has been framed for too long as though 
we have a choice between a free market, and thus against big government, and 
a strong government that is in control of  markets. The value based approach 
points at the oikos as the base of  all, the dominance of  the social sphere and 
the overarching cultural sphere. In the end the cultural is all that matters. 
Accordingly, the value based approach highlights the prevalence of  culture 
(C1, C2, and C3—see chapter 2). 
Those who govern may take important cues from the way we all have 
learned to cope with the practices of  the oikos and the social sphere. The 
focus should be on well-articulated qualities. Most quantitative measure-
ments, including the GDP and profits, have only instrumental significance 
and should be subordinate to the evaluation of  realized qualities. 
We will focus less on financial results and more on relevant qualities. We 
will understand that cultural organizations are about cultural qualities and 
social organizations about social qualities. Fighting poverty is about more than 
addressing financial inequality, since poverty can also be social and cultural. 
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The main contributions
Others will hopefully determine what the main contributions of  the value 
based approach are and how successful its development in this book has been. 
Being the author I would like to point out that I really needed to write an 
entire book to motivate and develop this line of  thought and develop the 
argumentation and the concepts. Even so, I too, would boil down the entire 
argument to a limited number of  points. I anticipated them in the preface and 
reiterate them here shortly to refresh the reader’s memory:
1. Doing the right thing is a matter of  realizing values, i.e. of  becoming 
aware of  the relevant values and making them real.
2. The realization of  value inevitably takes place in a cultural context 
that informs some values and renders them meaningful while render-
ing other values mute.
3. The realization of  values requires phronesis, practical wisdom (rather 
than rationality).
4. The realization of  values occurs by means of  goods, the most import-
ant of  which are shared goods. Bought goods and those goods pro-
vided by governments are instrumental and therefore subordinate 
to the important shared goods that tend to be social and cultural in 
kind.
5. Some goods are worth striving for; so-called ultimate goods consti-
tute the good life and good society. Praxis is an activity that is worth 
striving for, such as an artistic, scientific, or religious practice; they 
contain the goals as intrinsic goods. 
6. The resources, or possessions, of  people consist of  goods worth striv-
ing for, like the engagement in praxes, meaningful activities, and con-
versations. These resources constitute the cultural capital of  people. 
Possession of  instrumental goods, such as financial capital, social 
status, social capital, are potential resources. Conventional measure-
ments of  inequality focus on instrumental possessions. The most rel-
evant inequality concerns the distribution of  cultural resources. We 
can only guess the magnitude of  that inequality.
7. Five different spheres are available for the realization of  values, or 
their valorization. Each sphere has a distinctive logic and rhetoric. 
They are the cultural, oikos, social, market, and governmental spheres. 
The book may read as if  it is philosophical and quite abstract. The reason 
for this is that I have yet to develop a range of  new concepts and show how 
existing concepts can become more meaningful.  
Most crucial are the following concepts:
Values: whatever people consider important, the relevant qualities of  things, 
social entities, and practices. Values can be personal, social, societal, and 
transcendental.
A value based economy stresses and highlights the realization of  values, 
and thus focuses on the qualities that constitute good practices, a good life, 
good work, a good organization, and a good society. 
Goods: whatever people acquire in order to make their values real. Goods 
can be tangible and intangible, privately- and publicly-owned or shared with 
others. Goods can be personal, social, societal, and transcendental. Then 
there are all kinds of  goods that are inputs in the realization of  these goods. 
Goods to strive for constitute the good life and the good society. They 
answer the question what is it that we do good for? 
Praxis is a practice (or ongoing conversation) that contains the good to strive 
for; in that case, the good is intrinsic. 
Resources constitute richness and the lack thereof, poverty. The main 
sources are personal, social, societal, and transcendental. In addition there 
are financial sources (which usually get all the attention).  
Financial inequality in daily life is subordinate to social, societal, per-
sonal, and transcendental inequalities. In that way, the value based 
approach gives new meanings to the notion of  poverty and richness. 
Money or price is no value; they represent the potential for the realization 
of  values. 
Five spheres with each a distinct logic enable us to valorize our values. 
They include the cultural, oikos, social, market, and governmental spheres. 
The willingness to contribute is a characteristic of  the social logic and is 
critical for the realization of  shared goods like friendship, knowledge, and art. 
I was in need of  these concepts to develop the value based approach. In some 
cases I relied on other texts and thinkers, but I must confess that I had to think 
them through to make sense of  them and to make them meaningful. They 
undoubtedly will need further work and more testing to see their merit. 
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Some juxtapositions in brief
Value based approach Standard economics
The realization of values The allocation of scarce resources
Value Price
Social, societal, personal, and 
transcendental values
Preferences
Phronesis Rationality
Social behavior prevails, other 
types  are common
Self-interested common prevails
What appears altruistic is often 
social behavior, directed at a 
shared good 
Altruism cannot be accounted for
Shared, private, and collective 
goods 
Only private and collective           
Social, personal, and cultural capi-
tal 
Economic, Human and Financial 
capital                                                                                                                      
An addition to financial capital Human capital
Five spheres: C, O, S, G, and M Only M and G
Embedded in culture (C1 and C2) No culture (C1 and C2)
Relationships in S and O No relationships
Qualities Mainly quantities
What is important to you? What do you want?
Co-production and co-creation 
consumption
Production, distribution, and 
consumption
Substantive argument Instrumentalist argument
Focus on doing the right thing Focus on policy making
Substantive inequalities Financial inequalities
Happiness as the result of doing the 
right thing
Happiness as the result of  maximiz-
ing utility
Quality impact monitor Quantifiable results
Practical use
I use these concepts all the time in my daily life, in my work with professionals 
and in my political endeavors. Quite a few of  my students work with them in 
their research. There is actually a great deal to say with them on all kinds of  
topics, which I intend to do in the next volume. I intend to write on the value 
based approach to work, to organizations, entrepreneurship, cultural heri-
tage, social policy, the relationship between governments and private organi-
zations, the new economy, the creative economy, the circular economy, and 
other topics. Here I limit myself  to a few practical consequences. 
1. The willingness to contribute in the world of  the arts. The 
lack of  money and the cuts in government subsidies compel artists 
and people of  cultural organizations to consider the willingness of  
people to pay for their offerings. I turn their attention to the impor-
tance of  willingness to contribute. Make your visitors ambassadors, 
so I tell them, willing to contribute by talking about your work, get-
ting others to partake in it. And sure, the willingness to contribute 
may also come in the form of  monetary donations. But to realize 
that, you need to use the social logic. I actually try to get these people 
to visualize the social sphere with its social logic. 
2. Clarify the ideals. Be clear on the virtues and the goods to 
strive for. Know how to evaluate them and by whom. 
This is the most difficult part when I work with organizations. In 
order to apply the value based approach, people need to articulate 
their ideals, their goal values and their behavioral values. When I ask 
them out of  the blue, the answers are usually embarrassing. Even 
companies that have clearly defined their mission require additional 
work. Usually the criteria for evaluation remain unspecified, which 
makes the mission more or less moot. It is better to determine the 
mission together with the method of  evaluation. In the value based 
approach that calls for the naming of  the relevant stakeholders (see 
the box on the quality monitor below). 
In my experience, the exercise to clarify the relevant values and 
the evaluation that suits them is quite revealing and may have a last-
ing effect. 
3. Work with cooperatives or social enterprises. The US and 
the UK now also allow for what are called public benefit corpora-
tions. All these organizational forms have in common that they have 
a shared good—societal, social or transcendental—as their explicit 
goal. I would favor a fiscal policy that treats such organizations 
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differently from commercial ones. As a governor I prefer working 
with such organizations when they serve goals that are also mine.
4. Introduce social currencies next to official currencies (and 
re-introduce national currencies). My endless battle with the 
euro and the thinking that underlies it finds its motivation in the value 
based approach. At least that is what came to my attention in the past 
few years. The euro is too much a product of  G logic and neglects 
the logic of  S and C altogether. The euro lacks a demos (a people) and, 
with that, political legitimacy. The response to its weaknesses and 
flaws has insistently been a strengthening of  the G structure.
Actually, the euro has shown that a currency needs a strong S to 
function well. Accordingly, currencies have also a social function, by 
bringing about a bond in the good case, or driving people apart as in 
the case of  the euro. I, therefore, favor local currencies to strengthen 
local communities and local identity. In Hilversum, I am working 
with a group of  citizens on the introduction of  such a local currency.
5. Practices versus praxes. Lately I had to address the problem-
atic character of  the relationship between education and research. 
At universities, doing research is considered to be much more satis-
fying than teaching. So how to improve the teaching? Research and 
teaching are practices, things people do by way of  a series of  activi-
ties. The striving should be to have people to practice either activity 
with commitment and dedication. The teaching and the doing of  
research should have intrinsic value in the sense that doing either 
provides sufficient satisfaction that the practitioners gain. That would 
make them true professionals, and that would make the practices 
into praxes. The problem occurs when the true researcher considers 
the teaching to be a mere chore, a practice, that is, or when the true 
teacher considers doing research to be an obligation of  the job. In 
their case the practice fails to turn into a praxis. Deans could take 
this into account in the assignment of  tasks or do things to develop 
practices into praxes, for example, by appreciating true teaching and 
true researching. (Hint: steer for qualities.)
To my students, I tell of  the importance of  distinguishing prac-
tices from praxes. They undoubtedly will engage in all kinds of  activ-
ities or practices. What they want is to be able to name a practice a 
praxis, since doing the praxis is what gives real satisfaction in the end. 
I have so many stories for them of  people who failed to realize praxes 
and got hopelessly stuck even when they were financially successful, 
or maybe especially because of  such success. 
6. Altruism is the norm. It’s not only economists who consider altru-
ism to be unintelligible. Many people do. All too often I hear people 
expressing their lack of  faith in the good intentions of  their fellow 
men. “People are selfish,” they say, “preoccupied with what’s in it for 
themselves.” I am pleased to finally have a response to this widespread 
belief. First I ask them whether they are selfish themselves, as I spell 
out in the preface. But now I also have the notion of  the shared good 
and the S of  the social sphere. By evoking those notions I can quite 
convincingly state that altruistic behavior is instead the norm, at least 
if  we consider the social behavior that is directed at the realization of  
shared goods. The argument is quite practical, for example for din-
ner conversations. It also provides me with arguments in a discussion 
with staunch liberals or libertarians and their radical individualism. 
How individualist can we be if  our most important possessions are 
goods that derive their meanings and values from the sharing with 
others? When they retort that this is about enlightened self-interest 
I am okay, even though the remark suggests that the other has not 
gotten the point. (“Read my book, and we will continue the conversa-
tion,” may be a sensible remark but it is still a poor argument.) 
The Quality Impact monitor
When an organization, or a governmental policy is directed at the real-
ization of  qualities, it needs to be explicit on the qualities to be realized 
and on the evaluation of  them. A theatre group has to be clear on the 
artistic qualities that it is striving for, and when an organization has the 
ambition to contribute to a better world, it needs to indicate in what 
ways it wants to do so and who can determine that it actually does. 
The quality impact monitor is designed to monitor the realization 
of  values or qualities. It provides leaders of  organizations with clear 
indications of  what to do, of  what to change in their strategies, and it 
provides funders and supervisors a clear perspective on the effective-
ness of  the organization in realizing its goals. 
We, the developers of  this monitor, actually found that the process 
of  setting up the quality impact monitor in itself  is raising awareness 
and increasing clarity on the goals and the qualities that one seeks. 
Other methods usually sidestep the first stage and try to gather data 
from existing sources, thus forsaking the opportunities of  the explor-
atory stage. 
The first stage is dedicated to the determination of  the behav-
ioral and goal values as well as the stakeholders. Doing so requires a 
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process, so is our experience. Leaders of  organizations usually do not 
have those values fully articulated and if  they have, they are articulated 
in such a way that it is not clear who will be able to evaluate them. (“We 
want to make the world a happier place.” “We want to make the world 
more just.”) 
In the determination of  the values we make use of  the four dimen-
sions: social, societal, transcendental, and personal. 
Usually, leaders also want to stipulate instrumental goals such as 
the ideal number of  visitors, amount of  sponsored money, number and  
 
relevance of  external contacts, and so on. The quality impact monitor 
can take account of  such instrumental goals but the emphasis needs to 
be on the substantive goals, i.e. the qualities worth striving for. 
We then determine with the leaders of  the organization the various 
stakeholders for their activities. They usually include the visitors, pos-
sibly divided into several categories (like age groups, loyal visitors and 
incidental visitors), the local community, businesses, local and national 
governments, funders, supporting organizations, experts, educational 
institutions, fellow artists, colleagues, the supervisory board, and—
often overlooked—people within the organization. 
We then ask the leaders of  the organization to weigh the qualities, 
giving the most weight to the most important quality, and to weigh the 
importance of  the stakeholders. We take these weights into account in 
the final assessment.
When we approach the stakeholders, we have two types of  ques-
tions for them: what qualities do they value and how do they appreciate 
the qualities of  the activities of  the organization to be evaluated. The 
questions differ across the stakeholders. It is pointless, for example, to 
ask substantive questions on, say the artistic qualities to incidental vis-
itors. The latter may be able to say how moved they were, inspired or 
bored but they usually lack the experience and knowledge to be able to 
appreciate the craftsmanship involved or the societal relevance. 
There are several methods to get the evaluations of  the various 
stakeholders, such as surveys, interviews, panels, and visitation com-
mittees. The latter consist of  knowledgeable people with a variety of  
backgrounds who will spend a day or two talking with a select num-
ber of  stakeholders, reviewing data and reports, and, following a cer-
tain procedure, conclude with a qualitative assessment of  the qualities 
realized. 
In conclusion of  this book, I encourage others to make, and continue making, 
contributions in the same spirit: 
• I expect and hope that students will continue working with the value 
based approach. 
• I expect and hope that organizations will start with monitoring the 
qualities that they strive to realize. 
• I expect and hope that we will leave the dominance of  instrumen-
talist thinking behind us, and that it becomes normal to think of  
substantive qualities first before we consider quantities. 
This book intends to be a contribution to all of  that. There is much work still 
to be done. The conversation is far from over. 
The evaluation of  the instrumental goals usually requires the 
collection of  quantitative data. The leaders, the supervisors and the 
funders can draw two types of  conclusions from the gap observed 
between the stated qualities and the appreciation of  stakeholders. For 
example, when the quality impact monitor concludes that visitors find 
the plays of  the theatre company too experimental and too difficult, 
the leaders can decide to change their strategy in two different ways. 
Either they can plan plays that are less difficult or they can start a 
campaign educating people to appreciate complexity, innovation, and 
being challenged. In the latter case, they aim at changing the values of  
visitors.
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This book is for all those who are 
seeking a human perspective on economic 
and organizational processes. It lays the 
foundations for a value based approach to the 
economy. 
The key questions are: “What is important to you 
or your organization?” “What is this action or that 
organization good for?”
The book is directed at the prevalence of instrumentalist 
thinking in the current economy and responds to the calls 
for another economy. 
Another economy demands another economics. The value 
based approach is another economics; it focuses on values 
and on the most important goods such as families, homes, 
communities, knowledge, and art. It places economic 
processes in their cultural context. 
What does it take to do the right thing, as a person, as 
an organization, as a society? What is the good to 
strive for? This book gives directions for the 
answers. 
The value based approach restores the 
ancient idea that quality of life and of 
society is what the economy is all 
about. It advocates shifting 
the focus from quantities 
(“how much?”) to 
qualities (“what is 
important?”). 
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